25 About what prevent spoofing of misusing a session information

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Transcription:

25 About what prevent spoofing of misusing a session information 1140349 2014 2 28

Web Web [1]. [2] SAS-2(Simple And Secure password authentication protocol, ver.2)[3] SAS-2 i

Abstract About what prevent spoofing of misusing a session information Hiroki TAHARA It s increasing XSS(cross-site scripting) in a web-application vulnerability recently. XSS is used for one of a misusing session information. And a attacker get spoofing with the misusing session information. In this paper, I have proposed to prevent spoofing using SAS-2(Simple And Secure password authentication protocol, ver.2) to confirm a regular user when a session information leak. And i was to evaluate safety and compare the preceding method. key words Session-management, XSS, SAS-2 ii

1 1 2 2 2.1........................... 2 2.2........................... 3 2.2.1......................... 4 ID......................... 4 ID......................... 5 ID........................ 6 2.3....................... 6 2.3.1............... 7 2.3.2................ 8 HTML........... 8 HTML............ 8............. 9 2.3.3................ 10 2.4.............................. 10 ID................. 11 Cookie.................. 11 3 12 3.1 SAS-2............................... 12 3.1.1............................... 12 3.1.2 SAS-2........................... 13 iii

............................. 13............................. 14.......................... 17 3.2 SAS-2....................... 17 3.2.1............................... 18 3.2.2....................... 18............................. 19............................. 21 4 23 4.1........................... 23 4.1.1 ID............ 23 4.1.2 Cookie.................... 24 4.2................................... 24 4.2.1................................ 25 4.2.2............................... 25 4.2.3.................................. 27 4.3...................................... 28 5 29 30 31 iv

2.1 1........................... 2 2.2 2........................... 3 2.3........................ 4 2.4 ID........................ 5 2.5 ID........................ 5 2.6 ID....................... 6 2.7................... 7 2.8.................... 9 2.9.................. 10 3.1 SAS-2............................. 14 3.2 SAS i................. 16 3.3............................. 20 3.4 i......................... 22 4.1............................... 25 v

4.1.......................... 26 4.2....................... 26 4.3................................. 27 4.4................................. 27 vi

1 web SNS EC SNS EC Web ID ID HTTP ID Web ID ID 1

2 2.1 Web 2.1 Web Web Web Web Web Web Web 2.1 1 ID ID Web ID Web 2

2.2 ID ID ID Cookie 2.2 Cookie Web Web HTTP Cookie ID Cookie Web Cookie Web HTTP Cookie Web Cookie ID Cookie Web Web Web Web Cookie [4][7] 2.2 2 2.2 2.3 A 3

2.2 2.3 ID A ID ID A A [2] 2.2.1 ID ID ID 4

2.2 2.4 ID ID ID 2.5 ID 5

2.3 ID ID 2.6 ID ID [2] ID 2.3 HTTP [8][9] 6

2.3 Cookie Cookie 2.3.1 2.7 ID URL Cookie ID 2.7 7

2.3 2.3.2 2.8 [2] HTML HTML HTML HTML < > & HTML < > & HTML HTML HTML <script> javascript: <xscript> xjavascript: java&#09:script javascript: HTML 8

2.3 HTTP Content-Type Content-Type: text/html: charset=utf-8 charset HTML Content-Type HTML +ADw-script+AD4-alert(+ACI-test+ACI- )+ADsAPA-/script+AD4- UTF- <script>alter( test );</script> 2.8 9

2.4 2.3.3 2.9 IPA [1] 2.9 2.4. ID ID ID 2 ID Cookie 10

2.4 ID ID ID ID ID ID Cookie ID Cookie Cookie Web javascript ID ID Cookie Web 2 11

3 ID Cookie SAS-2(Simple And Secure password authentication protocol, Ver.2) SAS-2 3.1 SAS-2 SAS-2 SAS-2 [3][5][6] 3.1.1 User Server User ID 12

3.1 SAS-2 S X F H H(x) x i N i i + 3.1.2 SAS-2 SAS-2 SAS-2 3.1 SAS-2 1. ID S N 1 ID S N 1 A=X(ID S N 1 ) 2. ID A 3. ID A 13

3.1 SAS-2 3.1 SAS-2 SAS-2 3.2 i SAS-2 1. ID S N i A=X(ID S N i ) N i+1 User Server =C (F(C)+A) =F(C) A 2. ID Input ID,S Generates a rondom number N1 3. and Stores N1 A F(C) = A A=X(ΙD,S N1) C= (F(C)+A) F(C) F(ID, C) ID,Α (secure) Stores ID,A 14

3.1 SAS-2 4. A C = H(ID,F(C)) 5. 6. H(ID,F(C)) 15

3.1 SAS-2 User Data strages : Ni Server Data strages : ID,A Input ID,S A=X(ΙD,S Ni) Generates a rondom number Ni+1 and stores Ni+1 C=X(ΙD,S Ni+1) F(C)=F(ID,C) α=c (F(C)+Α) β=f(c) Α ID,α,β F(C)=β Α C=α (F(C)+Α) True F(C)=F(ID,C)? Authentication fail True A=C γ=η(ιd,f(c)) γ 3.2 SAS False i γ=h(id,f(c))? True Authentication fail 16

3.2 SAS-2 SAS-2 (i+1) = E (F (E) + C) = F (E) C ID. = x (F (x) + C) = F (x) C ID i SAS-2 3.2 SAS-2 SAS-2 17

3.2 SAS-2 3.2.1 Application Web browser Web browser Web Web server web Q web P I ID Web browser Cookie R HTTP X F H H(x) x i N i i + 3.2.2 SAS-2 ID 18

3.2 SAS-2 ID 3.3 1. N 1 A=X(N 1 ) 2. Q A Q A 3. Q P 4. IDI I A 5. HTTP R IDI 6. I Cookie I 19

3.2 SAS-2 3.3 20

3.2 SAS-2 ID ID 3.4 i 1. N i A=X(N i ) N i+1 C=X(N i+1 ) = C A = (F(C) + A) A 2. IDI 3. A = A C = (F( ) + A) 4. A 5. A C = (A) 6. HTTP R 7. H(F(X(N i ))) Cookie N i N i+1 21

3.2 SAS-2 3.4 i 22

4 4.1 ID Cookie 4.1.1 ID ID i +1 = E (F (E) + C) = F (E) C 23

4.2 = x (F (x) + C) = F (x) C i LAN ID 4.1.2 Cookie Cookie ID Cookie Cookie Cookie ID i Cookie Cookie 4.2 24

4.2 4.2.1 java java HTTP java API HttpURLConnection HttpURLConnection A POST Cookie PHP POST A 160bit SHA 4.1 4.1 4.2.2 4.1 4.2 25

4.2 H/W OS PHP CPU 4.1 centos 64bit php5.3 2.4GHz intel Coure 2 Duo 480Mb H/W OS mac osx 10.6 java CPU 4.2 JDK1.6 2.4GHz intel Coure 2 Duo 4Gb 26

4.2 4.2.3 URL SAS API 2 java API currenttimemillis 100 10 Google Chrome SSL HTTP 2 Google Chrome 1000 4.3 4.4 HTTP ms/ 17.4 SSL ms/ 41.8 2 ms/ 24.4 140.2 4.3 1 2 SAS HTTP ms/ 105.5 119.2 105.4 SAS ms/ 248.5 259.1 248.4 2 ms/ 143.0 139.9 143.0 135.5 117.46 135.7 4.4 27

4.3 4.3 ID ID Cookie ID SSL ID ID SSL 41.8 ms SAS 248.5 ms SSL 6 SAS HTTP HTTP HTTP 140.2-135.5 SSL 4.7 28

5 SAS ID SSL ID ID Cookie Cookie java Google Chrome fire fox 29

30

[1] IPA,, http://www.ipa.go.jp/security/vuln/report/vuln2012q3.html, 2012. [2] IPA, 6,, pp.22-28, 2012. [3] T.Tsuji, A.Shimizu, A one-time password authentication method for low spec machines and on internet protocols, IEICE Trans.Commun., vol.e87-b, no.6. pp.1594-1600, 2004. [4], Web : HTTP URI HTML REST,, pp.80-87, 2010. [5], SAS-2,,, pp.31-34, 2007. [6], SAS Web,,, pp.19-33, 2003. [7] IETF, HTTP State Management Mechanism, http://www.hcn.zaq.ne.jp/web/rfc6265-ja.html, 2013. [8],,,,,, pp.31-32, 2003. [9],,, www,:, pp.22-24, 2005. [10],,,,, 2001. 31