濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析 77 多角化企業の利潤分析多角化ディスカウントの寡占理論による説明 * 濱田弘潤 (diversification discount) Keywords: JEL classifications: D43, L13, L22, G

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1 濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析 77 多角化企業の利潤分析多角化ディスカウントの寡占理論による説明 * 濱田弘潤 (diversification discount) Keywords: JEL classifications: D43, L13, L22, G Tel. and fax: khamada@econ.niigata-u.ac.jp

2 78 新潟大学経済論集第 85 号英 1 ICT (diversification) (diversification discount) (conglomerate discount) (conglomerate) (influence activity)

3 濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析 M&A 1 3 M&A 1960 M&A 1980 M&A 1930 M&A M&A 1980 M&A 1990 IT M&A 2 3 Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley (2003) (synergy) (influence activity) (influence) (influence cost) Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992), Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), Scharfstein and Stein (2000) Scharfstein and Stein (2000) 1 Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley (2003) M&A M&A M&A M&A M&A (1997) 2 M&A (2007) 3 IT TBS 4 (2005) 5 pp

4 80 新潟大学経済論集第 85 号英 Milgrom and Roberts (1990) 5 Matsusaka (1993) 1960 Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) Lang and Stulz (1994) q (Tobin s q) q 10% Berger and Ofek (1995) (stand-alone value) % 15% Shin and Stulz (1998) Lins and Servaes (1999) % 15% Scharfstein and Stein (2000) Scharfstein (1998) q (demerger) Comment and Jarrell (1995) Berger and Ofek (1996) (takeover) 5 (2005) 5 Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley (2003) 6

5 濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析 81 Roberts (2004) 6 Chevalier (2002) 90 Villalonga (2002, 2004) 90 Villalonga (2002) Campa and Kedia (2002) Roberts (2004) 90 3 Roberts (2004) 5 (pp ) 7 (stand-alone firm) 6 Roberts (2004), Ch.5, pp (2005) 5 pp (2005) pp

6 82 新潟大学経済論集第 85 号英 Roberts (2004) Villalonga (2002, 2004) A B x = {A, B} x = {A, B} x x n x ( 1) 1 A n A B n B A i = {1, 2,...,n A } B j = {1, 2,...,n B } 1 (identical) x x (passive player) 2 (notations) A i B j

7 濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析 83 q i ( 0) q j ( 0) q A q B A 1 B 1 A B n A ( 1) n B ( 1) n n A + n B ( 2) Q A Q B U(Q A,Q B ) (Q A,Q B ) U(Q A,Q B ) > 0 U(Q A,Q B ) > 0 2 U(Q A,Q B ) < 0, 2 U(Q A,Q B ) < 0, Q 2 A Q 2 B 2 U(Q A,Q B ) < 0 A B p A p B U(Q A,Q B ) p A (Q A,Q B ) U(Q A,Q B ) p B (Q A,Q B ) p A(Q A,Q B ) = 2 U(Q A,Q B ) < 0, p B(Q A,Q B ) Q 2 Q A B = < 0, p A(Q A,Q B ) = p B(Q A,Q B ) = 2 U(Q A,Q B ) < 0 2 U(Q A,Q B ) Q 2 B (Q A,Q B ) ( p A(Q A,Q B ) )( p B(Q A,Q B ) ) > ( p A(Q A,Q B ) ) 2 p A(Q A,Q B ) < p A(Q A,Q B ) < 0 p B(Q A,Q B ) < p B(Q A,Q B ) < 0 A B c A ( 0) c B ( 0) p A (0, 0) >c A, p B (0, 0) >c B A B i j π i π j π A π B π A (p A (Q A,Q B ) c A )q A, π B (p B (Q A,Q B ) c B )q B A B Π A (Q A,Q B )=(p A (Q A,Q B ) c A )Q A Π B (Q A,Q B )= (p B (Q A,Q B ) c B )Q B PS(Q A,Q B ) Π A (Q A,Q B )+Π B (Q A,Q B ) CS(Q A,Q B ) U(Q A,Q B ) p A (Q A,Q B )Q A p B (Q A,Q B )Q B W (Q A,Q B ) CS(Q A,Q B )+PS(Q A,Q B )=U(Q A,Q B ) c A Q A c B Q B (subgame-perfect equilibrium) 2 x 2 A B q i q j (q ma,q mb )

8 84 新潟大学経済論集第 85 号英 A B (n A 1) (n B 1) max π m(q ma,q mb ; Q ma,q mb ) π ma + π mb (1) (q ma,q mb ) =(p A c A )q ma +(p B c B )q mb =(p A (q ma + Q ma ; q mb + Q mb ) c A )q ma +(p B (q ma + Q ma ; q mb + Q mb ) c B )q mb Q ma n A 1 i=1 q i = Q A q ma, Q mb n B 1 j=1 q j = Q B q mb (1) 1 8 π m (q ma,q mb ; Q ma,q mb ) q ma π m (q ma,q mb ; Q ma,q mb ) q mb = p A c A + p A q ma + p B q mb =0, (2) = p B c B + p B q mb + p A q ma =0. (3) 2 2 π m qma 2 =2 p A 2 π m qmb 2 =2 p B 2 π m q ma q mb = p A + p B p A Q 2 A + 2 p B Q 2 B 2 p A q ma + 2 π m qma 2 2 π m qmb 2 q ma + 2 p B Q 2 q mb < 0. (4) A q mb + 2 p A Q 2 q ma < 0. (5) B 2 p B q mb (< 0). (6) 2 π m ( ) 2 > 0. q ma q mb (7) A B π i π j max π i (q i,q i ; Q B )=(p A (q i + Q i,q B ) c A )q i q i and (8) max π j (q j,q j ; Q A )=(p B (q j + Q j,q A ) c B )q j q j (9) Q i n A 1 k=1,k i q k + q ma, Q j n B 1 l=1,l j q l + q mb 8

9 濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析 85 A B i j (8) (9) 1 π i (q i,q i ; Q B ) q i π j (q j,q j ; Q A ) q j = p A c A + p A q i =0, (10) = p B c B + p B q j =0. (11) A B q i = q A i q j = q B j 1 (10) (11) q A q B p A c A + p A q A =0, (12) p B c B + p B q B =0. (13) 1 (2), (3), (12), (13) (Cournot-Nash equilibrium) (qa,q B ;(q ma,q mb )) x AA p A (qa,q B ;(q ma,q mb ))=(q A,q B ;(q ma,q mb )) (14) x AB p A (qa,q B ;(q ma,q mb ))=(q A,q B ;(q ma,q mb )) (15) x BA p B (qa,q B ;(q ma,q mb ))=(q A,q B ;(q ma,q mb )) = x AB (16) x BB p B (qa,q B ;(q ma,q mb ))=(q A,q B ;(q ma,q mb )) (17) x AA <x AB < 0, x BB <x AB < 0, x AA x BB > (x AB ) 2 (14) (17) 1 (2), (3), (12), (13) p A c A + x AA q ma + x AB q mb =0, (18) p B c B + x BB q mb + x AB q ma =0, (19) p A c A + x AA q A =0, (20) p B c B + x BB q B =0. (21) (20) (21) p A c A = x AA q A p B c B = x BB q B A B π A π B A B π ma π mb π m (20) (21)

10 86 新潟大学経済論集第 85 号英 π A =(p A c A )q A = x AA qa 2, (22) π B =(p B c B )q B = x BB qb, 2 (23) π ma =(p A c A )q ma = x AA q A q ma, (24) π mb =(p B c B )q mb = x BB q B q mb, (25) π m = π ma + π mb = x AA q A q ma x BB q B q mb. (26) 1 2 x AB q A x BB q B = x AAx BB x 2 AB x AA q mb > 0, x AB q B x AA q A = x AAx BB x 2 AB x BB q ma > 0. 1 (18) (20) x AA q ma + x AB q mb = x AA q A (19) (21) x BB q mb + x AB q ma = x BB q B 1 2 x AB x AA (x AA x BB x 2 AB )q mb = x AA (x BB q B x AB q A ) x AB q B x AA q A = x AAx BB x 2 AB x BB q ma q A >q ma, q B >q mb 1 (18) (20) p A c A = x AA q ma x AB q mb = x AA q A x AA (q A q ma )= x AB q mb q A q ma = x AB x AA q mb (19) (21) p B c B = x BB q mb x AB q ma = x BB q B x BB (q B q mb )=x AB q ma q B q mb = x AB x BB q ma q A q ma = x AB x AA q mb > 0, q B q mb = x AB x BB q ma > 0

11 濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析 π A >π ma, π B >π mb 2 1 q A >q ma π A = x AA qa 2 >π ma = x AA q A q ma π B >π mb 2 (counter-intuitive) (π A >π ma, π B >π mb ) 3

12 88 新潟大学経済論集第 85 号英 3 π m >π A, π m >π B 3 π m = π ma + π mb = x AA q A q ma x BB q B q mb π A = x AA q 2 A π m π A = x AA q A (q ma q A ) x BB q B q mb 1 q ma q A = x AB x AA q mb (< 0) π m π A =(x AB q A x BB q B )q mb 1 x AB q A x BB q B = x AAx BB x 2 AB x AA q mb > 0 π m >π A π m >π B

13 濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析

14 90 新潟大学経済論集第 85 号英 2008 I [1] (2007) M&A [2] (1997) M&A [3] (2005) NTT [4] Berger, P. and E. Ofek (1995) Diversification s Effect on Firm Value, Journal of Financial Economics, 37(1): [5] Berger, P. and E. Ofek (1996) Bustup Takeovers of Value-Destroying Diversified Firms, Journal of Finance, 51(4): [6] Besanko, D., D. Dranove, and M. Shanley (2003) Economics of Strategy,, 3rd edition, John Wiley & Sons: New York. (2002) 2 [7] Cabral, L. (2000) Introduction to Industrial Organization, MIT Press: Massachusetts. [8] Campa, J. and S. Kedia (2002) Explaining the Diversification Discount, Journal of Finance, 57(4): [9] Chevalier, J. (2002) Why do Firms Undertake Diversifying Mergers? An Examination of the Investment Policies of Merging Firms, Working Paper, University of Chicago Graduate School of Business. [10] Comment, R. and G. Jarrell (1995) Corporate Focus and Stock Returns, Journal of Financial Economics, 37(1): [11] Lang, L. and R. Stulz (1994) Tobin s q, Corporate Diversification, and Firm Performance, Journal of Political Economy, 102(6): [12] Lins, K. and H. Servaes (1999) International Evidence on the Value of Corporate Diversification, Journal of Finance, 54(6): [13] Matsusaka, J. (1993) Takeover Motives during the Conglomerate Merger Wave, RAND Journal of Economics, 24(3): [14] Meyer, M., P. Milgrom, and J. Roberts (1992) Organizational Prospects, Influence Costs, and Ownership Changes, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1(1): [15] Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1990) The Efficiency of Equity in Organizational Decision Processes, American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 80(2): [16] Montgomery, C. and B. Wernerfelt (1988) Diversification, Ricardian Rents, and Tobin s q, RAND Journal of Economics, 19(4): [17] Rajan, R., H. Servaes, and L. Zingales (2000) The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment, Journal of Finance, 55(1): [18] Roberts, J. (2004) The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth, Oxford University Press: Oxford. [19] Scharfstein, D. (1998) The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets II: Evidence from Diversified Conglomerates, NBER Working Papers, 6352.

15 濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析 91 [20] Scharfstein, D. and J. Stein (2000) The Dark Side of Internal Capital Markets: Divisional Rent- Seeking and Inefficient Investment, Journal of Finance, 55(6), [21] Singh, N. and X. Vives (1984) Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly, RAND Journal of Economics, 15(4): [22] Shin, H. H. and R. Stulz (1998) Are Internal Capital Markets Efficient?, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(2): [23] Tirole, J. (1988) The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press: Massachusetts. [24] Villalonga, B. (2002) Does Diversification Cause the Diversification Discount? Working Paper, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration. [25] Villalonga, B. (2004) Diversification Discount or Premium? New Evidence from the Business Information Tracking Series, Journal of Finance, 59(2): [26] Vives, X. (1999) Oligopoly Pricing, MIT Press: Massachusetts.

株式保有構成と企業価値 ─コーポレート・ガバナンスに関する一考察─

株式保有構成と企業価値 ─コーポレート・ガバナンスに関する一考察─ q E-mail: kenji.nishizaki@boj.or.jp E-mail: kurasawa@ynu.ac.jp OECD Vives Tirole Shleifer and Vishny q %% %% % % Allen and Gale %% % Admati, Pfreiderer and Zechner Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi Cremer 1995Pagno

濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析 77 多角化企業の利潤分析 多角化ディスカウントの寡占理論による説明 * 濱田弘潤 (diversification discount) Keywords: JEL classifications: D43, L13, L22, G

濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析 77 多角化企業の利潤分析多角化ディスカウントの寡占理論による説明 * 濱田弘潤 (diversification discount) Keywords: JEL classifications: D43, L13, L22, G