- Margin of Safety V. Cha & D. Kang, Nuclear North Korea J. Pollack,The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework V. Cha Hawk En

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1 The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis Revised from the Perspective of Defensive Realism CHOI, Jung Hoon The Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis emerged due to the testimony given by J. Kerry, Assistant Secretary of Department of State, who visited DPRK in Oct. and that revealed a North Korean high-ranked officer acknowledged that DPRK possessed clandestine High Enriched Uranium Program, seen as the evidence of North Korea s vicious intension to threaten US security and the world peace and stability, although North Korea denied what Kerry reported afterward. The controversy between US and DPRK had not been resolved, and both sides since took hawkish behavior, while arguing their own actions were self-defense one another. As a result, the Agreed Framework, where the tensions over the Korean Peninsula were successfully calmed down from to, ended up to be collapsed. This paper presents that the cause of the Second North Korean Nuclear Crisis can be found in terms of the Spiral Model of Defensive Realism, where Security Dilemma inevitably takes place when nation states choose self-defense-oriented actions for keeping status quo in security, and by mutually misperceiving other s behaviors because of the lack of trust. North Korea; US Security Strategy; North Korean Nuclear Crisis; Missile Defense; Defensive Realism

2 - Margin of Safety V. Cha & D. Kang, Nuclear North Korea J. Pollack,The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework V. Cha Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula V. Cha R. Jervis R. Lebow SD SD

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20 H. Morgenthau ( ), Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, th ed., Knopf, p. R. Jervis ( ), Cooperation under the Security Dilemma, World Politics, ( ) : -, p. H. SD R. Jervis ( ), pp. -. L. Insecurity Greed L. Glaser ( ), The Security Dilemma Revisited World Politics, ( ): -, p. -. NFU - - 전주한미대사보스워스가말하는 악의축의진실 제네바합의지키지않은건오히려미국

21 Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, South Korea Offers to Supply Energy If North Gives Up Arms ( / / ), / / /AR. html, Accessed on Oct., R. - - Statement By The President, June,, accessed on Oct, - NPT NPT NPT NPT V. Cha & D. Kang ( ), Nuclear North Korea, Columbia University Press, p. KEDO S. Hecker, Can the North Korea Nuclear Crisis be Resolved?, CISCS (Mar., ), p. kg HEU kg news.jp/cn/ /CN.html EUP HEU LEU HEU HEU HEU ISIS D. Albright & C. Walrond, ISIS, North Korea s Estimated Stocks of Plutonium and Weapon-Grade Uranium Aug.,, p IAEA ( ), Application of Safeguards in the Democratic People s Republic of Korea (GOV/ / -GC ( ) / ), pp. -.

22 CIA J. Pollack ( ), The United States, North Korea, and the End of the Agreed Framework, pp. -. kg HEU KEDO 북, 제네바합의경수로보다북미수교목적KEDO 사무총장 D.Gregg& D. Oberdorfer, A Moment to Seize with North Korea, Washington Post (June, ) R. Jervis, ( ) - Defense Planning Guidance Report of the Rumsfeld Space Commission, Executive Summary, pp. vii-viii, cited by rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/rumsfeld_space_commission, accessed on Oct, Secretary Rumsfeld Announces Major National Security Space Management and Organizational Initiative (May, ), Department of Defense, aspx?releaseid=, accessed on Oct. V. Cha, ( ), Hawk Engagement and Preventive Defense on the Korean Peninsula, International Security, ( ): pp. - M. TMD

23 Sequen al Choice Version of Stag hunt 4,4 1,3 3,1 2,2

冷戦後の戦略環境変化とクリントン政権

冷戦後の戦略環境変化とクリントン政権 1998 11 3558 1 21 2 1 Paul D. Wolfowitz, Clinton s First Year, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 15 (January/February, 1994). 2 91 36 3 91 G-7 G-7 4 G-7 5 (primacy) 6 1949 1950 1962 10 71 89 11 91 12 3 James