Darwall (ed.), Equal Freedom (University of Michigan Press, 1995); Andrew Mason (ed.), Ideals of Equality (Basil Blackwell, 1998); Louis P Pojman and Robert Westmoreland (eds.), Equality: Selected Readings (Oxford University Press, 1997); Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality (Macmillan, 2000); Matthew Clayton and Andrew Williams (eds.), -Social

yard University Press, 1971); Ronald Dworkin, "What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare & Part 2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy & Public Af- Pojman and Westmoreland (eds.), op.cit., pp. 218-228; Kai Nielsen, Equality and Liberty: A Defense of Radical Egalitarianism (Rowman& Allenheld, 1985); Richard J. Arneson, "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," Philosophi- Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1977), pp. 234ff. reland (eds.), op. cit., pp. 9-10. (7) Dworkin, WE Part2, pp. 283-290. (8) Ibid., p. 293. (9) Ibid., pp. 310-312. (10) Ibid., pp. 297-299. (11) Ibid., pp. 292-297. (12) Ibid., pp. 304-323.

(14) Arneson, EEOW, pp. 79-80. (15) Ibid., p. 83. (16) Ibid., pp. 83-4. (17) Ibid., pp. 85-7. Matt Matravers, "Responsibility, Luck, and the 'Equality of What?' Debate," Review Service, Jamie Dreier and David Estlund, editors, World Wide Web, (http://www brown.edu/departments/philosophy/bears/homepage.html) (20) Eric Rakowski, Equal Justice (New York, Oxford University Press, 1991). (21) Anderson, WIPE, pp. 295-296. (22) Ibid., pp. 296-297. (23) Ibid., pp. 298-302. (24) Ibid., pp. 302-304. (25) Ibid., pp. 305-306 (26) Ibid., pp. 306-307. (27) Ibid., pp. 314-315. tya Sen, Inequality Reexamined (Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 39-42. (29) Anderson, WIPE, pp. 313-314.

(30) Ibid., pp. 321-326. (32) Iris Young, "Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model," Social Philosophy & Policy 23 (2006), pp. 102-130; Samuel Scheffler, "What Affairs 31 (2003), pp. 190-198. Samuel Scheffler, "Equality as the Virtue of Sovereigns: A Reply to Ronald Dworkin, "Philosophy & Public Affairs 31 (2003), pp. 199-206. (33) Susan L Hurlay, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge (Harvard University Press, (34) Price, T. L., "Egalitarian Justice, Luck, and the Cost of Chosen Ends," American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1999), pp. 267-278; Marc Fleurbaey, "Egalitarian Opportunities", Law and Philosophy 20 (2001), pp. 513-522.; Peter Vallentyne, "Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities, "Ethics 112 (2002), pp. 529-557. T. M. Scanlon, "The Significance of Choice," Sterling McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values (University of Utah Press, 1988), pp. 149-216. (37) Arneson, LE, pp. 13-14.

118-119, 114-115. (40) Anderson, WIPE, pp. 295, 298. (41) Scheffler, "What is Egalitarianism?", pp. 24-31. (42) Michael Otsuka, "Luck, Insurance, and Equality," Ethics 113 (2002), pp. 45-6. (43) Robert van der Veen, "Equality of Talent Resources: Procedures or Out- (44) Ibid., pp. 67-75. (45) Ibid., pp. 78-81; Ostuka, "Luck, Insurance, and Equality", pp. 46-7. tion, "Clayton and Williams (eds.), The Ideal of Equality, pp. 126-161. (50) Dworkin, SVR, pp. 122-125.

(52) Richard J. Arneson, "Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism," Ethics (53) Ibid., pp. 342-343. Do., "Equality or Priority," Mason (ed.), op. cit., p. 12. (55) Arneson, LEP, pp. 343-344. (56) Ibid., p. 344. (57) Ibid., pp. 342-343, 345. (58) Ibid., pp. 346-347. Arneson, "Disability, Priority, and Social Justice," Leslie A. Francis and Anita Silvers (eds.), Americans with Disabilities: Exploring the Implications of the Law for Individuals and Institutions, (London: Routledge, 2000). van Parijs, Real Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? (Clarendon Press, 1995). (61) Bernard A. 0. Williams, "The Idea of Equality," Peter Laslett and WG. Runciman (eds.), Philosophy, Politics and Society, Second Series: A Collection (Basil Blackwell, 1962), pp. 110-131.

The Annuals of Japanese Political Science Association 2006-I Summary of Articles Between Luck and Equality: One Dimension of Contemporary Normative Egalitarian Theory Fumio IIDA (11) This paper attempts to clarify the ways in which recent egalitarians have differentiated themselves by examining their core idea to neutralize the influence of different kinds of luck in distributive justice. The paper first highlights the ways in which both resourcist and welfarist egalitarians have accepted the idea of neutralizing the influence of luck in reference to the arguments of Ronald Dworkin and Richard Arneson until 1990's. Second, the paper focuses on the way in which Elizabeth Anderson criticized both of these egalitarian formulations under the labeling of "luck egalitarianism". Finally, this paper examines the different ways in which both resourcist and welfarist responded to the objections of Anderson in reference to the recent development of Dworkin's insurance schemes and Arneson's responsibility-catering prioritarianism. The paper concludes that the idea of neutralizing the influence of luck still plays an important role in egalitarian theory today, although some important revisions are indispensable to provide for the possible objections.