Kant s Concept Thing-in-Itself and the Resolution of its Significance for Pedagogy Hiroshi Suzuki Abstract In this paper we will take up various meanings of Kant s concept Thing-in-itself, along by his system of critical philosophy. This examination tries to show what a close connection this concept has to his thoughts about education. Kant s critical philosophy, that is to say, his three main works, Critique of Pure Reason, Critique of Practical Reason, and Critique of Judgment give the concept Thing-in-itself disunited different definitions. Of these definitions typical image from Critique of Pure Reason has been widely rooted; Thing-in-itself is something unknown to us and its existence cannot be proved theoretically. However, the definitions of Thing-in-itself, if examined in detail, should not be limited to this stereotype. From our view point, explanations in Critique of Pure Reason show at least three meanings on this concept. Thing-in-itself, placed as something unrecognizable in the foundation of the object of recognition in Critique of Pure Reason, was found out in our beings in Critique of Practical Reason. But there the discontinuity inevitably arose between the definitions in theoretical philosophy and in practical philosophy. So in Critique of Judgment Kant positions the concept Thing-in-itself something extrasensory. Thing-in-itself refers not only to the nature-concept, but to the freedom-concept. Therefore the extrasensory enables us to transit from the former to the latter. With these examinations about the changes in the meanings of Thing-in-itself in his critical philosophy, we focus on the relations between this concept and moralization, which is positioned as a final end in Kant s philosophy of education. Thing-in-itself and moralization, though they appear to have no relations to each other at a glance, come to be connected by the idea, freedom, described in Critique of Practical Reason. That is to say, we can recognize the practical existence of Thing-in-itself, the object unreachable by our theoretical cognitive capability, in free human being. In the same way, moralization as an end of education, even if unable to be accomplished perfectly, is still required to be free, to be autonomous. Key wordsimmanuel Kant, Thing-in-Itself, Critical Philosophy, Moralization, Freedom Ⅰ Immanuel Kant, 1724-1804Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 1781/1787 Ding an sich Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 1785 Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, 1788 Kritik der Urteilskraft, 1790 Erscheinung 5
Johann Gottlieb Fichte, 1762-1814 Moralisierung Ⅱ Ⅱ-Ⅰ 6
22 Die transzendentale Ästhetik affizieren A 19/B 33 Gegenstand Sache an sichgegenstände an sich Dinge an sich selbst A 30/B 45 Die transzendentale Analytik Phaenomena Noumena A 249/B 306 GrenzbegriffA 255/B 311 A 256/B 312 Die transzendentale Dialektik Kausalität A 536/B 564 7
Vorstellungen A 536-537/B 564-565 ⅡⅡ Faktum 31 Begehrungs -vermögen 24-25 transzendentale Freiheit Sinnenwelt 8
22 Intelligibele Welt Intelligibeles Wesen 105 Grundsatz der Sittlichkeit 105 4 451 451 Verstandeswelt 451 9
10 intellektuelle Welt 451 451 452 ⅡⅢ
22 11 175 175-176 Urteilskraft179
12 Ⅲ Über Pädagogik, 1803 451 Person
22 13 122 123 das Schöne344 353
Ⅳ 428 H. J. Paton, Kant s Metaphysics of Experience, vol.1, George Allen&Unwin Ltd., 1970, p.422. 2001 7 1974 190 Andre Hahmann, Kant und die Dinge an sich Was leistet die ontologische Version der zwei-aspekte-theorie? Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie, Jahrgang 35, frommann-holzboog, 2010, S.137. No.3841965 14
22 Kant s gesammelte Schriften, begonnen von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Berlin, 1900ff. AB Ding an sich Ding an sich selbst an sich an sich selbst Ding betrachtet Gerold Prauss, Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, Bonn, 1974, S. 13-43. 1967 8 17 1967 176 Persönlichkeit 15 1990 204 20 194 22 1982 70 455 Welt-klugheit Geschicklichkeit 486 15