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1 IV 7 :

2 1. ( ) 2. : i. ii. 3. 2

3 1. 3

4 : ( ) ( ) (strategic communication games) 4

5 i.e., (agenda control) 5

6 : (Sender) (Receiver). :. Θ : p( ).. :. :. A i vnm. : U S (θ, m, a) = (a θ b) 2 km/θ. (1) U R (θ, m, a) = (a θ) 2. (2) 6

7 : 1. p( ) θ 2. θ 3. θ m 4. m a : ( ). ( ). (). Θ 7

8 : : : θ Θ {H, L}: : p(h) = 1/3. p(l) = 2/3. m M {, }. H: 2L: 5. : a A { }. : H 1 L 1 0. :

9 ½ ½µ ½» µ À ¾ ¼µ ¾» µ Ä ¾ ½µ ¼µ 2 9

10 (perfect Bayesian equilibrium). 1 (σ, µ ; P ) PBE : i. θ Θ : (3) ii. m M : (4) iii. P σ 10

11 ( ) : 1. P µ. 2. µ σ. 3. P : i. ii. PBE (separating equilibrium). PBE (pooling equilibrium). PBE 11

12 ½ ½µ ¼µ ½» µ À ½µ ¾ ¼µ ½µ ¾» µ Ä ¼µ ¾ ½µ { σ if θ = H (θ) = if θ = L { µ (m) = P (θ m) = ¼µ if m = if m = 1 if [ ] or [ ] 0 otherwise (5) 12

13 ½ ½µ ½ µ ½» µ À ¼µ ¾ ¼µ ¾ µ ¾» µ Ä ½µ ¾ ½µ σ (θ) = θ Θ ¼µ µ (m) = m M (6) 1/3 if P 2/3 if (θ m) = 1 if 0 if 13

14 (equilibrium refinement) PBE : U (θ) : θ BR(m): m ( ) a BR(m) 14

15 (intuitive criterion). 2 (Cho and Kreps, 1987) PBE(σ, µ ; P ) : (i.e., m) (7) θ m θ 15

16 ½ ½µ ¼µ ½» µ À ½µ ¾ ¼µ ½µ ¾» µ Ä ¼µ ¾ ½µ ¼µ : 16

17 ½ ½µ ½ µ ½» µ À ¼µ ¾ ¼µ ¾ µ ¾» µ Ä ½µ ¾ ½µ ¼µ : m = U (L) = : L max a BR() U S (L,, a) =. 100% H 17

18 ½ ½µ ½ µ ½» µ À ½µ ¾ ¼µ ¾ µ ¾» µ Ä ¼µ ¾ ½µ ¼µ : ( ). 18

19 : 22 2 : D(θ, m) {a BR(m) U (θ) < U S (θ, m, a)} θ m D 0 (θ, m) {a BR(m) U (θ) = U S (θ, m, a)} θ m 19

20 (universal divinity). 3 (Cho and Kreps, 1987; Banks and Sobel, 1987) i. PBE(σ, µ ; P ) : ii. PBE(σ, µ ; P ) : 20

21 ( ) : θ θ m m θ 0 D1 : θ θ θ D2 : θ θ a θ a θ D2 21

22 2. 22

23 (cheap talk) ( ) 23

24 Ñ Ð Ñ ½» µ À ¾» µ Ä Ñ Ð Ñ ( ) M {h, l}. m = h(l): H(L) 24

25 Ñ Ð Ñ ½ µ ½» µ À ½ µ ¾ µ ¾» µ Ä ¾ µ Ñ σ (θ) = Ñ θ Θ µ (m) = m M (8) { P 1/3 if (θ m) = 2/3 if 25

26 Ñ Ð Ñ ½ µ ½» µ À ½ µ ¾ µ ¾» µ Ä ¾ µ Ñ Ð ( ) P µ σ P m = l 26

27 Ñ Ð Ñ ¼µ ½» µ À ½µ ½µ ¾» µ Ä ¼µ Ñ Ð σ (H) = h, σ (L) = l. µ (h) =, µ (l) = 27

28 : L H : / 28

29 ( ) : : : θ Θ {H, N, L}. : p(θ) = 1/3 θ Θ. : m M {h, n, l}. : a A {( ), } : ( ) θ = H : (60, 40): (0, 0) θ = N : (10, 10): (0, 0) θ = L : ( 40, 60): (0, 0) : H : H, N 29

30 PBE: { σ h if θ = H and N (θ) = l if θ = L { µ (m) = P (θ m) = if m = h if m = n and l if [m = h and θ = H] or [m = h and θ = N] if [m = l or n] and θ = L otherwise (9) m = h : : 0. H, N h L l 30

31 Crawford Sobel CS : θ Θ [0, 1]. : : m M [0, 1]. (e.g., ) OK : a A [0, 1]. vnm: U S (θ, a) = (10) U R (θ, a) = (11) :. :. b > 0: 31

32 ¼ ½ ½ Ñ Ñ ½ Ñ Ñ ¾ Crawford Sobel ( ) (partition equilibrium) : Θ : [0, θ 1 ] [θ 1, 1]. σ (θ) = { m1 if θ [0, θ 1 ] m 2 if θ (θ 1, 1] (12) 32

33 ¼ ½ ½ Ñ Ñ ½ Ñ Ñ ¾ Crawford Sobel ( ) P m = m 1 : m = m 2 : m: [0, θ 1 ] 33

34 ¼ ½ ½ ½ ¾ ½ ½ µ ¾ Crawford Sobel ( ) µ (m 1 ) = [0, θ 1 ] µ (m 2 ) = [θ 1, 1] m : µ (m ) =. µ : : 34

35 ¼ ½ ½ ½ ¾ ½ ½ ½µ ¾ Crawford Sobel ( ) : (13) (14) 35

36 ¼ ½ ½ ½ ¾ ¼ ½ ½ ½µ ¾ Crawford Sobel ( ) θ (< θ 1 ) a = θ 1 /2 m 1 36

37 ¼ ½ ½ ½ ¾ ½ ¼¼ ½ ½µ ¾ Crawford Sobel ( ) θ (> θ 1 ) a = (θ 1 + 1)/2 m 2 37

38 Crawford Sobel ( ) 1 (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) 1 N N(b) < N N CS PBE CS N = 1: (babbling equilibrium) N = N(b): b N(b) < 38

39 Crawford Sobel N(b) b: N(b) = ( ) 1/2. (15) 2 b < z > z b ( ) b 0 b = 0 (fully revealing equilibrium) 39

40 1. D1 D2 4 (Chen, Kartik and Sobel, 2008) PBE(σ, µ ; P ) : (16) CS NITS 40

41 2. (Farrell and Gibbons, 1989) or (Krishna and Morgan, 2001) / (Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2010) (Blume, Board and Kawamura, 2007) 41

42 3. 42

43 (verifiability) ( ) : (hard information) : (soft information) 43

44 (persuasion games) / / ( ) 44

45 Milgrom : θ Θ [0, 1] : f(θ) > 0 θ Θ. :. P (Θ): Θ : a A [0, 1]. vnm: U S (a) = (17) U R (θ, a) = (18) a 45

46 :. :. : M = { } OK : m M(θ) m / M(θ ) θ θ m θ 46

47 (skeptical inference). 5 (Milgrom and Roberts, 1986) P : m M θ Θ M(θ) P(θ m) = { 1 if 0 otherwise (19) : 47

48 : m 1 = [1/4, 1]. m 2 = [1/4, 2/3]. m 3 = {1/4}. a 48

49 (unraveling arguments) 2 (Milgrom, 1981) PBE 49

50 1. i. (Hagenbach, Koessler and Perez-Richet, 2013) ii. (Shin, 1994; Mathis, 2008) 2. (Che and Kartik, 2009) (Kamenica and Gentzkow, 2011) (Eso and Galambos, 2013; Hedlund, 2012) 50

51 : 1. : 2. : 3. : PBE : : : 51

52 52

「産業上利用することができる発明」の審査の運用指針（案）

「産業上利用することができる発明」の審査の運用指針（案） 1 1.... 2 1.1... 2 2.... 4 2.1... 4 3.... 6 4.... 6 1 1 29 1 29 1 1 1. 2 1 1.1 (1) (2) (3) 1 (4) 2 4 1 2 2 3 4 31 12 5 7 2.2 (5) ( a ) ( b ) 1 3 2 ( c ) (6) 2. 2.1 2.1 (1) 4 ( i ) ( ii ) ( iii ) ( iv)