2003
Outline of the Study 1. Purpose Housing finance in Japan is now at a turning point because the Government Housing Loan Corporation (the HLC) is scheduled to become an independent administrative institution in 2007. This transformation will completely relegate the HLC s major functionof supplying long-term, fixed-term and low-interest housing loansto private financial institutions. There are, however, several issues that must be overcome to enable the private sector to offer a steady supply of housing loans. One scheme, or solution, is for the HLC to purchase housing loan bonds before the introduction of securitization in October 2003. In the United States, the issuance of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) dates back to 1970. Outstanding issues, as of 2001, were approximately 2.8 trillion dollars. On the contrary, the housing loan securitization market in Japan is still quite small, and its history is short; total loans securitized by the HLC stood at a mere 950 billion yen at the end of FY2002. There is the potential, however, that Japan can develop a securitization market in only 10 yearsalthough the process took 30 years in the U.S. The purposes of this study are to: a) examine the business model of American mortgage companies, b) discuss the significance of introducing a mortgage company system into Japan, and c) propose a Japanese business model to stimulate the country s housing loan securitization market. 2. Chapter Outline Chapter 1 examines housing loans in Japan from two perspectives: a) how private financial institutions, or loan providers, are treating housing loans (based on a questionnaire survey and product database development) and; b) how consumers view housing loans (based on a questionnaire survey of people purchasing housing after 2000 asking about the type of house they purchased and their opinions of housing loans). Based on the results of the two surveys, the authors examine the present situation, and the possible future of housing loans. Chapter 2 examines US mortgage companies in the American housing loan market, their management style and profit structure. The authors discuss the legal controls in the U.S. market that could benefit Japan when she introduces mortgage companies into the Japanese market. Chapter 3 proposes a model for a Japanese mortgage company, based on the HLC s securitization scheme (purchase of housing loan bonds), to stimulate the Japanese housing loan securitization market. The authors discuss management style, profit structure, the companies that might entering this business, and the issues to be challenged to enable mortgage companies to establish themselves in this country.
11 1 12 2 1 2-1 -
- 2-90 13 3 1 79.4 14 4 3 4 13
15-3 -
- 4 -
64 2003 3 1 2003 3 31 2003 3 11 2003 3 25-5 -
5 20 6 7-6 -
8 8 14 9 25-7 -
9-8 -
10 8 95 471 11 10 11 13 3-9 -
12-10 -
- 11-13
12 1.0433 6 14-12 -
25.5 5-13 -
0.1 0.8 1-14 -
33.0 33.4 53.8 41.7 5 33.0 33.4 3 15-15 -
5,000 20,000 10 / 3 3,000 3 5 2,000 5,000 5 7 1,000 7 20,000 30,000 20,000 30,000-16 -
473-17 -
- 18 -
- 19 -
5 4 1 2 8 9 5 3-20 -
51.2 30.0 2 4 1 68.7 65.0 59.5 61.7 54.9 1 2-21 -
- 22 -
2000 2003 3 2000 1 12 2001 1 12 2002 2003 3-23 -
2000 1 12 2002 1 2003 3 3 2000 1 12 2002 1 2003 3 1/2 3-24 -
4 40.1 30.1 2 70-25 -
11 5 10 8 6 4 2-26 -
37.5 31.3 4.7 1 16-27 -
- 28-2000 2001 2002 1 2003 3 3
- 29 -
- 30 -
- 31 -
- 32 -
- 33 -
- 34 -
- 35 -
- 36 -
8.3 8.2 20 4.9 5.3 5.4 20-37 -
1 473 25.6 24.7 2002 20.1 20 4-38 -
2 17 185 76.9 18 17 18-39 -
3 19 8 19 12 9 29 10 19 9 11 12 6 25,000 10,217 40.9-40 -
384 40.9 35.2 2002 360 2001 12-41 -
- 42-20 20
- 43 -
- 44-21 1980 S&L 21 1938
Lender 23 3 24 10 '300 Lender 24 Lender 22 23 2-4 24-45 -
Lender Lender RESPA Lender 25 26 1500 8 500 27 25 1938 26 1970 27-46 -
28 29 2,000 500 250,000 20 300,000 HUD 30 HUD 200 HUD 0.3 0.5 28 http://www.banking.state.ny.us/iambb.htm 29 FHA 30-47 -
- 48 - Lender
Lender Lender 15 30456090 3 1 Lender Lender 5.50 3 90 500,000 5,000 Lender 1 0.25 5,000 31-49 -
RESPA RESPAREAL ESTATE SETTLEMENTE PROCEDURES ACT RESPA RESPA RESPA RESPA RESPA RESPA RESPA GOOD FAITH ESTIMATE RESPA GFE HUD-1 HUD-1A 34 1-4 RESPA 32 MBA(2002) Mortgage Bankers Guide to Regulatory Compliance 33 34-50 -
35 FHA B 36 37 35 36 37-51 -
RESPA RESPA 1-4 RESPA TILA 38 38-52 -
1% 1 GFE GFE a. GFE HUD-1 HUD-1A L b. GFE 1 TIL 39 ID GFE a. 3 GFE GFE 39 TRUTH IN LENDING - 53 -
3 GFE GFE a. GFE 3 GFE b. GFE GFE GFE c. 3 GFE GFE a. b. c. 12 RESPA a. HUD X D - 54 -
b. HUD-1 HUD-1A RESPA HUD-1 HUD-1 RESPA HUD-1 HUD-1A HUD-1 HUD-1A - 55 -
HUD-1 HUD-1 HUD-1A RESPA HUD RESPA RESPA RESPA HUD HUD * * VOE VOD / / / / * * - 56 -
HUD RESPA 5 HUD RESPA 8 * HUD RESPA RESPA 3 VOE VOD / 40-57 -
/ / / / GFE HUD-1 HUD-1A GFE HUD-1 HUD-1A GFE HUD-1 HUD-1A HUD a. 1-58 -
b. 3 3 0% 3 12 3 a. (i) (ii) (iii) b. - 59 -
c. 15 1 15 d. 60 1 20-60 -
- 61-41 41
- 62 -
42 2005 2003 3 42-63 -
- 64 -
43 13 3-65 -
- 66 -
- 67 -
44 2 45 13-68 -
46 3-1 47 MBS - 69 -
- 70-48 48
49 14 4-71 -
2000 35 50 10 50 1-72 -
1 bp 51 20bp 2.63% 10bp 10bp 10bp 10bp 10 20bp 10bp 3bp MBS 10bp 10bp 30bp 52 51 bp 0.01 52-73 -
53 2002-74 -
- 75 -
- 76 -
54 02 1-77 -
RESPA - 78 -
- 79 - < > < > http://www.banking.state.ny.us/iambb.htm