CO 2 CO 2 CO 2 CO 2 CO 2 CO 2 CO 2 CO 2 OKADA, Akira 1 1.1 CO 2 CO 2 11997CO 19980.4 200020022006 CO 2006 1.2199016.7 1 CO2Mt-CO2 300 250 200 150 0 50 0 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 1 CO 2006 2005 CO 1.2 CO CO 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 3 3 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 1 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1 2 CO2 1.2 CO 2 21998CO CO CO 2002 CO CO 200820125 GHGGreenhouse Gases 19906 201990 15.1 1 2 002 Vol.11 No.2 2008 Summer
3 20073 1,440 2 31 200515 199223 3 CO Mt-CO2 0 5 15 20 21 7.7 3.8 ITS 3.6 3.4 3.0 55 Mt-CO2 2.7 1.9 1.4 1.3 5.2 4 5 CO 200712 2015 20077 5 20 33.5Mt-CO CO CO GHG 6 7 7-9 1.3 GHG CO CO CO 3 4 CO 2 Vol.11 No.2 2008 Summer 003
3 CES 4 5 CO 2 Rubin and Kling 11 Rubin and Kling Rubin and Kling HC 6 Wang 12 Kling 13 CO 1990 Albrecht 14 Raux and Marlot 15 Raux and Marlot 1,000 Raux and Marlot Ahmad and Greene 16 Fischer et al. 17 Austin and Dinan 18 CAFECorporate Average Fuel Economy Standards Fischer et al. 17 CAFE 2000 Austin and Dinan 18 14 5 CAFE 004 Vol.11 No.2 2008 Summer
Austin and Dinan 3 CO 11 CO 2 2 3.1 2 GHG 8- CES 1 6 4 4 7 9 7-9 7-9 CES 2 16A 8 AA A A 17 CES 4 4 7 CESu x 2 x 1 1 Vol.11 No.2 2008 Summer 005
u x 1 0.5 x 2 2 0.55 x 21 21 3.5 x 22 22 0.25 A A B B A A B B i 1 CES p 1 1p 2 I 1x 1 x 2 p 2 x 2 p 2 x 2 x 21 x 22 x 211 x 212 x 213 x 214 x 221 x 222 x 223 x 224 211 0.1 212 0.1 213 0.1 214 0.1 221 0.1 222 0.1 223 0.1 224 0.1 x 2111 x 2112 x 2121 x 2122 x 2131 x 2132 x 2141 x 2142 x 2211 x 2212 x 2221 x 2222 x 2231 x 2232 x 2241 x 2242 k=1,2j=1,2,3,44 4 22i 22 CES p 221 Ap 222 Ap 223 Bp 224 B 42 x 211 x 224 p 21 p 22 5 4 p 221 p 224 7 p 2kj x 2kj k=1,2; j=1,2,3,4 x 2kj1 x 2kj2 6A 2 2i 2 CES p 21 p 22 2 x 21 x 22 p 2 6 221i 221 CES p 2211 Ap 2212 FE 2212 A 68x 2111 x 2242 p 211 p 224 3 p 21 x 21 p 22 x 22 x 2kj 7 006 Vol.11 No.2 2008 Summer
p 22j1 j=1,2,3,4 p D 22j1 j=1,2,3,4 p 21j1 j=1,2,3,4 FE 22j2 j=1,2,3,4 FE 21j2 p 2kj2 k=1,2j=1,2,3,4 3.2 2 2 8 Fischer et al. 17 2 1 9 4 AB4A B 3.2.1 AB 8 A B ABp0 22j1 jp s 22j1 jx s 22j1 jfe 22j1 j C A FE 22j1 C B FE 22j1 AB p s 22j1 x s 22j1 FE 22j1 3p0 22j1 89CFE 22j1 20 FE0 22j1 ja1a2a4 a1a2a44.2 1718 3.2.2 9 89 11 12 p FET FE REG 22j1 j 1112 Vol.11 No.2 2008 Summer 007
3.3 13 14 13 14 x 21j1 x 21j2 x 21j2 3.4 3 3 3 15 16 p g p tax g 17 17 11 3.5 9 4 4 4 a1a2a4 4.1 13 9 4 2003 263,360 21 281,000 71-921,000 161,000 22 23 22 2,700-2,7351,000 1,630-1,800 76-1361,000 53-83 X2211 X2221 X2231 X2241 8021,000 770 490 1,007 15,8371,000 26,886 25 27 008 Vol.11 No.2 2008 Summer
FE2212 FE2222 FE2232 FE2242.4kml 14.6.1 15.2 24 90 26 1,000km 27 42.6l 27 Q,pg 11 X,h 1km FE,pg X,h Greene 28 4 X,h 0.17 Q,pg 0.18 29 0.030.26 4 1 21 211 212 213 214 2111 2112 2121 2122 2131 2132 2141 2142 1 0.935 0.118 0.617 0.030 0.236 0.597 0.403 0.624 0.376 0.591 0.409 0.634 0.366 2 22 221 222 223 224 2211 2212 2221 2222 2231 2232 2241 2242 4.2 2.16E-5 0.065 0.312 0.190 0.274 0.223 0.963 0.037 0.957 0.043 0.962 0.038 0.962 0.038 18 a1a2a4 20 5 20 A B 5.3 20 1120 a1 a2 a4 20 4.3 3,433 6,302 38,895 4,512 6,796 41,095 8-6 CO2 5 3 CO GAMSGeneral Algebraic Modeling System 5.1 2,361 20,675 8,482 19.3l 30,000t-C 9.9l 7km 2.5km 2,785 24,173 4,324 7 413 Vol.11 No.2 2008 Summer 009
Reg Tax RegTx TraTx 5.2 13kml 17kml 0.3kml Reg 5l 15l 0.3l RegTx CO 5 8 93 200 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 0 2 4 6 8 CO2Mt-CO2 CO2 CO2 Reg 1.26 1,014 7 23 12 88 1,074 1.12 877 15 15 5 CO CO 51 9 21 11 76 912 Tax 4.11 1,440 395 77 40 1,067 139 RegTx 5.34 2,455 389 1 52 963 951 12 TraTx 5.2 2,320 405 98 50 979 788 CO 8 CO Fischer et al. 17 15 CO 8 8CO 2 8 13 CO 82 83 1 8917 CO CO 11 0 Vol.11 No.2 2008 Summer
5.3 4 CO 2 AB 5.3.1 CES Q,pg 0.300.12 211 222 69 5.20.17 0 0 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 Q,p g 0.6 0.8 6 CO 9 CO 8 5.3.2 0.30 0.30 1 1.2 5.2A 1.4 CO2Mt-CO2 0.12 0.17 Reg CO2 1.30 1,015 1 CO2 24 12 90 1,069 8 1.16 878 15 21 11 78 909 Reg 1.26 1,014 7 23 12 88 1,074 1.12 877 9 21 11 76 912 0.12 0.12 1.6 1.8 Reg 1.15 1,011 22 21 11 83 1,084 0.30 2 1.03 875 5 19 72 923 B 3 AB 1A B 2 2 3 23 7 71 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 2 2 900 0.5 1 1.5 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 3 900 3 2 0.5 1 1.5 CO2Mt-CO2 1 Reg CO2 1.26 1,060 7 CO2 23 12 90 1,121 8 1.05 849 20 70 878 2 Reg 1.26 1,025 6 23 12 89 1,085 1.07 843 8 20 71 877 3 Reg 1.26 1,048 8 23 12 89 1,1 7 CO 57 23 32 2 3 CO 2 1. 885 11 20 75 918 Vol.11 No.2 2008 Summer 011
5.4 5.25.32 CO CO CO Ahmad and Greene 16 2,500 12 Tietenberg 30 6 CO CO CO CES 1 1 3 13 1990.311.913Mt-CO 2 2 3 4 11 A A1 A2 B B1 kml 17 12 kml 14 14 14 kml AA117km/lA2km/l2 14km/l AA11 3km/l=1714 A214km/l=14 4km/l AA120A2 A20km/l=3204 B112km/lB11 B20km/l BA20km/l 14km/l 514 14 6 19 8 3 4 2 20 kml 60 40 20 14kml 012 Vol.11 No.2 2008 Summer
74 8 81718 9 11PQFEX 1kmhhP/FE QX/FE Q,p P/QdQ/dP18 18 12 1,800 12008 19902006 http://www-gio.nies.go.jp/aboutghg/data/2008/n001_6gas_2008- gioweb_j1.36.xls2008/5/29 22007 http://www.cgt.mlit.go.jp/koukan/toukei.html2007/12/25 32007 http://www.mlit.go.jp/jidosha/nenpi/nenpilist/nenpilist.html2007/12/25 42005 http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ondanka/kakugi/050428keikaku_betu.pdf 2006/8/11 5 2008 http://www.mlit.go.jp/kisha/kisha08/01/0208_.html2008/3/24 6 2001 72001 45pp. 187-19 82002 709IV-56pp. 39-49 92004 48pp. 161-170 United Nation Framework Convention on Climate Change2002Decision 15/CP.7: Principles, nature and scope of the mechanisms pursuant to Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto ProtocolFCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2online http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop7/13a02.pdf#page=22006/8/21 11J. Rubin and C. Kling1993An emission saved is and emission earned: An empirical study of emission banking for light-duty vehicle manufactures Journal of Environmental Economics and Management25(3), pp. 257-274 12M.Q. Wang1994Cost savings of using a marketable permit system for regulating light-duty vehicle emissionstransport Policy1(4), pp. 221-232 13C.L. Kling1994Emission trading vs. rigid regulations in the control of vehicle emissionsland Economics70(2), pp. 174-188 14J. Albrecht2000The diffusion of cleaner vehicles in CO 2 emission trading designstransportation Research Part D5(5), pp. 385-401 15C. Raux and G. Marlot2005A system of tradable permits applied to fuel consumption by motoriststransport Policy12(3), pp. 255-265 16S. Ahmad and D.L. Greene2003A preliminary economic analysis of tradable credits for fuel economy standardstrb 03-4082TRB 2003 Annual Meeting CD-ROMCD-ROM 17C. Fischer, W. Harrington and I.W.H. Parry2007Should Corporate Average Fuel Economy standards be tightened?energy Journal28(4), pp. 1-30 18D. Austin and T. Dinan2005Clearing the air: The costs and consequences of higher CAFE standards and increased gasoline taxesjournal of Environmental Economics and Management50, pp. 562-582 191989 202007 07-11 212006 222006 232006 242003 CD-ROM CD-ROM 252006 http://www.jama.or.jp/stats/m_report/index.html2007/5/4 262007 272006 http://toukei.mlit.go.jp/06/06a0excel.html2007/5/4 28Greene, D.1997Why CAFE WorkedOak Ridge National Laboratory 2920032 pp. 171-176 30T.H. Tietenberg2006Market PowerEmissions Trading: Principles and Practice, 2 nd ed., RFF Presspp. 144-164 Evaluation of Tradable Permit Policy to Reduce CO 2 Emission from Private Passenger Vehicles in Japan: A Case of Fuel Economy Trading Policy By Akira OKADA CO 2 emission from transportation sector in Japan has been reducing due to increasing fuel price, economic recession and CO 2 mitigation policy mix, which includes fuel economy regulation and tax exemption for purchasing better fuel economy vehicles. Japanese government makes further CO 2 reduction polices with tightening fuel economy regulation, because Japanese government intends to certainly reduce CO 2 emission from transportation sector. Existing researches, however, show that policy mix based on fuel economy regulation and tax exemption for buying new fuel-economy-improving car losses social welfare. Fuel economy trading has been gotten a lot of attention as an alternative policy for fuel economy regulation. This study evaluates introduction of fuel economy trading policy, a kind of tradable permit policy in transportation sector, to Japan. I use computational partial equilibrium model to simulate and evaluate effects of the policy. As a result, fuel economy trading policy doesnt undermine social welfare than fuel economy regulation, but reduction of CO 2 emission by the policy is less than by the regulation. Key Words : reduction of CO 2 emission from private cars, fuel economy trading, fuel economy regulation Vol.11 No.2 2008 Summer 013