Vol.57 No (Dec. 2016) CHAP 1,a) , CHAP 1 CHAP CHAP CHAP 2 Proposal and Evaluation of Methods for Mounting Protocol of M

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1 CHAP 1,a) , CHAP 1 CHAP CHAP CHAP 2 Proposal and Evaluation of Methods for Mounting Protocol of Multi-factor Authentication over CHAP Only Masaki Inamura 1,a) Received: March 10, 2016, Accepted: September 6, 2016 Abstract: Recently, unlawful access often happens caused by users mistakes of password setting, e.g. password-list-attacks. Therefore, proposing/implementation of other authentication methods, which are used together with password authentication, are urgent. Meanwhile, CHAP is used a lot of services over the Internet as de facto standard. Therefore, it is not easy to change a new authentication protocol into CHAP. I propose a new method which can send many types of authentication codes using intact CHAP with revising calculation on user terminal and servers. As a result, a multi-factor authentication over existing password-authenticaion protocol can be realized. In addition, I propose a revised method of my proposal using a proxy server because of continuity in services. Furthermore, I structure a test system using proposed method and evaluate performances of it. By using my proposal, other authentication method using password authentication together can be realized with a minimum cost burden. Keywords: authentication protocol, CHAP, two-factor authentication, multi-factor authentication 1. 1 School of Science and Engineering, Tokyo Denki University, Hatoyama-machi, Hiki-gun, Saitama , Japan a) minamura@rd.dendai.ac.jp SNS Social Networking Service c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan 2627

2 Fig. 1 1 PPPoE Structure of telecomunication devices under PPPoE over optical line. 1 CHAP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol [1] 1 PPP Point-to-Point Protocol [2] PPPoE PPP over Ethernet 1 ONU Optical Network Unit LAN ONU OLT Optical Line Terminal PPPoE LAN ONU OLT LAN PPPoE PPPoE [3] 1 [4] 1 2 [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12] CHAP 1 ONU OLT CHAP IT [13], [14], [15] CHAP CHAP 2 CHAP c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan 2628

3 2 CHAP Fig. 2 Procedure of CHAP. 2 CHAP 3 CHAP CHAP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol ID PW C R H K (α, β) α β 1 HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code [16] CHAP Set-up Set-up Set-up CHAP 2 1 Set-up 1 Authentication 2 Set-up: (1) ID (2) PW (3) ID PW Authentication: (1) ID (2) C C (3) PW C R H K (PW,C) R (4) PW (2) C H K (PW,C) c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan 2629

4 R Code 4 0x01: Challenge. 0x02: Response. 0x03: Success. 0x04: Failure. 1 Identifier 2 Length Code Code Success Failure 0 Challenge 4 1 Value Length Value 2 Value C C Value Length Value Name ID Challenge Response 5 1 Value Length Value 2 Value R R Value Length Value Name ID PW [17] C 3 CHAP Fig. 3 Packet format of CHAP. 4 CHAP Challenge Fig. 4 Challenge packet format of CHAP. 5 CHAP Response Fig. 5 Response packet format of CHAP. 2.2 [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12] CHAP 2 2 ( 1 ) CHAP ( a ) CHAP ( b ) CHAP ( 2 ) CHAP 2 CHAP (a) c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan 2630

5 Fig. 6 6 Procedure of a proposal using concatenation of verifying information. PPPoE PPPoE (b) 2 (1) (b) ID PW CHAP SK 1 PW PW C R Response H K (α, β) α β Set-up CHAP Set-up Authentication 2 6 Set-up: (1) ID (2) PW (3) SK 1 (4) ID PW SK 1 Authentication: (1) ID (2) C C (3) PW SK 1 C R H K (PW SK 1,C) R (4) PW SK 1 (2) C H K (PW SK 1,C) R c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan 2631

6 7 Response Fig. 7 Response packet format of a proposal using concatenation of verifying information Response Challenge Success Failure CHAP Response 7 CHAP Value CHAP R R 1 CHAP R Value CHAP R Response Value 2.2 CHAP Value 1 PW SK 1 CHAP C PW SK 1 1 R CHAP Response Value CHAP Response CHAP Response Value Length Value SHA Challenge Success Failure R CHAP R SK (1) (a) PW SK CHAP c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan 2632

7 3.2.2 CHAP CHAP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Response (3) (3) 2 Response (1) (2) (3) (4) Response (2) Response 3 PW SK 1 Response Value 2 Value SK 1 CHAP ID PW CHAP SK 1 PW C R CHAP R Response H K (α, β) α β ENC(α, β) α β DEC(α, β) α β ENC(α, β) c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan 2633

8 Fig. 8 8 Procedure of a revised version using a proxy server Set-up CHAP Set-up Authentication 2 8 Set-up: (1) ID (2) PW (3) SK 1 (4) ID PW SK 1 ID PW ID SK 1 Authentication: (1) ID (2) C C (3) PW C R H K (PW,C) R SK 1 R ENC(SK 1,R) R (4) SK 1 R R DEC(SK 1,R ) R (5) PW (2) C H K (PW,C) R Response Challenge Success Failure CHAP Response 9 CHAP Value R Value CHAP R R c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan 2634

9 9 Response Fig. 9 Response packet format of a revised version Response Value 2.2 CHAP Value 1 PW SK 1 CHAP C PW SK 1 1 R CHAP Response Value CHAP Response CHAP Response Value Length Value SHA AES Challenge Success Failure R CHAP R SK (1) (a) R 1 3 PW SK Web CHAP c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan 2635

10 4, Web OS Intel Server System R 1000GZ/GL Product Family CPU Intel Xeon E v2 2 8 RAM DDR GB OS VMware ESXi5.5.0 OS Ubuntu LTS desktop Web Apache Web Google Chrome OpenSSL 1.0.1j 1 SHA256AES-128 MySQL CPU 2 10 CHAP CHAP 3,000 1,000 CPU % 2 CHAP 3, CPU 2 Fig. 10 Results of throughput turning on 2 cores in the CPU. 11 CPU 8 Fig. 11 Results of throughput turning on 8 cores in the CPU. CHAP CHAP CPU 2 8 CPU CHAP RAM GB RAM 1 1KB MB MB RAM AES-128 CHAP 1 c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan 2636

11 CHAP AES CHAP 1 Response Value [1] Simpson, W.A.: PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP), Request for Comments, RFC 1994 (1996). [2] Simpson, W.A.: The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP), Request for Comments, RFC 1661 (1994). [3] 2014 (2014). [4] Nagel, B.: Password Seeks Partner for Long-Term, Secure Relationship, CIO: Business Technology Leadership, Vol.11, No.2, pp.28 31, IDG (2010). [5] Schneier, B.: Two-Factor Authentication: Too Little, Too Late, Comm. ACM, Vol.48, No.4, p.136 (2005). [6] Hagalisletto, A.M. and Riiber, A.: Using the Mobile Phone in Two-Factor Authentication, Proc. International Workshop on Security for Spontaneous Interaction (IWSSI 2007 ) (2007). [7] Aloul, F.A., Zahidi, S. and El-Hajj, W.: Two Factor Authentication Using Mobile Phones, Proc. IEEE/ACS International Conference on Computer Systems and Applications (AICCSA 2009 ), pp , IEEE press (2009). [8] Rathgeb, C. and Uhl, A.: Two-Factor Authentication or How to Potentially Counterfeit Experimental Results in Biometric Systems, Proc. International Conference on Image Analysis and Recognition (ICIAR 2010 ), LNCS 6112, pp , Springer (2010). [9] Fan, C., Ho, P. and Hsu, R.: Provably Secure Nested One-Time Secret Mechanisms for Fast Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange in Mobile Communications, IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking, Vol.18, No.3, pp (2009). [10] Eldefrawy, M.H., Alghathbar, K. and Khan, M.K.: OTP-Based Two-Factor Authentication Using Mobile Phones, Proc. International Conference on Information Technology: New Generations (ITNG 2011 ), pp , IEEE press (2011). [11] Acharya, S., Polawar, A. and Pawar, P.Y.: Two Factor Authentication Using Smartphone Generated One Time Password, IOSR J. Computer Engineering, Vol.11, No.2, pp (2013). [12] Hwang, T. and Gope, P.: Provably Secure Mutual Authentication and Key Exchange Scheme for Expeditious Mobile Communication Through Synchronously One-Time Secrets, Wireless Personal Communications, Vol.77, No.1, pp (2014). [13] 2015 IPA available from pdf (2016) [14] NEC Vol.58, No.2, pp (2005). [15] UNISYS TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, Vol.89, pp (2006). [16] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and Canetti, R.: HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication, Request for Comments, RFC 2104 (1997). [17] Rogaway, P. and Shrimpton, T.: Cryptographic Hash- Function Basics: Definitions, Implications, and Separations for Preimage Resistance, Second-Preimage Resistance, and Collision Resistance, Proc. International Workshop on Fast Software Encryption (FSE 2004 ), LNCS 3017, pp , Springer (2004). A.1 A.1.1 A ID c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan 2637

12 Fig. A 1 A 1 Procedure of a proposed multi-factor authentication using concatenation of verifying information. PW CHAP SK i PW PW 1 i n n PW C R Response H K (α, β) α β A CHAP Set-up Authentication 2 A 1 Set-up: (1) ID (2) PW (3) SK 1,...,SK n (4) ID,PW,SK 1,...,SK n Authentication: (1) ID (2) C C (3) PW C R H K (PW SK 1... SK n,c) R (4) PW,SK 1,...,SK n (2) C H K (PW SK 1... SK n,c) R A.1.2 A ID PW CHAP SK i PW 1 i n n PW C R CHAP R Response H K (α, β) α β ENC(α, β) α c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan 2638

13 Fig. A 2 A 2 Procedure of a revised multi-factor authentication using a proxy server. β DEC(α, β) α β ENC(α, β) A CHAP Set-up Authentication 2 A 2 Set-up: (1) ID (2) PW (3) SK 1,...,SK n (4) ID,PW,SK 1,...,SK n ID PW ID SK 1,...,SK n Authentication: (1) ID (2) C C (3) PW C R n SK 1,...,SK n R ENC(SK n,...enc(sk 2, ENC(SK 1,R))...) R (4) SK 1,...,SK n R R DEC(SK 1,...DEC(SK n 1, DEC(SK n,r ))...) R (5) PW (2) C H K (PW,C) R R H K (PW,C) c 2016 Information Processing Society of Japan 2639

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