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2003 2006 M&A 2006 5 2007 5 TOB TOB TOB TOB 2006 12 TOB Grossman-Hart 1980 TOB

free-rider TOB TOB TOB TOB TOB TOB free-rider Grossman-Hart 1980 dilution TOB pressure-to-tender Burkart-Gromb-Panunzi 1998 TOB freezeout pressure-to-tender Amihud-Kahan-Sundaram 2004 free-rider pressure-to-tender Bebchuk-Hart 2001 2 proxy fights TOB TOB free-rider

TOB Bagnoli-Lipman 1988 Holmstrom-Nalebuff 1993 freerider Shleifer-Vishny 1986 Hirshleiher-Titman 1988 2 3 free-rider 4 Bagnoli-Lipman 1988 Holmstrom-Nalebuff 1993 5 TOB Grossman-Hart 1980 Burkart-Gromb-Panunzi 1998 6 Amihud-Kahan-Sundaram 2004 freezeout 7 Bebchuk-Hart 2002 TOB TOB 8 I 0 public firm 0 TOB I I 0 1 1 I 2 1 3 I

TOB TOB conditional TOB TOB restricted TOB any and all TOB 3 2 1 0 TOB I 0 TOB 2 0 0 I I I 3 V I Bebchuk-Hart 2001 I B I Y I V I = Y I + B I I V I B I Y I = V I B I Y I 0 I I 1 R I R 3 V R R B R Y R V R = Y R + B R I N 1 Y I /N = y I B I /N = b I V I /N = v I Y R /N = y R B R /N = b R V R /N = v R

TOB I I R 3 TOB I I R (i) V R V I C T 0 (ii) V R Y I C T 0 (iii) Y R Y I C T 0 (i) (iii) TOB (ii) (i) V I Y I I Bebchuk-Hart 2001 I B I I 0 TOB B I Y I (i) (ii) 0 H h H n h N = n h h H K TOB K TOB K/N = ω TOB K TOB TOB

h 0 < n h < N K TOB TOB C T TOB q Q = Nq Y I Y R h t h h t h m h 0 m h n h f h (m h ) t h h h m h m h n h t h = m h t = (t h ) h H h t h = (t j ) j H h T = t h, T h = t j (1) h H j H h T T h h Pr[success t] t = (t h ) h H TOB T K Pr[success t h, t h = m h ] h t h = (t j ) j H h h m h S h (q, t) S h (q, t h, t h ) S R (q, t) TOB T h K m h q t = (t h ) h H h q h t h = (t j ) j H h h t h h q t = (t h ) h H Pr[success t] Pr[success t h, t h = m h ] 0 1

Pr[success t] Pr[success t h, t h = m h ] (2) m h h t pivotal (2) t = (t h ) h H h m h TOB h TOB t m h = 0 TOB h t h t h free-rider TOB TOB 1 TOB TOB q y I y R y I h h TOB q < y R 3.1 h q y R TOB TOB q y R (3) free-rider

TOB TOB TOB TOB TOB Grossman-Hart 1980 free-rider TOB TOB q < y R γ 0 < γ < 1 q < y R γ q + (1 γ) y R < y R TOB TOB TOB q h TOB 1 TOB TOB q q y R y I 1 TOB q < y R TOB 1 TOB 1 TOB y I < q TOB 1 TOB Grossman-Hart 1980 TOB (3.2-1) q < y R 1 TOB (3.2-2) y I < q 1 TOB

TOB 1 0 y I < q < y R TOB q y R TOB Bagnoli-Lipman 1988 Holmstrom-Nalebuff 1993 any and all TOB R q y R y I t * = (m * h ) h H m * h = K, m * h n, h H (4) h H h (4) TOB R n h m h 1 y R (4) q y R > q > y I (4) t * m * h m * h h TOB I 1 y I q (4) S h (q, t * ) > S h (q, t h *, m h ) for any m h m h * (5) Bagnoli-Lipman 1988, p.94, Example 1 TOB y R > q > y I K TOB 1 h m h

m * h = K, m * h n, h H h H t * = (m * h ) h H S R (t * ) = K(y R q) + B R C T (6) q y I S R (t * ) = K(y R y I ) + B R C T = (K/N) (Y R Y I ) + B R C T (7) 4.1 S R (t * ) = (K/N) (Y R Y I ) + B R C T 0 TOB K < N 2.1 y R > q > y I q 1 #H N = #H { f 0, with probability 1 f t h =, h H (8) 1, with probability f 1 TOB f TOB 1 f t f = (t h f )h H Pr[success t f ] = N j=k ( ) N f j (1 f) N j (9) J N 1 ( ) Pr[success t h f N 1, t h = 0] = f j (1 f) N 1 j (10) J j=k K 1 ( ) (1 Pr[success t h f N 1, t h = 0]) = f j (1 f) N 1 j (11) J j=0

(9) t f TOB (10) (11) h (8) h TOB TOB h (8) TOB q TOB q = (1 Pr[success t h f, t h = 0]) y I + Pr[success t h f, t h = 0] y R (12) TOB TOB (12) (10) (11) f = 0 y I f = 1 y R y R > q > y I q (12) f (12) f TOB Y R Y I TOB Pr[success t f ] Pr[success t f ](Y R Y I ) + Y I (13) (12) TOB q = Pr[success t h f, t h = 0](y R y I ) + y I (10) Pr[success t h f, t h = 0] h R S R (q, t f ) = Pr[success t f ](Y R Y I ) + Y I N{Pr[success t h f, t h = 0](y R y I ) + y I } + B R C T = (Pr[success t f ] Pr[success t h f, t h = 0])(Y R Y I ) + B R C T (14) ( ) N 1 = f K (1 f) N K (Y R Y I ) + B R C T K 1 Pr[success q, t f ] Pr[success q, t h f, t h = 0] TOB h TOB h TOB h h h N 1 K 1 h h

Pr[success q, t f ] = Pr[success q, t h f, t h = 0] 0 R q q (12) 1 TOB f q f (12) 1 1 R(14) f (14) f 0 (14) f f K f K = K/N (15) (12) f K/N Bagnoli-Lipman 1988, p.96 Holmstrom-Nalebuff 1993, p.45 TOB 1 K/N R ( )( ) S R (t f N 1 K K ( K ) = 1 K ) N K(YR Y K 1 N N I ) + B R C T (16) K + 1 R f 4.2 f K+1 = (K + 1)/N (17) R ( S R (t f N 1 K+1 ) = K ( N 1 > K ( N 1 = K )( ) K + 1 K+1 ( 1 K ) N K 1(YR Y N N I ) + B R C T )( ) K K+1 ( 1 K ) N K 1(YR Y N N I ) + B R C T (18) )( ) K K ( 1 K ) N K(YR Y N N I ) + B R C T = S R (t f K ) (18) K + 1 R f (17) Holmstrom-Nalebuff 1993, p.46, Proposition 1

R 3 2 4.3 R Holmstrom-Nalebuff 1993 Focal z * max{n h z *, 0} K > max{n h (z * + 1), 0} (19) h H h H z * z z TOB z (z * + 1) H z H z = {h H : n h z * + 1} (20) H z #H z (19) (n h z * ) K > (n h z * 1) (21) h H z h H z H z h (n h z * 1) TOB #H z H z 1 1 1 Holmstrom-Nalebuff 1993, p.51. Proposition 3 TOB y R > q > y I q t h z = 0 for h H z (22)

t h z = m h with probability f z (m h ) m h = 1, 2,..., n h for h H z (23) f z (m h ) = 1 π for m h = n h z * 1 π for m h = n h z * 0 otherwise t z = (t h z ) h H π 0 < π < 1 Holmstrom-Nalebuff 1993 ( n h = a h n for h H N = n h = a h n = a h )n K = kn (24) h H h H h H n n K Holmstrom-Nalebuff 1993, p.51. Proposition 4 Corollary y R > q > y I q n TOB 1 R S R = ω(y R Q) + B R C T (25) Q = Nq 4.5 q y I Q Ny I = Y I R Y R Y I ω (= K/N) S R = ω(y R Y I ) + B R C T TOB R q M M TOB R M = N q y I TOB I

1 y I TOB 1 q TOB 1 y I 1 4.1 N TOB q y I y I y I q > y I M = N q > y I R q > y I Bagnoli-Lipman 1988, p.100, Theorem 2 TOB y R > y I R y I TOB TOB 1 TOB R S R = (Y R Y I ) + B R C T = V R Y I C T TOB 2.1 (ii) TOB I TOB Holmstrom- Nalebuff 1993 TOB credible y R KR

M = K 4 free-rider free-rider free-rider ω 0 < ω < 1 ω = 0.5 TOB ω TOB ω ω ω < 1 1 1 q Q = Nq R α 0 < α < ω TOB Shleifer-Vishny 1986 R Y R ω TOB ω = ω α TOB ω ω < 1 α β 0 β 1 α R S R TOB S R = β(y R Q) C T, if β < ω α (26)

S R = α(y R Y I ) + β(y R Q) + B R C T, if β ω α (27) TOB S R = C T, if β < ω α (28) S R = α(y R Y I ) + β(y R Q) + B R C T, if β ω α (29) TOB S R = C T, if β < ω α (30) S R = α(y R Y I ) + β(y R Q) + B R C T, if ω β ω α (31) S R = α(y R Y I ) + ω(y R Q) + B R C T, if β > ω (32) TOB S R = β(y I Q) C T, if β < ω α (33) S R = α(y R Y I ) + β(y R Q) + B R C T, if ω β > ω α (34) S R = α(y R Y I ) + ω(y R Q) + B R C T, if β > ω (35) (26) (28) (30) TOB TOB I β(y I Q) Q Y I Q < Y I (31) (32) TOB TOB α α(y R Y I ) β(y R Q) TOB TOB ω (32) ω(y R Q) TOB β < ω α TOB TOB TOB 3.1 TOB free-rider Q Y R Q = Y R

R Q = Y R TOB R S R = α(y R Y I ) + B R C T (36) R TOB S R = α(y R Y I ) + B R C T 0 (37) α(y R Y I ) B R TOB R TOB 0 α(y R Y I ) > C T (38) α R 2.1 TOB TOB TOB ToSTNET-1 2006 5 5 2005 TOB R Y R B R B R V R Y R B R Y R B R

R F R δ 0 δ 1 δ (1 δ)f R B R (δ) B R (δ) δ 0 δ 1 δ Y R = (1 δ)f R B R = B R (δ) (39) δ R Grossman-Hart 1980 Burkart-Gromb-Panunzi 1998 Grossman-Hart 1980 δ TOB 0 Grossman- Hart 1980 dilution δ δ δ B R (δ) = δf R + B 0 (40) δf R B 0 δ credible δ = δ Y R B R 3 3 TOB

free-rider (3) Q (1 δ)f R (41) TOB (1 δ)f R 5.1 0 α < ω δ (40) R TOB S R = α{(1 δ)f R Y I } + δf R + B 0 C T 0 (42) S R S R = α{(1 δ)f R Y I } + δf R + B 0 C T = αf R +(1 α) δf R + B 0 C T (43) 0 α < ω < 1 S R δ δ S R TOB TOB δ δ Y I > (1 δ)f R (44) Q Y I > Q (1 δ)f R (45) free-rider 3 TOB TOB I TOB TOB TOB TOB Q Y I > Q (1 δ)f R TOB

TOB Grossman-Hart 1980 p.47 8 TOB Y I > Q (1 δ)f R 2 (i) TOB 1 TOB (ii) TOB 1 TOB TOB TOB Y I > Q (1 δ)f R TOB pressure-to-tender Grossman-Hart 1980 Q Y I (46) Y I TOB Amihud-Kahan-Sundaram 2004 Y I observableverifiable (46) δ R B R (δ) (40) δf R 100 δ = 1 Burkart-Gromb-Panunzi 1998 B R (δ) B R (δ) [0, 1] 2 B R (0) = F R B R (1) = 0 B R (δ) < 0 (47) 0 B R (δ) F R δ

δ R δ R η R Π R Π R = η (1 δ)f R + B R (δ) (48) δ Π R δ 0 Burkart-Gromb-Panunzi 1998 p.178 Lemma 1 B R (δ) (47) TOB R η R B R (δ) = ηf R (49) δ δ δ(η) η (47) δ 5.4 Q TOB TOB Q Q < (1 δ(ω))f R (50) 5.4 Q < (1 δ( η))f R, if ω η 1 (51) TOB ω (51) TOB

Q > F R (52) TOB 2 (1 δ(ω))f R Q F R (53) Q = (1 δ(η))f R (54) ω η 1 η η η Q β = η Q α (55) β 55 η Q (54) Q = (1 δ(η Q ))F R β (52) Burkart-Gromb-Panunzi 1998 p.179 Lemma 2 B R (δ) (47) (1 δ(ω))f R > Y I R TOB (i) Q < (1 δ(ω))f R TOB (ii) Q > F R TOB (iii) (1 δ(ω))f R Q F R Q = (1 δ(α + β))f R ω α + β 1 β 5.5 R Q Q < (1 δ(ω))f R TOB Q > F R Q = F R R 100 Q = F R (1 δ(ω))f R Q F R Q

Q = (1 δ(α + β))f R (56) β R (29) Y R = (1 δ(α + β))f R Q = (1 δ(α + β))f R S R = α{(1 δ(α + β))f R Y I } + B R (δ(α + β)) C T (57) 5.4 δ(α + β) β (56) Q β 1 1 (1 δ(ω))f R Q F R R ω α + β 1 ω α β 1 α (58) (57) β S R β δ(α + β) (49) B R (δ(α + β)) = (α + β)f R (59) δ S R = αδ F R + δ B R = βδ F R < 0 (60) ω α β 1 α R β = ω α α + β = ω R S R = α{(1 δ(ω))f R Y I } + B R (δ(ω)) C T (61) TOB Q = (1 δ(ω))f R TOB 60 ω (61) R Burkart-Gromb-Panunzi 1998 p.180 Lemma 3 p.184 Lemma4 B R (δ) (47) (1 δ(ω))f R > Y I R TOB (i) α{(1 δ(ω))f R Y I } + B R (δ(ω)) < C T R TOB α{(1 δ(ω))f R Y I } + B R (δ(ω)) C T R Q =

(1 δ(ω))f R TOB β = ω α (ii) ω R TOB TOB ω δ (47) Burkart-Gromb-Panunzi 1998 5.6(ii) ω TOB 5.6(ii) 4.3 TOB TOB TOB 100 Freezeout Squeeze out 2007 TOB 5.2.1 Grossman-Hart 1980 TOB pressure-to-tender pressure-to-tender TOB Grossman-Hart 1980 (46) Amihud-Kahan-Sundaram 2004 TOB TOB I R 0 free-rider pressure-to-tender 4 1

TOB 1 TOB TOB 0 I p 0 0 1 y R TOB C T 0 1 I p 0 1 I y I 0 1 TOB µ f TOB µ s p 0 = (1 µ f µ s )y I + µ f E[ TOB ] + µ s E[ TOB ] (62) E[ TOB ] TOB q y I E[ TOB ] TOB Amihud-Kahan-Sundaram 2004 TOB max{p 0, q} (63) p 0 TOB I q TOB (63) min{p 0, y I } q max{p 0, y I } (64) q < min{p 0, y I } TOB q TOB y I max{p 0, q} = p 0

max{p 0, y I } < q TOB max{p 0, y I } < q < q q TOB R TOB [min{p 0, y I }, max{p 0, y I }] (62) (1 µ f µ s )y I + (µ f + µ s ) min{p 0, y I } p 0 (1 µ f µ s )y I + (µ f + µ s ) max{p 0, y I } (65) (65) p 0 y I p 0 y I q = p 0 = y I (66) TOB R I 100 R S R (66) S R = Y R + B R Y I C T = V R Y I C T (67) Amihud-Kahan-Sundaram 2004 6.1 B R S R = Y R Y I C T 6.1 V R Y R Amihud-Kahan- Sundaram 2004 p.1332 Proposition 2 (63) (i) Y R Y I C T > 0 TOB (ii) Y R Y I C T < 0 TOB (iii) Y R Y I C T = 0 TOB TOB R I 6.1 B R 0 6.1 TOB TOB

Y R Y I C T 0 (68) TOB 2.1(iii) B R 0 6.1 Y R Y I C T 0 (69) TOB 2.1(ii) I B I 2.1(i) (64) Gomes 2001 TOB q Amihud-Kahan-Sundaram 2004 6.1 q y I TOB (63) TOB I q y I 6.1 (66) TOB I TOB y I TOB 6.1 TOB R I R I proxy fights

Y R > Y I (70) R R R R R C P (70) S R = B R C P > 0 (71) (71) R I R I α R S R = α(y R Y I ) + B R C P > 0 (72) TOB R Y R > Y I pressure-to-tender C T > C P free-rider R Y R R R I TOB Bebchuck 1985 Bebchuk-Hart 2001 Voting-on-acquisition-offers VAO R 1 q (a) R

(b) q R q VAO 1 qy I q > y I (73) VAO free-rider pressure-to-tender y R > q y I (74) TOB free-rider y I VAO y I > q y R (75) TOB pressure-to-tender y I VAO VAO (b) free-rider (a) pressure-totender VAO q y I S R S R = V R Y I C T (76) TOB 2.1(ii) VAO TOB TOB q Bebchuk-Hart 2001

VAO 0 I TOB 1 R TOB R R 0 TOB 7.1 (a) TOB 7.1 (b) VAO free-rider pressure-to-tender 6.1 TOB Staggered Board I Staggered Board TOB TOB TOB TOB Grossman-Hart 1980 free-rider TOB TOB TOB TOB

2 freezeout TOB pressure-to-tender 2Bebchuk-Hart 2001 TOB TOB Voting-on-acquisition-offers VAO Amihud-Kahan-Sundaram 2004 freeezeout TOB TOB 2007 freezeout Amihud-Kahan-Sundaram 2004 free-dider TOB Bagnoli- Lipman 1988 Holmstrom-Nalebuff 1993 TOB TOB free-rider TOB TOB TOB

3 2 TOB Bagnoli-Lipman 1988 Holmstrom- Nalebuff 1993 TOB TOB Burkart-Gromb- Panunzi 1998 TOB TOB Amihud-Kahan-Sundaram 2004 TOB Bebchuk-Hart 2001 Shleifer- Vishny 1986 TOB Hirshleifer-Titman 1988 free-rider TOB Chowdhry-Jagadeesh 1994 TOB TOB TOB TOB TOB

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Hirshleifer, D., and S. Titman (1990), Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids, Journal of Political Economy 98, 295-328. Holmstrom, B., and B. Nalebuff (1992), To the Raider Goes the Surplus? A Reexamination of the Free-Rider Problem, Jounal of Economics and Management Strategy 1, 37-62. Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny (1986) Large Shareholders and Corporate Control, Journal of Political Economy 94, 461-488. Stein, J. (1988), Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, Journal of Political Economy 95, 61-80. Stein, J. (1989), Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 655-669. 2006 M&A 2006 2006 2005 M&A 2004 2004 M&A 2005 M&A BP