1489 TESLA 9) ARIANDE 10) DoS SEAD 11) CONFIDANT 12) TRUST-BASED ROUTING 13) AODV-REX 14) Watchdog Parther 15) CONFIDANT ALARM CONFIDANT ALARM TRUST-B

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1 Vol. 51 No (Sep. 2010) Trust Level Evaluation for Communication Paths in MANETs Using Attribute Certificate Shinichiro Inoue, 1 Masakuni Ishii, 1 Naofumi Sugaya, 1 Takeshi Yatagai 1 and Iwao Sasase 1 Since a Mobile Ad hoc NETwork (MANET) is a distributed and selforganized network which closely depends on cooperation among mobile nodes, it is important to consider the existence of malicious nodes that intentionally modify packets or do not forward packets. Recently, for evading those malicious nodes in communication routes, a number of trust-based secure routing protocols have been proposed. However, two problems are remained in trust sharing or reporting phase in conventional schemes. One problem is that trust itself might be modified. The other problem is that a node might impersonate other nodes. In this paper, we propose a scheme to evaluate trust level of communication paths in MANETs using Attribute Certificates (ACs). Using ACs enables to detect if trust has been modified, and if a node has spoofed thier IDs. Moreover, our proposed scheme is able to not only increase security level, but also share trust effectively using ACs in a witty way. In simulation, we show the effectiveness of using ACs for sharing trust. 1. MANET: Mobile Ad-hoc NETwork 1) MANET DSR 2) AODV 3) MANET 4) 5) MANET CA Certificate Authority ARAN 6) SPAAR 7) SAODV 8) ARAN SPAAR SAODV 1 Department of Information and Computer Science, Faculty of Science and Technology, Keio University 1488 c 2010 Information Processing Society of Japan

2 1489 TESLA 9) ARIANDE 10) DoS SEAD 11) CONFIDANT 12) TRUST-BASED ROUTING 13) AODV-REX 14) Watchdog Parther 15) CONFIDANT ALARM CONFIDANT ALARM TRUST-BASED ROUTING DSR RREQ AODV-REX AODV RREP CONFIDANT TRUST-BASED ROUTING AODV-REX 2 2 MANET 16) SMR 17) MANET SMR SMR 2.1 MANET CA MANET A B B C A C 1 1

3 SMR RREP Fig. 3 RREP sendig in SMR. Fig. 1 1 MANET On demand distributed public key management for wireless ad hoc networks. RREQ SMR S D 3. CON- FIDANT TRUST-BASED ROUTING AODV-REX 2 SMR RREQ Fig. 2 RREQ flooding in SMR. MANET 2.2 SMR SMR SMR RREQ 2 S D RREQ RREQ 2 D C F I RREQ RREQ RREQ RREP 3 D RREP WATCHDOG-PATHRATER 18) ESTABLISHING TRUST 15) 3.1 CONFIDANT CONFIDANT ALARM ALARM RREQ 3.2 TRUST-BASED ROUTING TRUST-BASED ROUTING DSR RREQ 21)

4 TRUST-BASED ROUTING RREQ Fig. 4 Trust sharing by RREQ in TRUST-BASED ROUTING. 4 TRUST-BASED ROUTING TxY X Y S D RREQ RREQ RREQ 4 a S RREQ TaS a RREQ d Tda TRUST-BASED ROUTING TxY X Y 3.3 AODV-REX AODV-REX AODV RREQ RREQ ID RREQ RREQ AODV-REX AODV 3.4 CONFIDANT TRUST- BASED ROUTING AODV-REX Fig. 5 Conventional scheme for trust sharing. 5 A 5 5 A B C X

5 ) 6 A B C X X X Fig. 6 Proposed scheme for trust sharing. 7 Fig. 7 Flowcart of proposed scheme.

6 ) 20) 8 A B A B B A ID B ID A B ID 8 Fig. 8 An example of attribute certificate. ID A A 4.1.3

7 Fig. 9 Proposed way to gather attribute certificates. SMR SMR 17) SMR SMR 9 RREP 9 S D D RREP S RREP S RREP A B A A A A A A S

8 Fig. 10 Evaluation and selection of a route. 11 Fig. 11 Size of attribute certificate. 12 Fig. 12 A packet which carries attribute certificates. 22) 10 Route1 0.2 = Route = S Route MAC 48 bit UNIX 32 bit bit SHA-1 RSA 1,024 bit 1,024 bit byte byte 1 1,500 byte 10 RREP ,000 m 1,000 m 250 m SMR SMR SMR SMR RREP Mbytes

1496 13 Fig. 13 Overhead of gathering attribute certificates. SMR RREP 14 Fig. 14 Use efficiency of calculated trust. 15 Fig.

9 Fig. 13 Overhead of gathering attribute certificates. SMR RREP 14 Fig. 14 Use efficiency of calculated trust. 15 Fig. 15 Probability of using other routes. 12 RREP 3Mbytes SMR RREP 5.2 1,000 s s 1 60 s 60 s % % 20% % 50% 17 50% 1

1497 Fig. 16 16 Probability of achieving packets. 17 Fig. 17 A margin of hop numbers. 15 17 10% 20% 6. COE KDDI 1) Corson, S. and Macker, J.

10 1497 Fig Probability of achieving packets. 17 Fig. 17 A margin of hop numbers % 20% 6. COE KDDI 1) Corson, S. and Macker, J.: Mobile ad hoc networking (MANET): Routing protocol performance issues and evaluation consideration, IET-FRFC25010 (1999). 2) Johnson, D.B.: Dynamic Source Routing in Ad Hoc Networks of Mobile Hosts, Proc. IEEE Workshop on Mobile Communication Systems and Applications (1994). 3) Perkins, C.E. and Royer, E.M.: Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector Routing, WMCSA, pp (1999). 4) Dongbin, W., Mingzeng, H. and Hui, Z.: A Survey of secure routing in ad hoc networks, WAIM 2008, pp (2008). 5) Abusalah, L., Khokhar, A. and Guizani, M.: A Survey of Secure Mobile Ad Hoc Routing Protocols, Communication Surveys & Tutorials IEEE, pp (2008). 6) Sanzgiri, K., LaFlamme, D., Dahill, B., Levine, B.N., Shields, C. and Belding- Royer, E.M.: Authenticated routing for ad hoc networks, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communication, pp (2005). 7) Ramesh, R. and Kumar, S.S.: Secure Position Routing Using Ad hoc Network, ISAUHC 06, pp (2006). 8) Zapata, M.G. and Asokan, N.: Securing ad hoc routing protocols, WiSe 02 (2002). 9) Perrig, A., Canneti, R., Tygar, J.D. and Song, D.: The TESLA Broadcast Authentication Protocol, RSA CryptoBytes, pp.2 13 (2002). 10) Yih-Chun, H. and Perrig, A.: Ariadne: A Secure On-Demand Routing Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks, Wireless Networks 2005, pp (2005). 11) Yin-Chun, H., Johnson, D.B. and Perrig, A.: SEAD: secure efficient distance vector routing for mobile wireless ad hoc networks, Proc. 4th IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing System and Application 2002, pp.3 13 (2002). 12) Buchegger, S. and Boudec, J.L.: Perfomance Analysis of the CONFIDANT Protocol (Cooperation of Nodes: Fairness In Dynamic Ad-Hoc NeTworks), MobiHoc 2002, pp (2002). 13) Pirzada, A.A., Datta, A. and McDonald, C.: TRUST-BASED ROUTING FOR AD-HOC WIRELESS NETWORKS, ICON 2004, pp (2004). 14) Oliviero, F. and Romano, S.P.: A Reputation-based Metric for Secure Routing in Wireless Mesh Networks, IEEE GLOBECOM 2008, pp.1 5 (2008). 15) Pirzada, A.A. and McDonald, C.: Establishing Trust in pure ad-hoc networks, ACSC 2004, pp (2004). 16) Vol.103, No.692, pp (2004). 17) Lee, S.J. and Gerla, M.: Split multipath routing with maximally disjont paths in

1498 ad hoc networks, ICC2001, pp.3201 3205 (2001). 18) Marti, S., Giuli, T.J., Lai, K.

: Mitigating Routing Misbehavior in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, MOBILECOM 2000, pp.

: Analysis of a reputation system for mobile as-hoc networks with liars, WIOPT 2005, pp.

: HADOF Defense against routing disruptions in mobile ad hoc networks, IEEE INFCOM FL,

: A note on two problems in connection with graphs, Numerische Mathematik, pp.

11 1498 ad hoc networks, ICC2001, pp (2001). 18) Marti, S., Giuli, T.J., Lai, K. and Baker, M.: Mitigating Routing Misbehavior in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks, MOBILECOM 2000, pp (2000). 19) Mundinger, J. and LeBoudec, J.-Y.: Analysis of a reputation system for mobile as-hoc networks with liars, WIOPT 2005, pp (Apr. 2005). 20) Yu, W. et al.: HADOF Defense against routing disruptions in mobile ad hoc networks, IEEE INFCOM FL, pp.1 12 (2005). 21) Dijkstra, E.W.: A note on two problems in connection with graphs, Numerische Mathematik, pp (1959). 22) Yi, S. and Kravets, R.: Composite Key Management for Ad Hoc Networks, MobiQuitous 2004, pp (2004). ( ) ( ) IEEE ComSoc IEEE ConSoc Asia Pacific Director IEEE ComSoc Satellite and Space Technical Committee Chair IEEE Senior Member

TCP/IP IEEE Bluetooth LAN TCP TCP BEC FEC M T M R M T 2. 2 [5] AODV [4]DSR [3] 1 MS 100m 5 /100m 2 MD 2 c 2009 Information Processing Society of

TCP/IP IEEE Bluetooth LAN TCP TCP BEC FEC M T M R M T 2. 2 [5] AODV [4]DSR [3] 1 MS 100m 5 /100m 2 MD 2 c 2009 Information Processing Society of IEEE802.11 [1]Bluetooth [2] 1 1 (1) [6] Ack (Ack) BEC FEC (BEC) BEC FEC 100 20 BEC FEC 6.19% 14.1% High Throughput and Highly Reliable Transmission in MANET Masaaki Kosugi 1 and Hiroaki Higaki 1 1. LAN