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1 The Journal of Social Science 58 [2006] pp MoPS (executive function) (political executive) (political appointment) 1 (John Halligan) (internal-external) (political-non-political) 2 * 29

2 (external-political) (internal-non-political) 3 (Patricia Ingraham) (Guy Peters) 8 NPM NPM 30

3 (Joel D. Aberback) ( 39 )

4 (Ministerial Staff) (Special Adviser) 1972 ( ) 16 4 ( ) 17 (Patrick Weller) 18 32

5 1976 ( ) ( ) ( ) Holland, 2002a, p

6 ( ) 20 (Public Service Reform Act 1984) 1987 ( ) (Public Service Legislation [streaming] Act 1986) (Senior Executive Service SES) (Public Service Board) (Public Service Commission) (Members of Parliament (Staff) Act: MoPS ) MoPS (seconded) ( ) 34

7 24 MoPS (office-holders) (1 ) MoPS (9 ) MoPS 27 MoPS 3 (a) (aa) 12 (b) (a) 28 (Ministry) 29 (parliamentary secretary) (Executive Council) (b) 31 (7 ) 32 ( ) 35

8 ( ) (11 ) 13 4 (i) ( 12 ) (ii) ( ) (iii) ( ) ( ) (iv) ( 16 2 ) ( 21 ) (Directions) (Special Minister of State) (9 ) 33 MoPS 34 MoPS (Certified Agreement) (8 ) (Industrial Relations Act 1988) ( ) (Australian Workplace Agreement: AWA s) (Workplace Relations Act 1996) SES 35 (Determinations) ( 14 3 ) 36 36

9 MoPS (Maria Maley) ( ) * 39 MoPS 3 37

10 (Samuel E. Finer) (responsible) answerable to answerable for 40 (accountability: ) (responsibility: ) (Ministerial Accountability) (Philip Ruddock) 41 38

11 ( ) (de facto assistant Ministers) ( ) 46 (evidence) ( ) ( ) (21 ) 39

12 permanent secretaries departmental secretaries (Moore-Wilton) 1996 NPM 52 NPM ( 58 1 ) ( 59 ) 1999 ( : FCA 1132) 53 ( 58 4 )

13 SES SES 1999 ( ) SES (Directions) 54 SES ( 38 ) 55 ( ) (ongoing) ( ) SES 57 3 MoPS MoPS 41

14 (40,42 ) ( 48 A) MoPS MoPS (on leave without pay) ( 25 ) ( 24 ) MoPS 59 42

15 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) 40 Halligan et al., pp ibid. Ingraham, pp.xviii-xxii. (161 (Herbert Kaufman) (neutral competence) (political neutrality) Peters et al., p.2. ibid. ibid., p.284. Weller, 1989, p.371. Aberback et al., p (88 ) 41 Dunn, p.9. RCAGA, p.105. Weller, 2001, p.101. Wilenski, p.38. Commonwealth of Australia, p Campbell et al., p.204. Maley, 2002, p.105. Finance and Public Administration References Committee (the Senate)

16 (26) (Department of Finance and Administration, Additional Information (Finance and Public Administration References Committee), 1 October 2003, question 9) (MoPS 31 ) (27) (Opposition) 1 ( ) (28) 3 (29) Ministry Cabinet 41 (30) 8 ( 12 ) 12 2 (31) Government Members Secretariat (32) (Australian National Audit Office, pp.30-31) (33) (Department of Finance and Administration) (Ministerial and Parliamentary Service) (34) Holland, 2002c, p.1. (35) AWAs (8 ) (36) 2 (37) Maley, 2000, pp (38) (39) 1995 (Guidelines of Official Conduct of Commonwealth Public Service) 1999 (40) Finer, p.379. (41) Select Committee (the Senate), pp.xxv-xxvii. (42) Keating, 2003, pp (43) Select Committee (the Senate), p.xxxvii. (44) Clerk of the Senate, p.4. 44

17 (Tiernan, P.97) (45) Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, p.4. (46) Prime Minister, pp (47) ibid., pp (48) (Weller et al., p.157) (49) ibid., p.158. (50) ibid. (51) ibid., p.160. (52) Reith ( 7 (53) ( 59 3 ) ( 2 ) (54) (Public Service & Merit Protection Commission, pp.3-4.) (55) ibid., p.11. (56) 1999 permanent temporary ongoing non-ongoing ongoing non-ongoing (57) Mulgan, p.7. (58) Halligan et al., p.89. (59) Public Employment (Consequential and Transitional) Amendment (PECTA) Act 1999 (Sched.1). ( 21 ) Aberback, Joel D., and Bert A. Rockman, Comparative Administration: Methods, Muddles, and Models, Administration and Society, 18, 1987, pp Australian National Audit Office, Administration of Staff Employed Under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984, (Audit Report No.15), Campbell, Colin and John Halligan, Political Leadership in an Age of Constraint: Bureaucratic Politics under 45

18 Hawke and Keating, St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, Commonwealth of Australia, Reforming the Australian Public Service, Clerk of the Senate, Correspondence to the Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, 22 March 2002 ( Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, Government Guidelines for Official Witnesses before Parliamentary Committees and Related Matters, 1989 ( Dunn, Delmer, D., Politics and Administration at the Top: Lessons from Down Under, University of Pittsburgh Press, Finance and Public Administration References Committee (the Senate), Staff employed under the Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984, Finer, Samuel Edward., The Individual Responsibilities of Ministers, Public Administration, 34, 1956, pp Halligan, John and John Power, Political Management in the 1990s, Oxford University Press, Holland, Ian, Accountability of Ministerial Staff? (Research Paper), No.19, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2002a. Holland, Ian, Members of Parliament (Staff) Act: Background, Research Note, No.14, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2002b. Holland, Ian, Members of Parliament (Staff) Act: Employment Issues, Research Note, No.15, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 2002c. Ingraham, Patricia, The Foundation of Merit: Public Service in American Democracy, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Keating, Michael, In the Wake of A Certain Maritime Incident : Ministerial Advisers, Departments and Accountability, Australian Journal of Public Administration (AJPA), 62(3), 2003, pp Maley, Maria, Australian Ministerial Advisers and the Royal Commission on Government Administration, AJPA, 61(1), 2002, pp Maley, Maria, Too Many or Too Few? The Increase in Federal Ministerial Advisers , AJPA, 59(4), 2000, pp, Mulgan, Richard, Politicisation of Senior Appointments in the Australian Public Service, AJPA, 57(3), 1998, pp Peters, Guy B., and Jon Pierre (eds.), Politicization of the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective, Routledge, Prime Minister, Guide on Key Elements of Ministerial Responsibility, 1998 ( index.cfm). Public Service & Merit Protection Commission, The Senior Executive Service (SES), Reith, Peter, Towards a Best Practice Australian Public Service, 1996 ( 46

19 apsreformdiscussionpaper.htm). Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (RCAGA), Report, Select Committee (the Senate), A Certain Maritime Incident, Tiernan, Anne, Problem or Solution? The Role of Ministerial Staff, Motivating Ministers to Morality, Dartmouth, Weller, Patrick, Australia s Mandarins: The Frank and Fearless, Crow s Nest NSA, Weller, Patrick, Politicisation and the Australian Public Service, AJPA, 48(4), 1989, pp Weller, Patrick, and Liz Young, Australia: mandarins or lemons? R.A.W. Rhodes and Patrick Weller (eds.), The Changing World of Top Officials, Open University Press, 2001, pp Wilenski, Peter, Ministers, Public Servants and Public Policy, Australian Quarterly, 51(2), 1979, pp HRM(Human Resource Management)

20 Political Appointment and Ministerial Staff in Australian Federal Government <Summary> Akiko Izumo One of the ways of enhancing executive function in government is through political appointments at the cabinet or ministerial levels or even within the public service. It is not, however, easy to define the meaning of political appointment. There is a wide variety of styles on political appointment in the national and local governments, and the difference is mostly depends on numbers and levels. It is very limited extent of political appointment applied in Japan, as there is a line of political and non-political appointment between parliamentary and departmental secretaries. On the country, it is widely spread to appoint ministerial staff in Cabinet and ministerial level. They work between politicians and public servants, forming the interface of them. Their role is facilitating exchange of interests of these two. This interface is primary critical on government turnover as it will be an issue in near future in Japan. The questions of political appointment concerning the appointee s role and their accountability criteria are explored in this article, through the ministerial staff in Australian federal government. In practice, ministers expected their departments to provide staff on secondment. The non-partisan public servants were operating within a ministerial office till Whitlam government. The situation has been reversed since then. The personal advisers, those partisans selected to work within the office, form an important part of the system of support for ministers in Hawke government. The Members of Parliament (Staff) Act 1984 (the MoPS Act) institutionalized this practice. The act classifies staff in three categories; electorate officers of the Members and Senators, ministerial consultants, and office-holders staff. The last 48

21 two categories are recognized as ministerial staff in general, excluding staff for parliamentary secretaries and others except Ministers. Within ministerial staff, advisory staff is the type of staff who provide partisan policy advice to ministers. Around half of ministerial staff are currently public servants on leave without pay. Partisan public servant is an interesting feature of the Australian ministerial office. It is a definitional impossibility in Britain, where public servants simply cannot work as special advisers. However, it is accepted with little debate that many public servants go to work in partisan rules in ministerial office and then return to work in the public service. The role of ministerial staff have become a permanent and accepted part of machinery of government over Keating government, facilitated by several public service reform to enhance political responsiveness from bureaucracy. Yet, some incidents such as the Children Overbroad Affair, revealed the serious influence of ministerial staff on bureaucracy. Ministerial advisers are not accountable to government at present. It is discussed that ministerial staff is required its own regulatory framework. Lastly, departmental secretaries are also political appointees in Australia. There is a warning to politicization of senior public servants, but it is thought to be still closer to the professional Westminster model in this dimension than to a fully politised system. 49

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