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1 Graduate School of Policy and Management, Doshisha University 77 Donation Booth Super PAC 2012 Federal Election Campaign Act 1 FECA 1971 Presidential Election Campaign Fund PECF FECA Federal Election Commission FEC FECA 1974 L Buckley v. Valeo 3 FECA Donation Booth 1 Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C D.C. FBI 3 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).

2 78 Buckley v. Valeo symbolic expression 4 5 1,000 Political Action Committee PAC 5,000 25, PECF 1974 FECA 8 9 quid pro quo ,000 PAC 12 25,000 1, independent expenditures United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) U.S. at PAC U.S. at Id. at Id. at Id. at Id. at Id. at The over-all effect of the Act's contribution ceilings is merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons... rather than to reduce the total amount of money potentially available to promote political expression. 13 Id. at Buckley Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) PAC Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress and a Plan to Stop It (Hachette Book Group 2011).

3 79 preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption 17 issue advocacy express advocacy FECA PAC Buckley 1976 FECA PECF FECA U.S. at 45. We find that the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption is inadequate to justify 608(e)(1)'s ceiling on independent expenditures U.S. at 44 n. 52. This construction would restrict the application of 608(e)(1) to communications containing express words of advocacy of election or defeat, such as vote for, elect, support, cast your ballot for, Smith for Congress, vote against, defeat, reject. 20 Anthony Corrado, Campaign Finance Reform 24 (The Century Foundation Press 2000). Most courts have therefore embraced the magic words test that was suggested by the Supreme Court... So, any communications or advertisements that avoid the words used to signal express advocacy are considered issue advocacy under the law. 21 Id. at 86. [B]ecause candidates are closely linked to issues and policies... it is important to look at the broader context of a message to determine whether it presents an electioneering message U.S. at Id. at NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) U.S. at Id Super PAC Alicia Mundy, The Wall Street Journal, Adelson to Keep Betting on the GOP, SB html (Dec. 4, 2012). 29 McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93, n. 78 (2003) He talks law and order but is himself a convicted felon....

4 80 FECA 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 BCRA BCRA Citizens United v. FEC 30 Citizens United v. FEC BCRA BCRA U.S.C. 441b (c) electioneering communication 31 10,000 1,000 BCRA U.S.C. 434(f) BCRA U.S.C. 441d (d)(2) 32 Austin U.S.C 441b Buckley Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 31 BCRA U.S.C. 434 (f)(3)(a) Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) U.S. at Floyd Abrams & Burt Neuborne, The Nation, Debating Citizens United, (Jan. 13, 2011) U.S. at See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986); First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 37 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 38 Geoffrey R. Stone, The Huffington Post, Is Money Speech?, (May 2, 2012). 39 The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harvard Law Review 171, 175 (1976) U.S. at FECA

5 81 41 Buckley 42 BCRA PAC PAC 25,000 2 U.S.C. 441(a) undue influence Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28 n. 31. The Act places no limit on the number of funds that may be formed... The potential for proliferation of these sources of contributions is not insignificant. Buckley PAC U.S. at Id. at Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 Stanford Law Review 837, 861 (1998). [B]ecause candidates are not accountable for independent ad campaigns, these campaigns are likely to be particularly negative and reckless. 45 The New York Times, Election Independent Spending Totals, totals/ (accessed Nov. 8, 2012) Restore Our Future Super PAC 11 4, Deborah Jordan Brooks & Michael Murov, Assessing Accountability in a Post-Citizens United Era: The Effects of Attack Ad Sponsorship by Unknown Independent Groups, 40 American Politics Research 383 (May 2012). Super PAC U.S. at 67 n. 80. Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman. 49 Ayers, supra n. 44, at Quid Pro Quo Corruption Monetary Influence Corruption Inequality

6 U.S.C. 434 (b)(3) U.S.C. 434 (b)(4) PAC 250 PAC 434 (c) PAC 20 1,000 10,000 BCRA FEC 434 (f), (g) principal campaign committee 434 (a)(2), (3) 434 (a)(4) 53 2,000 PAC 5,000 national party committee 25,000 10,000 2 U.S.C. 441a (a)(1) 37,500 57,500 PAC 37, a (a) (3) BCRA 441a (c) 2012 PAC PAC PAC PAC PAC FECA Buckley PECF 1,000 2,000 2 U.S.C. 441a (b) FECA Buckley 53 Dave Levinthal & Kenneth P. Vogel, Politico, Super PACs Go Stealth through First Contests, (Dec. 30, 2011). Super PAC

7 83 5,000 PAC 5,000 15, a (a)(2) 54 coordinated expenditures 441a(d) 35, a(g) BCRA 2 U.S.C. 441d 441b 441c PAC 441b (b) g 55 2 U.S.C. 441b (c) U.S.C. 501(c)(3) 58 promotion of social welfare FECA 501 (c)(4) PAC FECA Citizens United SpeechNow.org v. FEC D.C. 59 Super PAC 54 Corrado, supra n. 20, at U.S.C. 501(c)(3), 501(c)(4), 527(e) Alliance for Justice, Comparison of 501(c)(3)s, 501(c)(4)s, and Political Organizations, resources/resource1/comparison-of-501c3s-501c4s.pdf (accessed Jan. 1, 2013) U.S.C. 501(c)(3). [N]o substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence legislation.... Center for Lobbying in the Public Interest, The Law, FAQ, (accessed Dec. 31, 2012). 58 Citizens United 501(c)(3) 59 SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 599 F.3d 686 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

8 84 527(e) Super PAC independent-expenditure-only committees 60 Super PAC Super PAC FECA 61 Super PAC Citizens United Super PAC 1, Super PAC PAC contribution bundling 65 PAC 5,000 PAC ,000 2 U.S.C 434 (i) 60 Dan Eggen & T. W. Farnam, Washington Post, New Super PACs Bringing Millions into Campaigns, content/article/2010/09/27/ar html (Sep. 28, 2010). 61 Federal Election Commission, Compliance Help, Brochures, Coordinated Communications and Independent Expenditures, brochures/indexp.shtml (last updated Feb. 2011). 62 Norman J. Ornstein, Thomas E. Mann, Michael J. Malbin & Andrew Rugg, The Brookings Institution, Vital Statistics on Congress, (July 2013) ,731, ,215, Center for Responsive Politics, OpenSecrets.org, (accessed Nov. 16, 2013) 64 Christopher Rowland, Boston Globe, Deadlock by design hobbles election agency, america-campaign-finance-watchdog-rendered-nearly-toothless-its-own-appointed-commissioners/44zzojwnzehyzxtbynl2qp/story.html (July 7, 2013). 65 OpenSecrets.org, supra n. 63. Super PAC AT&T ,143, , Philip M. Nichols, The Perverse Effect of Campaign Contribution Limits: Reducing the Allowable Amounts Increases the Likelihood of Corruption in the Federal Legislature, 48 American Business Law Journal 77 (2011). PAC 67 Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, Pub. L , 121 Stat. 735 (2007).

9 Super PAC 68 Citizens United 2012 Super PAC 1998 Donation Booth 69 Donation Booth 70 Donation Booth 71 BCRA 2012 Super PAC FECA 68 Lessig, supra n. 16, at Donation Booth Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance (Yale University Press, 2002) Joel W. Johnson, Incumbents without a Campaign Finance Advantage: Competition and Money in Chile's Congressional Elections, 3 Journal of Politics in Latin America 3 (2011). 71 Corrado, supra n. 20, at Ornstein, supra n. 62, at ,351, ,998, Lessig, supra n. 16, ; James L. Huffman, Wall Street Journal, How Donor Disclosure Hurts Democracy, SB html (Apr. 11, 2011); Dylan Matthews, Washington Post WONKBLOG, Beyond the Disclose Act: What Else Could Congress Do on Campaign Finance?, beyond-the-disclose-act-what-else-could-congress-do-on-campaign-finance/ (Jul. 20, 2012).

10 86 influence buying 74 rent extraction FECA , Buckley 1,000 2, , , Ayres, supra n. 44, at Ayres, supra n. 44, at 846 n Id. at Ackerman, supra n. 69, at Lessig, supra n. 16, at Id. at Id. at 348 n. 51. Quoting Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch 18 (Oxford University Press 2006). 82 Nichols, supra n. 66, at 118.

11 Donation Booth 83 Ackerman, supra n. 69, at 27 n U.S. at Ackerman, supra n. 69, at Ayers, supra n. 44, at Lessig, supra n. 16, at Ayres, supra n. 44, at Id. at 887. Quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at Birkenstock, infra n Lessig, supra n. 16, at Adam Skaggs & Fred Wertheimer, Democracy 21 & Brennan Center for Justice, Empowering Small Donors in Federal Elections, (2012).

12 88 Donation Booth 93 Donation Booth 94 FEC blind trust FEC PAC ,000 FEC Ayres, supra n. 44, at 852. Donation Booth 1998 ATM 94 Id. at Ackerman, supra n. 69, at Ayers, supra n. 44, at Nolo's Plain-English Law Dictionary, Blind Trust, (accessed Jan. 2, 2012). A trust in which a trustee manages investments for someone who has no knowledge of the trust's specific assets or the actions taken by the trustee to manage them. Blind trusts are often used by high-ranking elected or appointed officials to avoid conflicts of interest. 98 Ayers, supra n. 44, at Id. at Ackerman, supra n. 69, at Id. at

13 check bombing 105 2,500 7,500 50, ,000 PAC 100, FECA Buckley 107 FEC Ayers, supra n. 44, at Ackerman, supra n. 69, at 183; Ayers, supra n. 44, at Ayers, supra n. 44, at 856 n Ackerman, supra n. 69, at Id. at , Ayers, supra n. 44, at 857.

14 90 Donation Booth Buckley 111 PAC PAC PAC BCRA FECA Citizens United 114 Donation Booth FECA Donation Booth 109 Id. at 857 n Id. at Id. at Id. at 870 n PAC 113 Joseph M. Birkenstock, Three Can Keep a Secret, If Two of Them Are Dead: A Thought Experiment Around Compelled Public Disclosure of Anonymous Political Expenditures, 27 Journal of Law & Politics 609, 622 (2012). 114 Donation Booth 2002 BCRA 2012 Citizens United

15 91 Donation Booth 115 Donation Booth PAC 30,800 10,000 5,000 2,500 46,200 (26 U.S.C. 501 (c), 527 (e)) PAC 5,000 5,000 43,100 15,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 FEC Contribution Limits for ,800 PAC 46,200 2 U.S.C. 441a (a)(3) national party committee Senate campaign committee 2 U.S.C. 441a (h) Ayres, supra n. 44, at 890. At a minimum, Congress should change the law to give individual candidates the option of using blind trusts to finance their campaigns... We hope that candidates would voluntarily comply in order to avoid explaining why they need to know the identity of their donors. Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, The Secret Refund Booth, 73 University of Chicago Law Review 1107 (2006).

16 Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign Finance (Yale University Press 2002). Anthony Corrado, Campaign Finance Reform (The Century Foundation Press 2000). Lawrence Lessig, Republic, Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress and a Plan to Stop It (Hachette Book Group 2011). Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, The Secret Refund Booth, 73 University of Chicago Law Review 1107 (2006). Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Infl uence, 50 Stanford Law Review 837 (1998). Joseph M. Birkenstock, Three Can Keep a Secret, If Two of Them Are Dead: A Thought Experiment Around Compelled Public Disclosure of Anonymous Political Expenditures, 27 Journal of Law & Politics 609 (2012). Deborah Jordan Brooks & Michael Murov, Assessing Accountability in a Post-Citizens United Era: The Effects of Attack Ad Sponsorship by Unknown Independent Groups, 40 American Politics Research 383 (May 2012). Joel W. Johnson, Incumbents without a Campaign Finance Advantage: Competition and Money in Chile's Congressional Elections, 3 Journal of Politics in Latin America 3 (2011). Philip M. Nichols, The Perverse Effect of Campaign Contribution Limits: Reducing the Allowable Amounts Increases the Likelihood of Corruption in the Federal Legislature, 48 American Business Law Journal 77 (2011). The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 Harvard Law Review 171 (1976).

<90AD8DF489C88A D322E696E6462>

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