incompatible 2. 基 本 となるモデル オリジナルモデル A B, A x A B x A B x B A x B x A x B x A x B x B x A A B i AB t Hendricks et al. 84

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1 Abstract 1.イントロダクション war of attrition Maynard Smith, A Fudenberg and Tirole Ghemawat and Nalebuff Bliss and Nalebuff Ordover and Rubinstein Kennan and Wilson 83

2 incompatible 2. 基 本 となるモデル オリジナルモデル A B, A x A B x A B x B A x B x A x B x A x B x B x A A B i AB t Hendricks et al. 84

3 y i y i e rit r i A x B x B B B B x A B B A x B x B B x A B e r A x B er A x B B x r A A e x B B r A x B x A x B A A r B x A x A x B 評 判 モデル 85

4 reputation Abreu and Gul stubborn i i z i i i i T t i Gt; i T Gt; i T Gt i T i Gt i T t GT i T z i Gt i T z i e it t i t T i T i T i G; i T i T i log x i x j i z i r j x i log z i T i T j j t T i j t G; j T i t j t Kornhauser et al. Myerson Ponsati and Sakovics 86

5 P ma P ma G j T i z z j e j T i j T i T j T i T j T T i T j 図 1. 妥 協 していない 確 率 の 推 移 最 初 の 要 求 を 選 べるモデルと 要 求 を 変 えられるモデル 最 初 の 要 求 を 選 べるモデル 要 求 を 変 えられるモデル 3.どうやって 一 つの 要 求 にコミットするか 87

6 Q. 一 つの 要 求 を 変 えない 状 況 にはどんなものがあるか Rubinstein Abreu ad Sethi 88

7 Coase conjecture Gul et al., Crawford Q. 要 求 を 変 化 させないことはメリットがあるか Rubinstein Kambe, a Ellingsen and Miettinen 89

8 Q. 頑 固 なタイプについて Kambe, Q. 途 中 で 要 求 を 変 化 させる 経 路 にコミットすると 交 渉 に 有 利 か 90

9 Kambe, Kambe, 4.どうして 非 整 合 (incompatible)な 要 求 がなされるか Abreu and Gul Kambe, 積 極 的 91

10 Q. 最 初 の 要 求 を 選 べる 評 判 モデルで, 要 求 に 関 して 混 合 戦 略 が 取 られることがあるか Kambe Q. 評 判 モデルで, 不 確 実 性 があることでシグナリングとして 不 整 合 な 要 求 がなされる ことがあるか payoff irrelevant SCPsingle crossing property SCP ve rit Admati and Perry SCP Q. 評 判 モデルで, 両 者 に 積 極 的 理 由 がある 状 況 はあるか? Kambe, b 92

11 i ii 5.なぜ 永 久 に 続 かないか Q. 消 耗 戦 の 終 わり 方 にはどんなものがあるか Q.どんな 時 に 両 者 がこれ 以 上 交 渉 を 続 ける 価 値 がないと 合 意 するか i Ponsati 93

12 ii Q.デッドラインでの 終 わり 方 にはどんなものがあるか A t S t T B Q.デッドラインでの 利 得 を 決 定 する 要 因 は? A 6. 最 近 の 話 題 Compte and Jehiel, Atakan and Ekmekci,, Özyurt, Özyurt 94

13 shortside 7. 終 わりに References Abreu, Dilip and Faruk Gul Bargaining and Reputation, Econometrica, 68, -. Abreu, Dilip and Rajiv Sethi Evolutionary Stability in a Reputational Model of Bargaining, Games and Economic Behavior, 44, -. Admati, Anat R. and Motty Perry Strategic Delay in Bargaining, Review of Economics Studies, 54, -. Atakan, Alp E. and Mehmet Ekmekci Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets,mimeo. Bliss, Christopher and Barry J. Nalebuff Dragon-slaying and Ballroom Dancing: The Private Supply of a Public Good, Journal of Public Economics, 25, -. Compte, Olivier and Philippe Jehiel On the Role of outside Options in Bargaining with Obstinate Parties, Econometrica, 70, -. Crawford, Vincent P. A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining, Econometrica, 50, -. Ellingsen, Tore and Topi Miettinen Commitment and Conflict in Bilateral Bargaining, American Economic Review, 98, -. Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole A Theory of Exit in Duopoly, Econometrica, 54, -. Ghemawat, Pankaj and Barry Nalebuff Exit, The RAND Journal of Economics, 16, -. Gul, Faruk, Hugo Sonnenschein and Robert Wilson Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture, Journal of Economic Theory, 39, -. Hendricks, Ken, Andrew Weiss, and Charles Wilson The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information, International Economic Review, 29, -. Kambe, Shinsuke Reputation and Incomplete Information in Bilateral Bargaining, presented at the Japanese Economic Association Meeting. Kambe, Shinsuke Bargaining with Imperfect Commitment, Games and Economic Behavior, 28, -. Kambe, Shinsuke athe Commitment in Bargaining: not to Make a Lower Demand versus not to Accept a Lower Offer, mimeo. 95

14 Kambe, Shinsuke bthe Chicken Type and Incompatible Demands in Bargaining, presented at the Japanese Economic Association Meeting. Kennan, John and Robert Wilson Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 4 Supplement, S-S. Kornhauser, Lewis, Ariel Rubinstein and Charles WilsonReputation and Patience in the War of Attrition, Economica, 56, -. Maynard Smith, John The Theory of Games and the Evolution of Animal Conflicts, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 47, -. Myerson, Roger Chapter, Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ordover, Janusz A. and Ariel Rubinstein A Sequential Concession Game with Asymmetric Information, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, -. Özyurt, Selçuk Searching a bargain: power of strategic commitment, mimeo. Ponsati, Clara The deadline effect: A theoretical note, Economics Letters, 48, -. Ponsati, Clara and Jozsef Sakovics The war of attrition with incomplete information, Mathematical Social Sciences, 29, -. Rubinstein, Ariel Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica, 50, -. 96

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