44-2 2011 Truthmaker Abstract Abstract. According to the truthmaker maximalism, every true contingent proposition is made true by something in the world, called its truthmaker. Although at first sight the maximalism seems to be a natural position, it has serious difficulties, especially concerning negative truths. In view of this, many truthmaker theorists adopt some non-maximalist position. It is not clear, however, whether these non-maximalists are justified, since existing reasons to justify the non-maximalism are not good enough. In this paper, then, I shall propose a new reason for the non-maximalism, which consists in the observation that the maximalism cannot acknowledge the widely accepted view that certain inferences involving logical constants are valid in the properly logical sense. 1 3,776m 3,776m truthmaker TM TM 115
2 TM TM Truthmaker Maximalism 3 TM TM 4 1 2 3 TM TM 5 116
Truthmaker TM TM TM TM TM 6 Nec P e e P e P TM TM 3 3 TM 3 3 TM TM 7 117
TM C P P e e P TM C TM TM TM 3 TM 3 3 3 3 3 3 TM 3 3 TM 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 TM 3 TM C TM C 8 Max P P e e P TM TM TM TM TM TM TM 9 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 118
Truthmaker TM 10 TM TM 3 3 3 3 P TM P 3 TM e.g. 3 3 3 3 P TM P 3 3 P TM P TM TM 3 3 3 3 3 119
P P 3 3 3 TM TM TM 11 12 TM 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 TM TM 3 3 3 3 120
Truthmaker 13 TM A A A TM TM 3 3 3 3 3 TM 3 3 3 TM TM TM TM 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 TM TM A 121
3 3 3 3 3 A A TM Wittgenstein 1922: 4.0312 14 P P 1.3 P Q TM TM P TM Q TM TM TM 122
Truthmaker Max 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 TM D. M. 15 P Q TM TM P TM Q TM P TM 1.3 Max Max 16 2.2 2.2 3.1 3.2-3 123
3 3 3 P Q 3 3 3 C P Q P Q C C 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 C C C P Q Max C C 1 e 1 e 1 P e 2 e 2 Q C 2 e e P Q C C 1 C 2 C C 1 C 2 C* e 1 e 1 P e 2 e 2 Q e e P Q 124
Truthmaker C 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 C C* C* x x x P P Q C C* 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 C 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 C 3 3 3 3 3 17 P N P P N N* e e P e e P C* N* N N* TM TM TM 125
2.2 Max 2.2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3.1 3.1 Max W 18 W P P TM P TM W TM TM 3.1 C N C* N* W W 3.1 Max C N C* N* 126
Truthmaker 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 C* N* C N W C* N* W W W 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 C N W C* N* C N W C* N* W C* P Q e 1 e 2 C* W e 1 e 2 P Q C* N* P N* W P 3 3 3 P P P N* W C* N* 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 W 3.1 127
W 19 W 20 TM 1.1 Nec e P TM e P W w w w w W de re a F a F W 3 3 3 3 3 128
Truthmaker W W T T W W 3.1 W 3.1 2 TM 21 1 a 129
b c TM a c a b TM c 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 TM 1 TM a c TM c a TM c a TM c c P P 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 TM 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 c c a c a TM c c TM c a F TM c P Q P Q 130
Truthmaker P 1, P 2,, Q 1, Q 2, TM c a c TM 22 c a c 3 3 3 3 a 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 TM c TM 3 3 TM TM a c TM TM TM TM 23 131
1. P <P> < > 2. TM Rami 2009 3. maximalism TM 4. Cf. Mulligan et al. (1984), Simons (1992). 5. Cf. Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005: 20ff.) TM TM cf.dodd (2007) 6. Cf. Armstrong (2004: 5-7), Rami (2009: 8-9). 7. TM TM Rami 2009: 4) TM TM 8. Armstrong (2004), Molnar (2000) 9. Armstrong 2004: ch.7-8 10. Dodd (2007), Molnar (2000) 11. TM 12. Cf. Mulligan et al. (1984), Simons (1992) TM TM Dodd 2007: 394-5), Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005: 19) 13. Armstrong (2004: 55), Dodd (2007: 393-4) 14. 2002: 89ff. 15. Cf. Armstrong (2004: 16-7). 16. Simons 1992: 161ff. Cameron (forthcoming: 5) 17. TM 18. Armstrong (2004: 18), Simons (1992: 165) 19. Cameron (2008: 5) 132
Truthmaker W de re de dicto 20. e.g. de re 21. Dodd (2007: 393-4) 22. e.g. because after cf. Simons (1992) constitutively 23. 2010 11 27 8 43 22 23 Armstrong, D.M. (2004) Truth and Truthmakers, Cambridge UP. Cameron, R. (2008) How to be a Truthmaker Maximalist, Noûs 42 (3) : 410 421. Cameron, R. (forthcoming) Truthmakers, in M. Glanzberg (ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Truth, Oxford UP. Dodd, J. (2007) Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles, Synthese 156 (2) : 383 401. Molnar, G. (2000) Truthmakers for Negative Truths, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (1) : 72 86. Mulligan, K., Simons, P., Smith, B. (1984) Truth-makers, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44 (3) : 287 321. Rami, A. (2009) Introduction, in A.Rami & E.J. Lowe (eds.) Truth and Truth-making, McGill-Queen s: 1 36. 133
Rodriguez-Pereyra, G. (2005) Why Truthmakers, in H. Beebee & J. Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: the contemporary debate. Oxford UP : 17 31. Simons, P. (1992) Logical Atomism and its Ontological Refinement: A Defense, in K. Mulligan (ed.) Language, Truth and Ontology, Kluwer: 157 79. Wittgenstein, L. (1922) Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge. 2002. PD 134