March Durkheim, 1933, pp. Durkheim, 1933, p. 38f

Parsons, 1937, Vol. 1, pp. 318 9 ibid., p. 333f Habermas, 1981, Bd. 2, S. 74 ebd.,s.126

March ebd., S. 119 Diskurs latency a b Freud, 1905 AGIL Latent Pattern Maintenance Parsons et al., 1953, pp. 185 90 Parsons

Polanyi, 1966, p. 4 skill knowing-what that knowing-how ibid., p. 6 f ibid., p. 10 focal subsidiary Polanyi, 1962, p. 55 dwell in ibid., p. 59 interiorization Polanyi, 1966, p. 17

March L descriptive fallacy performative Austin, 1962, p. 6 Heritage pp. b Wieder seen but unnoticed Garfinkel, 1967, p. 36

felicitous happy constative locutionary illocutionary perlocutionary illocutionary force Austin, 1961, p. 251 Lewis

March sincerity parasitic Derrida, 1982, pp. J Searle, 1969, chap. constitutive A regulative Searle, 1969 pp. Luhmann 1988, S. 134, S. 181f, usw., 1990, S.174,usw., 1986, p.179

Kripke, 1982 x y x y=x+y x y Kripke, 1982, p. 15

March Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 81 McGinn, 1984, p. 68 Malcolm, 1986, p. 154 5 Kripke, 1982, pp.

representationalism Luhmann 1985, S.415, 1990, Kap.2,bes.S.115

March vorführen, present zeigen, show, exhibit perform Wettgenstein, 1958, p. 81 Ryle, 1949 presuppose imply Strawson Levinson chap., Grice chap.

Ryle, 1949, p. 25 intelligent knowing-how

March Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 76 Coulter, 1979, 1989 Austin, John L. 1962, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Austin, John L. 1961, Philosophical Papers, Oxford, Oxford University Press. disposition

Coulter, Jeff 1979 The Social Construction of Mind, London, Macmillan Press. Coulter, Jeff 1989 Mind in Action, Cambridge, Polity Press. Derrida, Jacques 1982, Signature Event Context, in Margins of Philosophy, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. Vol. Durkheim, Emile 1933, The Division of Labor in Society, NewYork,TheFreePress. Freud, Sigmund 1905, Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie, in Gesammelte Werke Bd. 5, London, Imago Pub. Garfinkel, Harold 1967, Studies in Ethnomethodology, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall. Grice, Paul 1989, Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. Habermas, Jürgen 1981, Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, Frankfurt a.m., Suhrkamp. Heritage, John 1984, Garfinkel and Ethnomethodology, Cambridge, Polity Press. Kripke, Saul A. 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. Levinson, Stephen C. 1983, Pragmatics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Lewis, David 1969, Convention, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press. Luhmann, Niklas 1985, Die Autopoiesis des Bewuβtseins, Soziale Welt, 36 4. Luhmann, Niklas 1986, The Autopoiesis of Social Systems in F. Geyer and J. van der Zouwen eds., Sociocybernetic Paradoxes, London, Sage. Luhmann, Niklas 1988, Die Wirtschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a.m., Suhrkamp. Luhmann, Niklas 1990, Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft, Frankfurt a.m., Suhrkamp. Malcolm, Norman 1986, Nothing is Hidden, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. McGinn, Colin 1984, Wittgenstein on Meaning, Oxford, Basil Blackwell. Parsons, Talcott 1937, The Structure of Social Action, New York, The Free Press. Parsons, Talcott 1964, Social Structure and Personality, London, The Free Press. Parsons, Talcott, Bales, Robert F. and Shils, Edward A. 1953, Working Papers in the Theory of Action, Westport, Connecticut, Greenwood Press. Polanyi, Michael 1966, The Tacit Dimension, Gloucester, Mass., Peter Smith. Polanyi, Michael 1962, Personal Knowledge, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. Ryle, Gilbert 1949, The Concept of Mind, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press. Searl, John R. 1969, Speech Acts, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Strawson, Peter Frederick 1950, On Referring, Mind, Vol. 59, pp. 320 344. a b Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1958, Philosophische Untersuchungen/Philosophical Investigations, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers. Wieder,D.L. 1974, Telling the Code, in Turner, R. ed., Ethnomethodology, Harmondsworth, Penguin.

March Norm and Mind: The Structure of Practical Action ABSTRACT Emile Durkheim focused on the problem of non-contractual element in contract inorder to explicate the nature of the social element. This idea suggests that the social or normative element should not be regarded as a kind of agreement Jürgen Habermas, but rather as something latent in action Talcott Parsons, since, as Durkheim put it, it implicitly forms the background of our explicit agreement. By using Michael Polanyi s idea of tacit knowing, we can revise the concept of latency. To know tacitly the rule being used in practical action means that the rule is not something latent and independent of action itself. John L. Austin elucidated the concept of practical action by describing it as the use of a language speech act. His efforts, however, lead us to the paradoxical consequence that the felicitous context of the practical action could not be determined. Since the felicitous context should be defined by what we call a rule, it follows that no rule could determine a course of action Saul A. Kripke. Is practical action involved in a paradox? We must draw attention to the distinction between following a rule and interpreting a rule which Ludwig Wittgenstein emphasized. Based on this distinction, Kripke s paradox turns out to be arisen from interpreting a rule, not from following a rule. In practical action, as Wittgenstein put it, the rule we follow is not to be referred, but to be showed or displayed. There is no paradox in practical action. Therefore there is no need to entparadoxieren Niklas Luhmann. This insight plays an important role for us to think about mind. As Gilbert Ryle argued, mind should not be regarded as something apart from action. Rather, mind is in the way of action, that is, in following some kind of rule or norm. Therefore it is concluded that the grammar of norm and that of mind have a common basis. Norm and mind should be regarded as something to be shown in our inter action. Key Words: practical action, referring and showing, the grammar of norm and mind.