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1 No. 26 March The September 30th Incident and Japan Aiko Kurasawa This paper will examine how Japanese government, media and society responded to the Indonesia s September 30 th Incident in 1965 and the following political development including brutal mass killing. Japan had close relation with Sukarno s Indonesia in the time when most of the western nations were very critical to him. Although Sukarno was very close to communists, one of the strongest political forces in his country, and consequently close to eastern nations, many of Japanese politicians regarded him as a nationalist and judged that he could control the communists. After the Incident took place on 30 th September Japanese government was still sympathetic to Sukarno in the midst of uncertainty and hoped that he would get strong grip to recover the situation. Army blamed communists as the main instigator of the Incident and urged Sukarno to take the strong action against them, but Sukarno rejected this interpretation by army and kept defending communists. Looking at this situation Japanese politicians and diplomats began to realize that it would be more realistic to discard Sukarno and support army that was trying to wipe out communists. It was the midst of Cold War and sweep over communist was the most urgent matter for western countiries. Therefore Japanese government eventually took very cool attitude towards Sukarno government: in spite of plead for emergency aid of daily commodities such as food and clothing, Japanese government did not give any with fear that aid would benefit the existing government. Even more significant was that Japanese government did not take any action to prevent brutal mass killing toward communist. She just kept silence and waited for the moment that anti-communist army leaders would take power, which finally took place on 11 March After that Japanese government supported Suharto s new regime by promptly giving economic aid. She gradually had very important role in Suharto s development policy as the largest investor, the largest partner of trade, and as the largest provider of aid. Of course Japan had gained tremendous benefit out of it. Yet most of Japanese are not aware that access to such economic prosperity of Japan after 1970s was made possible only as a result of tremendous social, political upheaval in Indonesia which took millions of lives. There was not strong public move in Japanese society to protest serious offense against humanity. Japanese media was, just like all other western media, less enthusiastic in reporting mass killing with full intensity, although they reported political development in Jakarta in detail. Absense of interest of Japanese society in Indonesian affairs was also influenced by too strong interest in Vietnamese War. Political process happening in Vietnam was the largest focus of interest for most of Japanese for both leftist and rightist. Also there was no strong appeal from leftist political parties to stir up the society. All those factors combined there was very little response from Japanese society to condemn the brutal killing

Japan had close relation with Sukarno s Indonesia in the time when most of the western nations were very critical to him.

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19 Tanaka 2016: PKI PKI Nishihara 1975: PKI PKI 9 30 PKI PKI PKI PKI No

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20 PKI PKI PKI PKI KAMI Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia 3 11 Andi Jusuf Amir Machmud Basuki Rachmat Surat Perintah Sebelas Maret PKI PKI ;

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22 Sumitro Joyohadikusumo Achmad Soemarjono Ginanjar 2013: Nishihara 1976: Resolusi CGMI PKI Jul Sumartojo

23 Soerono, Sudjatmiko, Budi Saronto, Wibisono Singgih, A. H. H. Husin, Lie Shie Liang, 3. Dias Hanafi, Rika Suatan, Liehantje, Soegiarto Sriwibowo, Pranadjaja, Soemarmo, Notje Kadarisman, 5. Trikojo, Prabowo, Subiarto Hadinoto, Ir. Lily Satari PKI Berita Yudha

24 Berita Yudha Mas Ban Dik Jul Dik Tshombe: 9 Djawoto Ahem Erningpradja Harian Kami Minguan Mahasiswa Indonesia PPI 30

25 9 30 Lie Shie Liang PKI PPI Abdul Habib KAMI Pelopor Baru, Duta Masyarakat

26 IMF Inter-governmental Group on Indonesia, IGGI ODA IGGI CGI Consultative Group on Indonesia 32

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28 33 Baskara T. Wardaya 2013 A Tale of Two views: Indonesia s 1965 Tragedy in the Eyes of US Foreign Policy Makers and the Tragedy s Victim paper presented at at a conference New Perspectives on 1965 in Indonesia, held at The Australian National University, Canberra, on February 2013 Fujikura Tetsuro 2016 Pemberitaan Media Vietnam in Kurasawa & Matsumura edit. G30D dan Asia, Jakarta; Kompas Ginanjar Kartasasmita 2008 Managing Indonesia s Transformation: An Oral History, Singapore: Scientific World Nishihara Masashi 1976 The Japanese and Sukarno s Indonesia: Tokyo-Jakarta Relations, , Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii Simpson Bradley 2008 Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U.S. Indonesian Relations, , Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press Tanaka, Yuichiro, Pemberitaan Media Korea Utara dan Selatan in Kurasawa & Matsumura edit. G30D dan Asia, Jakarta; Kompas Tshombe, Lima Puluh Tahun Mahanda

29 / Berita Yudha Duta Masyarakat Harian Gelora Harian Kami Minguan Mahasiswa Indonesia, Pelopor Baru Tempo US Declassified documents Coup and Counter Reaction: October 1965 March 1966 No. 145 Memo. Of Tel. Bet. Ball and Rusk Washington Oct No. 155 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to Department of State Djakarta Oct No. 163 Telegram from Dept. of State to the Embassy Washington Oct No. 167 Memo. From Director to the office of Southwest Pacific Affairs Cuthell to the assistant secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Bundy Washington Nov No. 168 Memo from Nuechterlein to Deputy assistant secretary of Defense for International security affairs Friedman Washington Nov No. 179 Telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia to Department of State Djakarta Dec A A

30 & Abdul Habir Amangku Ali Shahab & 4 3 Witaryono Reksopredjo Gatot Wilotikto Sujatmoko Soemarmo Dewi Soekarno Trikoyo Turi Ramijo Torseno Lie Shie Liang Lili Satari

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„h‹¤.05.07 Japanese Civilian Control in the Cold War Era Takeo MIYAMOTO In European and American democratic countries, the predominance of politics over military, i.e. civilian control, has been assumed as an axiom.