z.prn(Gray)
|
|
- やすもり のたけ
- 7 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1 Friedman[1983] Friedman ( ) Dockner[1992] closed-loop Theorem 2 Theorem 4 Dockner ( ) 31
2 Kinoshita, Suzuki and Kaiser [2002] () 1) 2) () VAR 32
3 () Mueller[1986], Mueller ed. [1990] Mueller[1986] OLS AR(1) AR(1) Geroski[1990] Gerosky Mueller ed.[1990] AR(1) Odagiri and Yamawaki[1990] Maruyama and Odagiri[2002] [1999] AR(1) Geroski [1991] AR(1) 1 ( ) VAR VARMA VAR 4 2. VAR 2.1 Sargent[1987](Chapter XI) VAR (a) p 1t = A 01t A 11 q 1t A 12 q 2t + u 1t, p 2t = A 02t A 22 q 2t A 21 q 1t + u 2t, p it t i q it t i u it t 33
4 u it MA(1) u it MA(1) A 01t A 02t (b) i ( ) C it = c 1it q it + (c 2i /2)(q it q it 1 ) 2 + s it q it. s it MA(1) 3) (c) (u it, s it ) (d) i b i (e) i t t κ ji q jt / q it q jt+ j / q it = 0 t closed-loop t open-loop i (1) V it = Σ j=0 b j i {p t+ j q it+ j C it+ j } V it / q it+ j = 0 (2) 1 b 1 c 21 q 1t+ j+1 q 1t+ j (2A 11 + A 12κ21 + c 21 + b 1 c 21 ) + c 21 q 1t+ j 1 = A 01t+ j + c 11t+ j + A 12 q 2t+ j + u 1t+ j + s 1t+ j, 2 b 2 c 22 q 2t+ j+1 q 2t+1 (2A 22 + A 21κ12 + c 22 + b 1 c 22 ) + c 22 q 2t+ j 1 = A 02t+ j + c 12t+ j + A 21 q 2t+ j + u 2t+ j + s 2t+ j. MA(1) 2.2 VAR (2) VARMA (2) t π it (i = 1, 2) (q 1t, q 2t ) 1 i (3) π it = π it + π 1 it (q 1t q 1t ) + π it 2 (q 2t q 2t ), i = 1, 2 π j it π it / q jt qit=qit, i=1,2. q 1t q 2t t i 1 G i t j q it+ j+1 = (2 G i ) q it+ j1. q it+ j+1 (2) π it (3) q 1t q 2t (4) q 1t q 1t = (π 2 2t π + 1t π 2 1t π + 2t )/Ω q 2t q 2t = (π 1 1t π + 2t π 1 2t π + 1t )/Ω π + it π it π it Ω π 1 1t π 2 2t π 2 1 1t π 2t (4) (2) 2 SVARMA structural VARMA SVARMA 34
5 (5) π 1t+ j+1 = const + α 1 π 2t+ j+1 + β 11 π 1t+ j + β 12 π 1t+ j 1 + γ 11 π 2t+ j + γ 12 π 2t+ j 1 + MA(1) π 2t+ j+1 = const + α 2 π 1t+ j+1 + β 21 π 2t+ j + β 22 π 2t+ j 1 + γ 21 π 1t+ j + γ 22 π 1t+ j 1 + MA(1) SVARMA (5) MA(1) (u it ) (s it ) MA(1) SVARMA π 1t+ j+1 π 2t+ j+1 VARMA (6) π 1t+ j+1 = v 10 + v 11 π 1t+ j+ v 12 π 1t+ j 1 + v 13 π 2t+ j + v 14 π 2t+ j 1 + ε 1t+ j+1 + θ 1 ε 1t+ j, π 2t+ j+1 = v 20 + v 21 π 2t+ j + v 22 π 2t+ j 1 + v 23 π 1t+ j + v 24 π 1t+ j 1 + ε 2t+ j+1 + θ 2 ε 2t+ j, ε it+ j+1 + θ i ε it+ j MA(1) 10 v in i=1,2. n=0,1,,4 1 1 b 1 b 2 b b 1 = b 2 v i2 = 1/b, v i4 = 0 (i = 1, 2) (7) Π 1t+ j+1 = v 10 + v 11 π 1t+ j + v 13 π 2t+ j + ε 1t+ j+1, Π 2t+ j+1 = v 20 + v 21 π 2t+ j + v 23 π 1t+ j + ε 2t+ j+1, Π it+ j+1 π it+ j+1 v i2 π it+ j 1 θ 1 ε it+ j, ε it i, i, d, Gaussian 1 v 10 H 20 /H 21 (A 02 c 12 )/(b 2 c 22 H 21 ) H 20 /(b 2 H 21 ) + A 21 H 10 /(b 2 c 22 H 21 ) + (2A 22 + c 22 + b 2 c22 + A 21 κ 12 )H 20 /(b 2 c 22 H 21 ) (1/(H 21 H))[H 22 {H 21 (H 10 + (A 01 c 11 )/(b 1 c 21 ) + H 10 /b 1 (2A 11 + c 21 + b 1 c 21 + A 12 κ 21 )H 10 /(b 1 c 21 ) A 12 H 20 /(b 1 c 21 )) H 11 (H 20 +(A 02 c 12 )/(b 2 c 22 )+ H 20 /b 2 A 21 H 10 /(b 1 c 21 )) H 11 (H 20 + (A 02 c 12 )/(b 2 c 22 ) + H 20 /b 2 A 21 H 10 /(b 2 c 22 ) (2A 22 + c 22 + b 2 c 22 + A 21 κ 12 )H 20 /(b 2 c 22 ))}], v 11 A 21 H 11 /(b 2 c 22 H 21 ) + (2A 22 + c 22 + b 2 c 22 + A 21 κ 12 )H 21 /(b 2 c 22 H 21 ) (1/H 21 H)[H 22 {H 21 ( (2A 11 + c 21 + b 1 c 21 + A 12 κ 21 )H11/(b 1 c 21 ) A 12 H 21 /(b 1 c 21 )) H 11 ( A 21 H 11 /(b 2 c 22 ) (2A 22 + c 22 + b 2 c22 + A 21 κ 12 )H 21 /(b 2 c 22 ))}], v 12 1/b 2 H 22 H 11 (1/b 1 1/b 2 )/H, v 13 A 21 H 12 /(b 2 c 22 H 21 )+(2A 22 +c 22 +b 2 c22+ A 21 κ 12 )H 22 /(b 2 c 22 H 21 ) (1/H 21 H)[H 22 {H 21 ( (2A 11 +c 21 +b 1 c 21 + A 12 κ 21 )H 12 /(b 1 c 21 ) A 12 H 22 /(b 1 c 21 )) H 11 ( A 21 H 12 /(b 2 c 22 ) (2A 22 + c 22 + b 2 c22 + A 21 κ 12 )H22/(b 2 c 22 ))}], v 14 H 22 /(b 2 H 21 ) H 22 (H 12 H 21 /b 1 H 11 H 22 /b 2 )/(H 21 H), v 20 (1/H)[H 21 {H 10 + (A 01 c 11 )/(b 1 c 21 ) + H 10 /b 1 (2A 11 + c 21 + b 1 c 21 + A 12 κ 21 )H 10 /(b 1 c 21 ) A 12 H 20 /(b 1 c 21 )} H 11 {H 20 + (A 02 c 12 )/(b 2 c 22 ) + H 20 /b 2 A 21 H 10 /(b 2 c 22 ) (2A 22 + c 22 + b 2 c22 + A 21 κ 12 )H 20 /(b 2 c 22 )}], v 21 (1/H)[H 21 { (2A 11 + c 21 + b 1 c 21 + A 12 κ 21 )H 12 /(b 1 c 21 ) A 12 H 22 /(b 1 c 21 )} H 11 { A 21 H 12 /(b 2 c 22 ) (2A 22 + c 22 + b 2 c22 + A 21 κ 12 )H 22 /(b 2 c 22 )}], v 22 (H 21 H 12 /b 1 H 11 H 22 /b 2 )/H, 35
6 v 23 [H 21 { (2A 11 + c 21 + b 1 c 21 + A 12 κ 21 )H 11 /(b 1 c 21 ) A 12 H 21 /(b 1 c 21 )} H 11 { A 21 H 11 /(b 2 c 22 ) (2A 22 + c 22 + b 2 c 22 + A 21 κ 12 )H 21 /(b 2 c 22 )}], v 24 H 21 H 11 (1/b 1 1/b 2 )/H, H H 11 H 22 H 12 H 21, H 10 [e π2 {e π2 q 1 ( c 12 /(q 2 p 2 ) + A 21 ( c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 22 )/(q 2 p 2 2 )) + e π2 q 2 (A 22 ( c c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 )/p c 22 (1 G 2 )/p 2 ) π 2 }]/{ c 12 /(q 2 p 2 )+A 21 ( c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 )/(q 2 p 2 2 )}+D/E D { 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )/p 2 + A 22 ( c c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 )/p 2 2 }[ e π2 { c 12 /(q 2 p 2 ) + A 21 ( c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 )/(q 2 p 2 2 )}{e π1 q 2 A 12 ( c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 )/p 2 1 +e π1 q 1 (A 11 ( c 11 o.5c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 )/p c 21 (1 G 1 )/p 1 ) π 1 }+e π1 {A 11 ( c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 )/p c 21 (1 G 1 )/p 1 }{e π2 q 1 ( c 12 /(q 2 p 2 )+ A 21 ( c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 22 )/(q 2 p 2 2 )) + e π2 q 2 (A 22 ( c c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 /p c 22 (1 G 2 )/p 2 ) π 2 )}] E { c 12 /(p 2 q 2 ) + A 21 ( c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 )/q 2 p 2 2 }[ e π1 π2 A 12 { c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 }(1/p 2 1 ){ c 12 /(q 2 p 2 ) + A 21 ( c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 )/q 2 p 2 2 } e π1 π2 {A 11 ( c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 )/p c 21 (1 G 1 )/p 1 }{A 22 ( c c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 )/p c 22 (1 G 2 )/p2}], H 11 [ 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )/p 2 + A 22 { c c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 }]( e π2 )[ c 12 /(q 2 p 2 ) + A 21 { c c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 }/(q 2 p 2 2 )]/F F [ c 12 /(q 2 p 2 )+A 21 { c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 }/q2p2 2 ](e π1 π2 )[A 12 { c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 }/p 2 1 ][ c 12 /(q 2 p 2 )+ A 21 { c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 }/q 2 p 2 2 ] (e π1 π2 )[A 11 { c 11 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 1 )q 2 2 }/p c 21 (1 G 1 )/p 1 ][A 22 { c c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 }/p c 22 (1 G 2 /p 2 ], H 12 e π2 /[ c 12 /(q 2 p 2 ) + A 21 { c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 }/(q 2 p 2 2 )}] + [ 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )/p 2 + A 22 { c c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 }/p 2 2 ]( e π1 )[A 11 { c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 }/p c 21 (1 G 1 )/p 1 ]/L, L [ c 12 /(q 2 p 2 ) + A 21 { c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 }/(q 2 p2 2 )](e π1 π2 )[A 12 { c 11 q 1 0.5c 21 (1 G 1 )p 2 1 }/p 2 1 { c 12 /(q 2 p 2 ) + A 21 ( c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 )} {A 11 ( c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 )/p c 21 (1 G 1 )/p 1 }{A 22 ( c c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 )/p c 22 (1 G 2 )/p 2 }], H 20 [ e π2 { c 12 /(q 2 p 2 ) + A 21 ( c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 )/(q 2 p 2 2 )}{e π1 q 2 (A 12 ( c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 )/p 2 1 ) + e π1 q 1 (A 11 ( c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 )/p c 21 (1 G 1 )/p 1 ) π 1 }+e π1 {A 11 ( c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 )/p c 21 (1 G 1 )/p 1 }{e π2 q 1 ( c 12 /(q 2 p 2 ) + A21( c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 )/(q 2 p 2 2 )) + e π2 q 2 (A 22 ( c c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 )/p c 22 (1 G 2 )/p 2 ) π 2 }]/M, M (e π1 π2 )A 12 { c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 }/p 2 1 { c 12 /(q 2 p 2 ) + A 21 ( c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 )/q 2 p 2 2 } (e π1 π2 ){A 11 ( c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 )/p c 21 (1 G 1 )/p 1 }{A 22 ( c c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 )/p c 22 (1 G 2 )/p 2 }, H 21 e π2 { c 12 /(q 2 p 2 ) + A 21 ( c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 )/q 2 p 2 2 }/N, N (e π1 π2 ){A 12 ( c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 )/p 1 2 }{ c 12 /(q 2 p 2 ) + A 21 ( c 21 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 )/(q 2 p 2 2 }} (e π1 π2 ) {A 11 ( c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 )/p c 21 (1 G 1 )/p 1 }{A 22 ( c c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 )/p c 22 (1 G 2 )/p 2 }, 36
7 H 22 e π1 {A 11 ( c (1 G 1 )q 1 )/p c 21 (1 G 1 )/p 1 }/R, R (e π1 π2 )A 12 { c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 }(1/p 2 1 ){ c 12 /(q 2 p 2 )+A 21 ( c 12 q 1 0.5c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 2 )/(q 2 p 2 2 )} (e π1 π2 ) {A 11 ( c c 21 (1 G 1 )q 1 )/p c 21 (1 G 1 )/p 1 }{A 22 ( c c 22 (1 G 2 )q 2 )/p c 22 (1 G 2 )/p 2 }, 3. 2 ( ) ) CAPM 1971 = (60 ) + β 60 β β 1977 = 10 +β ( ) β 1 ( ) () (5) v i j (6) v 10 v 20 37
8 Chen 3 ADF F ADF F 4 (6) VAR F VAR F VAR, VAMA 1 3 univariate AR, univariate ARMA VAR VAMA univariate AR, univariate ARMA (5) (5) (5) VARπ =MA VAR 2 L( ) 2 2 MA MA(1) 1 2 π (5) (5) π =(VAR) 1 MA, (VAR) 1 VAR L 4 VAR (5) univariate ARMA(4,3) 4.1 3) Lumsdaine and Papell [1997] 1 Zivot and Andrews[1992] ) ADF T(ρ µ 1) T ρ µ ADF ADF 1 2 (k) t 1.6 5) 4 i T(ρ µ 1) T(ρ µ 1)/(1 Σ k π ik ) 2 38
9 2 T(ρ µ 1) (1) 1 (2) 2 1% 2.5% 5% 10% 1% 2.5% 5% 10% ADF ADF T(ρ µ 1) = (k = 0) % (k = 0) 4.7% (k = 1) 0.05% ADF 8.40 (k = 0) % (k = 1) 0.4% (k = 1) 0.07% Chen Chen Chen and Tiao[1990] ARMA ARIMA ARMA ARIMA Chen 2 1 Chen
10 ADF F ADF ADF π it = +ρπ it 1 + α 1 π it 1 + α 2 π it 2 + α 3 π it 3 + ε it ε it i.i.d.gaussian π ip p = 3 ADF α i F F F OLS F α VAR F (7) VAR b = 0.9 Π 1t+ j+1 (6) MA(1) MA univaliate ARMA(4, 3) Π 1t+ j+1 = v 11 π 1t+ j + v 13 π 2t+ j + ε 1t+ j+1, Π 2t+ j+1 = v 21 π 2t+ j + v 23 π 1t+ j + ε 2t+ j+1, VAR F 1968 v v v v 21 v 23 = 0 F 1994 v 23 F Chen AR(2) ( ) 40
11 6) 5. (6) (7) ARMA(4,3) MA(3) i.i.d. ARMA(4,3) (6) univariate ARMA(4,3) b 1 = b 2 = 0.9 π it+ j+1 v i2 π it+ j 1 v i2 = 1/0.9, 1 (6) (6) (7) 1 2 VAR OLS SUR (7) (7) t t (61,62,63 64 ) π it ARMA(4,3) i.i.d. MA(3) (-1/0.9)π it 2 π it Π it v (5.8549) ( ) (1.7512) v (2.5751) v (2.8921) 73 v (1.9858) 73 v ( ) 90 v (4.4542) SBIC R v (9.4862) v (1.3804) ( ) ( ) ( ) 90 v (2.8879) 98 v ( ) 66 v ( ) 70 v ( ) 95 v ( ) 98 v (3.2457) SBIC R v i0 v i1 v i3 v i0 v i1 v i3 3 v i0, v i1, v i3 v i0, v i1, v i3 1 (8) v i j = v i j, i = 1, 2, j = 0, 1, 3, 3 (6) (7) v i2 = 1/0.9 v i4 = 0 v i j ( j = 0, 1, 3) 41
12 t π i = π it π i 3 1 π i p t q t (9) t i = {pit q it c 1it q it c 2it (1 G i ) 2 q 2 it /2}/(p it q it ), i = 1, 2, 1 q i+t t j q it+ j+1 = (2 G i )q it+ j (2) q 1t = (A 02 c 12 )/(A 21 G 1 ) [b 2 c 22 {1 + G 2 2 /b 2 G 2 (2A 22 + c 22 + b 2 c 22 + A 21 κ 12 )/(b 2 c 22 )}][ A 21 (A 01 c 11 )G 1 /(b 1 b 2 c 21 c 22 ) (A 02 c 12 ){1 + G 2 1 /b 1 G 1 (2A 11 + c 21 + b 1 c 21 + A 12 κ 21 )}/(b 2 c 22 )]/S, q 2t = A 21 G 1 [ A 21 (A 01 c 11 )G 1 /(b 1 b 2 c 21 c 22 ) (A 02 c 12 ){1 + G 2 1 /b 1 G 1 (2A 11 + c 21 + b 1 c 21 + A 12 κ 21 )/(b 1 c 21 )}/(b 2 c 22 )]/S, S A 21 G 1 [A 12 A 21 G 1 G 2 /(b 1 b 2 c 21 c 22 ) {1+G 2 2 /b 2 G 2 (2A 22 +c 22 +b 2 c 22 + A 21 κ 12 )/(b 2 c 22 )}{1+G 2 1 /b 1 G 1 (2A 11 + c 21 + b 1 c 21 + A 12 κ 12 )/(b 1 c 21 )}], i q it = (x it )/p it (10) (x it ) = p it q it, i = 1, 2, A 01, A 02, A 11, A 12, A 21, A 22, c 11, c 12, c 21, c 22, p 1t, p 2t, κ 21, κ 12 ) 10 (8),(9),(10) (a) 12 c 11 = c 12 = 1 12 (8),(9),(10) 2 A 11 = 1, A 12 = 1, A 21 = 1, A 22 = 1, c 21 = 1, c 22 = 1, p 1t = 100, p 2t = 100, κ 21 = 0, κ 12 = 0 Gauss=Newton A(A 11, A 12, A 21, A 22 ) = {0 10 }, c 2 (c 21, c 22 ) = {0 10 }, κ(κ 21, κ 12 ) = {0 10 }, p (p 1t, p 2t ) = {1, 100, 1000} (11) A i1 A i2, c 2i 0, c 2i 0, p it 0, A 11 A 12 A 21 A 22 () A 11 A 21 /H A 11 < A 12 42
13 A A A A c c p 1t p 2t κ κ closed-loop b i 2 b i 0.9 b i Federal Reserve Board s Quarterly Model b i c 11 = c 12 = 1 A 0i MA 3 Worthington[1990] 2 ()
14 (et) 1 y t y t = y t 1 + e t, 225 y t y t (y 0 ) 225 y t ADF T(ρ µ 1) T(ρ µ 1) 7 t t = x t t Sales t t D () T T () 1 ln(sales t x t ) = (ln(sales t 1 ) x t 1 ) (ln(sales t 2 ) x t 2 ), x t = D (73 1) D(98 1) T(62 = 1) T (73 = 1) T (90 = 1) T (98 = 1), ln(sales t x t ) = (ln(sales t 1 ) x t 1 ) ln(sales t 2 ) x t 2 ), x t = D (66 1) D (95 1) T(62 = 1) T(66 = 1) T (73 = 1)) T(90 = 1) T(95 = 1) (1999) ( 10 ) NTT. Bresnahan, T. F. (1982) The Oligopoly Solution Concept is Identified, Economic Letters 10, pp Chen, C. and G. C. Tiao (1990) Random Level-Shift Time Series Models, ARIMA Approximation, and Level- Shift Detection, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, vol.8, no.1, Engelbert, J. D. (1992) A Dynamic Theory of Conjectural Variations, The Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol.XL, No.4, December Friedman, J. W. (1983) Oligopoly and the Theory of Games, North-Holland, Amsterdam. Geroski, P. A. (1990) Modeling Persistent Profitability, in Muller, D. C., ed. The Dynamic of Company Profits: An International Comparison. (1991), Market Dynamics And Entry, Brackwell: Cambridge, MA. Kinoshita, J., N. Suzuki and H. M. Kaiser (2002) Explaining Pricing Conduct in a Product-Differentiated Oligopolistic Market: An Empirical Application of a price Conjectural Variations Model, Agribusiness, vol.18, No.4. Lumsdaine, R. L. and D. H. Papell (1997) Multiple Trend Breaks and the Unit-Root Hypothesis, The Review of Economics and Statistics, vol.79, Maruyama, N. and H. Odagiri (2002) Does the Persistence of Profits Persists?: A Study of Company Profits in Japan , International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.20, Muller, D. C., ed. (1986) Profits in the Long Run, Cambridge University Press: Cambriege, MA. (1990) The Dynamic of Company Profits: An International Comparison, WZB-Publication: Wissenschaftszentrum, Berlin. Odagiri, H. and H. Yamawaki (1990) The Persistence of Profits in Japan, in Mueller, D. C.,ed. The Dynamic of 44
15 Company Profits: An International Comparison. Roberts, M. L. and Samuelson (1988) An Empirical Analysis of Dynamic, Nonprice Competition in an Oligopolistic Industry, Rand journal of Economics, Vol.19, No.2. Seldon, B. J., S. Banerjee and R. G. Boyd (1993) Advertizing Conjectures and the Nature of Advertizing Competition in an Oligopoly, Managerial and Decision Economics, Vol.14, Sergeant, T. J. (1987) Macroeconomic Theory, Academic Press, San Diego:CA. Worthington, P. R. (1990) Strategic Investment and Conjectural Variations, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol.8, Zivot, E. and D. W. K. Andrews (1992) Further Evidence on the Great Crash, the Oil-Price Shock, and the Unit- Root Hypothesis, Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, vol.10, no.3. 45
ワールド・ワイド 10‐2(P)/3.中尾
28 1 35 35 1 2003 35 2 3 4 29 1965 1998 35 1000 5 647 1960 6 35 7 8 2 30 10 2 2. 1 2. 2 2. 3 3 3. 1 3. 2 4 2 2 2. 1 9 1 2003 1 647 10 t π macro 1 1964 1998 31 t- π macro 7.21 0.12 t 31.3610.65 R 2 0.77
More information1970). Baumol, W. J., Panzar, J. C. and R. D. Willig (1982); Contestable Markets and The Theory of Industry Structure, 1982. Caves, R. and M. E. Porter (1977); From entry barriers to mobility barriers:
More informationわが国企業による資金調達方法の選択問題
* takeshi.shimatani@boj.or.jp ** kawai@ml.me.titech.ac.jp *** naohiko.baba@boj.or.jp No.05-J-3 2005 3 103-8660 30 No.05-J-3 2005 3 1990 * E-mailtakeshi.shimatani@boj.or.jp ** E-mailkawai@ml.me.titech.ac.jp
More information第85 回日本感染症学会総会学術集会後抄録(III)
β β α α α µ µ µ µ α α α α γ αβ α γ α α γ α γ µ µ β β β β β β β β β µ β α µ µ µ β β µ µ µ µ µ µ γ γ γ γ γ γ µ α β γ β β µ µ µ µ µ β β µ β β µ α β β µ µµ β µ µ µ µ µ µ λ µ µ β µ µ µ µ µ µ µ µ
More information橡同居選択における所得の影響(DP原稿).PDF
** *** * 2000 13 ** *** (1) (2) (1986) - 1 - - 2 - (1986) Ohtake (1991) (1993) (1994) (1996) (1997) (1997) Hayashi (1997) (1999) 60 Ohtake (1991) 86 (1996) 89 (1997) 92 (1999) 95 (1993) 86 89 74 79 (1986)
More information204 / CHEMISTRY & CHEMICAL INDUSTRY Vol.69-1 January 2016 047
9 π 046 Vol.69-1 January 2016 204 / CHEMISTRY & CHEMICAL INDUSTRY Vol.69-1 January 2016 047 β γ α / α / 048 Vol.69-1 January 2016 π π π / CHEMISTRY & CHEMICAL INDUSTRY Vol.69-1 January 2016 049 β 050 Vol.69-1
More information2 / 24
2017 11 9 1 / 24 2 / 24 Solow, 1957 total factor productivity; TFP 5% 経済成長率の要因分解 4% 3% 2.68% 2.51% 2% 1% 0% 1.63% 1.50% 0.34% 0.42% 0.55% 0.97% 1.14% 0.86% 0.13% -0.59% -0.59% -0.09% 0.01% -1% 1970-80
More information02.„o“φiflì„㙃fic†j
X-12-ARIMA Band-PassDECOMP HP X-12-ARIMADECOMP HPBeveridge and Nelson DECOMP X-12-ARIMA Band-PassHodrick and PrescottHP DECOMPBeveridge and Nelson M CD X ARIMA DECOMP HP Band-PassDECOMP Kiyotaki and Moore
More information[ 1 ] Barcena-Ruiz, J. C., and M. P. Espinosa, 1996, Long-term or Short-term Managerial Incentive Contracts, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 5, 343-359. [2] Barros, F., 1995, Incentive Schemes
More information1990年代以降の日本の経済変動
1990 * kenichi.sakura@boj.or.jp ** hitoshi.sasaki@boj.or.jp *** masahiro.higo@boj.or.jp No.05-J-10 2005 12 103-8660 30 * ** *** 1990 2005 12 1990 1990 1990 2005 11 2425 BIS E-mail: kenichi.sakura@boj.or.jp
More information2 DEA Bain Mann Strickland and Weiss Structure Conduct Performance S-C-P Brozen Demsetz
1 2 DEA Bain Mann Strickland and Weiss Structure Conduct Performance S-C-P Brozen Demsetz 3 Ravenscraft Bothwell et. al Smirlock et. al New Industrial Organization NIO New Empirical Industrial Organization
More information<96D889BA904D2E696E6464>
615 379 1 1995 10 OECD 1995 380 616 57 3 1993 4 3071 2003 1 3247 10 10 4 1 1990 2000 2003 10 617 381 2002 2 3 4 5 2 1 1990 1995 1995 12 1995 IPP Independent Power Producer 1 2004a, b 2005a, b 382 618 57
More informationbottleneckjapanese.dvi
1 M&A Keywords:,. Address: 742-1, Higashinakano, Hachioji-shi, Tokyo 192-09,Japan fax:+81 426 74 425 E-mail: yangc@tamacc.chuo-u.ac.jp ; yasuokaw@tamacc.chuo-u.ac.jp 1 Yang and Kawashima(2008) 1 2 ( MVI
More informationBB 報告書完成版_修正版)040415.doc
3 4 5 8 KW Q = AK α W β q = a + α k + βw q = log Q, k = log K, w = logw i P ij v ij P ij = exp( vij ), J exp( v ) k= 1 ik v i j = X β αp + γnu j j j j X j j p j j NU j j NU j (
More informationTitle ベンチャー企業の研究開発支出の決定要因 日本と台湾の事例を中心に Author(s) 蘇, 顯揚 Citation 經濟論叢 (1996), 158(1): Issue Date URL Right
Title ベンチャー企業の研究開発支出の決定要因 日本と台湾の事例を中心に Author(s) 蘇, 顯揚 Citation 經濟論叢 (1996), 158(1): 54-76 Issue Date 1996-07 URL https://doi.org/10.14989/45083 Right Type Departmental Bulletin Paper Textversion publisher
More informationStepwise Chow Test * Chow Test Chow Test Stepwise Chow Test Stepwise Chow Test Stepwise Chow Test Riddell Riddell first step second step sub-step Step
Stepwise Chow Test * Chow Test Chow Test Stepwise Chow Test Stepwise Chow Test Stepwise Chow Test Riddell Riddell first step second step sub-step Stepwise Chow Test a Stepwise Chow Test Takeuchi 1991Nomura
More informationM&A の経済分析:M&A はなぜ増加したのか
RIETI Discussion Paper Series 06-J-034 RIETI Discussion Paper Series 06-J-034 M&A の経済分析 :M&A はなぜ増加したのか 蟻川靖浩 宮島英昭 ( 早稲田大学 RIETI) 2006 年 4 月 要旨 1990 年代以降の M&A の急増の主要な要因は 産業や企業の成長性や収益性へのショックである とりわけ M&A を活発に行っている産業あるいは企業の特性としては
More information受賞講演要旨2012cs3
アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート アハ ート α β α α α α α
More informationC. R. McKenzie 2003 3 2004 ( 38 ) 2 2004 2005 (Keio Household Panel Survey) control group treatment group 1
KEIO UNIVERSITY MARKET QUALITY RESEARCH PROJECT (A 21 st Century Center of Excellence Project) DP2005-020 * C. R. McKenzie** 2003 3 2004 ( 38 ) 2 2004 2005 (Keio Household Panel Survey) control group treatment
More informationビールと発泡酒の税率と経済厚生
RIETI Discussion Paper Series 12-J-019 RIETI Discussion Paper Series 12-J-019 2012 年 6 月 ビールと 発 泡 酒 の 税 率 と 経 済 厚 生 * 慶 田 昌 之 ( 立 正 大 学 ) 要 旨 本 稿 では, 近 年 ビール 系 飲 料 として 販 売 されている 発 泡 酒 の 登 場 によって 発 生 している
More information濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析 77 多角化企業の利潤分析 多角化ディスカウントの寡占理論による説明 * 濱田弘潤 (diversification discount) Keywords: JEL classifications: D43, L13, L22, G
濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析 77 多角化企業の利潤分析 多角化ディスカウントの寡占理論による説明 * 濱田弘潤 (diversification discount) Keywords: JEL classifications: D43, L13, L22, G34 950-2181 2 8050 Tel. and fax: 025-262-6538 E-mail: khamada@econ.niigata-u.ac.jp
More informationSNAと家計調査における貯蓄率の乖離-日本の貯蓄率低下の要因-
RIETI Discussion Paper Series 10-J-003 RIETI Discussion Paper Series 10-J-003 2009 年 12 月 SNA と家計調査における貯蓄率の乖離 - 日本の貯蓄率低下の要因 - 宇南山卓 ( 神戸大学大学院経済学研究科 ) 要 旨 SNA と家計調査から計算される家計貯蓄率の乖離の原因を明らかにし 日本の貯蓄率の低下の原因を考察した
More information一般演題(ポスター)
6 5 13 : 00 14 : 00 A μ 13 : 00 14 : 00 A β β β 13 : 00 14 : 00 A 13 : 00 14 : 00 A 13 : 00 14 : 00 A β 13 : 00 14 : 00 A β 13 : 00 14 : 00 A 13 : 00 14 : 00 A β 13 : 00 14 : 00 A 13 : 00 14 : 00 A
More information研究シリーズ第40号
165 PEN WPI CPI WAGE IIP Feige and Pearce 166 167 168 169 Vector Autoregression n (z) z z p p p zt = φ1zt 1 + φ2zt 2 + + φ pzt p + t Cov( 0 ε t, ε t j )= Σ for for j 0 j = 0 Cov( ε t, zt j ) = 0 j = >
More information( β K ) p β W W p β K K aβ β W W β β K K ) 1/(βW +β K ) 3 ln C =lnα + 1 β W + β K ln Q (3) 1/(β W + β K ) ( β W + β K ) 4 ( ) ( ) (1998 2 1 3 ) ( 1998
3 1 1993-1995 ( Cobb-Douglas ) (1998 2 3 ) ( ) 17 (1998 2 1 ) 1 Christensen, Jorgensonand Lau (1973) 1983 ( ) 2 W = K = β W,β K > 0 Q = aw βw K βk (1) C = αq 1/(βW +βk) (2) 10 ( (A) (A03) ) ( ) ( ) 1 2
More information(EHChamberlin) (ESMason) (JSBain) (RECaves) (CKaysen) (DFTurner) (FMScherer) (1) - (2) (1) (Structure) (2) (Conduct) (3) (Performance) (S
(1999 4 ) 0038 ( ) (Old Industrial Organization Theory) (Harvard School) (Chicago School) 1 (1995) 1 2 1930 (EHChamberlin) (ESMason) 50 60 (JSBain) (RECaves) (CKaysen) (DFTurner) (FMScherer) (1) - (2)
More information橡表紙参照.PDF
CIRJE-J-58 X-12-ARIMA 2000 : 2001 6 How to use X-12-ARIMA2000 when you must: A Case Study of Hojinkigyo-Tokei Naoto Kunitomo Faculty of Economics, The University of Tokyo Abstract: We illustrate how to
More informationThe Institute for Economic Studies Seijo University 6 1 20, Seijo, Setagaya Tokyo 157-8511, Japan The Institute for Economic Studies Green Paper No. 59 Consumers Decision on the Choice of Small Payment
More information物価指数の計測誤差と品質調整手法:わが国CPIからの教訓
CPICPI CPI CPI CPI CPI Economic Perspective Shiratsukaa Consumer Price IndexCPI CPI CPI CPI CPI Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index 1996Shiratsuka 1999bHoffmann 1998Cunningham 1996 Crawford
More informationウェーブレット分数を用いた金融時系列の長期記憶性の分析
TOPIX E-mail: masakazu.inada@boj.or.jp wavelet TOPIX Baillie Gourieroux and Jasiak Elliott and Hoek TOPIX I (0) I (1) I (0) I (1) TOPIX ADFAugmented Dickey-Fuller testppphillips-perron test I (1) I (0)
More informationuntitled
* 2009 6 15 2006 10 24 MNP MNP MNP MNP MNP 18% 2.6% Keywords: Mobile Number Portability (MNP), Switching Cost, Nested Logit Model, Choice-based Sampling JEL Classification: D12, L96 1. 2006 10 24 (Mobile
More informationDGE DGE 2 2 1 1990 1 1 3 (1) ( 1
早 稲 田 大 学 現 代 政 治 経 済 研 究 所 ゼロ 金 利 下 で 量 的 緩 和 政 策 は 有 効 か? -ニューケインジアンDGEモデルによる 信 用 創 造 の 罠 の 分 析 - 井 上 智 洋 品 川 俊 介 都 築 栄 司 上 浦 基 No.J1403 Working Paper Series Institute for Research in Contemporary Political
More information開発金融増刊号
4 6 Y = f (, E, Y E ( Y E = α ( E α we py α 0 β E ( ( E β ( E β 6 ( = ( α β ( E β 8 i Y i f i, E i, i 9 Y = α α ( α E α S E 0 ( β β E β E( β E β β6 ( we Y = = = α β E py E β ( β Y Y B Y A r / pr p Y
More information戦間期日本企業の資金調達、資本コスト、資本構成:最適資本構成理論からみた1930年代における企業財務
1930 Modigliani and Miller [1958] 170 1930 2008 7 16 I E-mail: takashi.nanjou@boj.or.jp E-mail: cc00881@srv.cc.hit-u.ac.jp //2009.7 81 1. 1 2 M&A 3 4 1965 1969 1995 1995 1993 1 2008 2008 1985 2006 10 ROA
More information59-1・2 鳥居昭夫・春日教測 .pwd
logit JEL Classifications: D10, M30, L82 Wilbur 2008 Shishikura et al. 2018 and de Gracia 2012 Bayraktaroglu et al. 2018 Carare and Zentner 2012 Carare and Zentner 2012 Train et al. 1987 Hendel 1999 Spence
More informationY-...W
259 21 1 1 2003 2 1 2 1 15 22 260 56 3 2 2. 1 2. 2 2. 3 2. 4 3 3. 1 3. 2 4 2 2. 1 1965 1999 2 Brick, Frierman, and Kim 1998 Choate 1997Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner 1989 Gilson 1997 Mauer and Triantis
More informationPreliminary Version Manning et al. (1986) Rand Health Insurance Experiment Manning et al. (1986) 3 Medicare Me
Preliminary Version. 600 * 14530029 12-1- Preliminary Version. 1 70 1 1997 9 1020 70 1 3 2 70 1 Manning et al. (1986) Rand Health Insurance Experiment 25 50 Manning et al. (1986) 3 Medicare Medicare Medicare
More information時間割引:双曲割引と弱加法性
Discussion aper No. 666 June 2006 The Institute of Social and Economic Research Osaka University 6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan Time Discounting: Declining Impatience and Interval Effect
More information2) 3) 2) Ohkusa, 1996 ; 1999 ; Ohtake and Ohkusa, 1994 ; La Croix and A. Kawamura, Reject American Economic Review, Journal of Political Econom
1) IOC Major League Baseball s MLB Blue Ribbon Panel Levin et al. 1) Yamamura and Shin, 2005 a ; 2005 b ; 2005 c communication 2) 3) 2) Ohkusa, 1996 ; 1999 ; Ohtake and Ohkusa, 1994 ; La Croix and A. Kawamura,
More information平成12年度 対日直接投資増加の理由と日本経済にもたらす影響に関する調査 第2章 対日投資と多国籍企業の戦略について
OLI 2-1. 2-1-1. 10% 2-1-2. 20 Hymer 1960 1 2 2 1 Vernon 1966 Smith 1987 Jacquemin 1985 21 Buckley & Casson 1976 Teece 1977 arm s-length internalize 2-1-3. OLI 40 OLI Dunning 1979 2 OLI 3 O: Ownership specific
More information論文08.indd
* 1 はじめに,, TOPIX TOPIX, TOPIX TOPIX Shelor Anderson and Cross C Japan Society of Monetary Economics 図 1 東日本大震災前後の株価 (TOPIX) の推移 1,000 950 900 850 800 750 700 図 2 阪神大震災前後の株価 (TOPIX) の推移 1,650 1,550 1,450
More informationAbstract Gale-Shapley 2 (1) 2 (2) (1)
( ) 2011 3 Abstract Gale-Shapley 2 (1) 2 (2) (1) 1 1 1.1........................................... 1 1.2......................................... 2 2 4 2.1................................... 4 2.1.1 Gale-Shapley..........................
More information1 913 10301200 A B C D E F G H J K L M 1A1030 10 : 45 1A1045 11 : 00 1A1100 11 : 15 1A1115 11 : 30 1A1130 11 : 45 1A1145 12 : 00 1B1030 1B1045 1C1030
1 913 9001030 A B C D E F G H J K L M 9:00 1A0900 9:15 1A0915 9:30 1A0930 9:45 1A0945 10 : 00 1A1000 10 : 15 1B0900 1B0915 1B0930 1B0945 1B1000 1C0900 1C0915 1D0915 1C0930 1C0945 1C1000 1D0930 1D0945 1D1000
More information1 Flores, D. (009) All you can drink: should we worry about quality? Journal of Regulatory Economics 35(1), Saggi, K., and Vettas, N. (00) On in
6 016 4 6 1 1 Flores, D. (009) All you can drink: should we worry about quality? Journal of Regulatory Economics 35(1), 1 18. Saggi, K., and Vettas, N. (00) On intrabrand and interbrand competition: The
More informationTezukayama RIEB Discussion Paper Series No. 7 地方政府間の距離が財政調整に対する態度に与える影響 - 独裁者ゲーム実験からの示唆 - 竹本亨 小川一仁 高橋広雅 鈴木明宏 伊藤健宏 帝塚山大学 関西大学 広島市立大学 山形大学 岩手県立大学 経済学部 社
Tezukayama RIEB Discussion Paper Series No. 7 地方政府間の距離が財政調整に対する態度に与える影響 - 独裁者ゲーム実験からの示唆 - 竹本亨 小川一仁 高橋広雅 鈴木明宏 伊藤健宏 帝塚山大学 関西大学 広島市立大学 山形大学 岩手県立大学 経済学部 社会学部 国際学部 人文学部 総合政策学部 2013 年 11 月 Tezukayama University
More information表紙_目次.PDF
JIL 2 1980 vol.3 15 3 1 3 15 18 IT 26 28 33 20 OECD 80 90 (1998) (2000) 2 Aghion et al. (1999) OECD 1970 1 2 70 1980 90 1.1 Kuznets U inverted U-shaped hypothesis GNP U 1 18901940 6 3 Kuznets(1955) (1963)
More informationHi-Stat Discussion Paper Series No.228 経済時系列分析と単位根検定 : これまでの発展と今後の展望 黒住英司 December 27 Hitotsubashi University Research Unit for Statistical Analysis i
経済時系列分析と単位根検定 : これまでの発展と今後の Title 展望 Author(s) 黒住, 英司 Citation Issue 27-12 Date Type Technical Report Text Version publisher URL http://hdl.handle.net/186/15111 Right Hitotsubashi University Repository
More information(CFW ) CFW 1
DSGE * 1 * 2 2012 11 *1 2012 11 22 25 ( ) ( ) *2 3 (CFW ) CFW 1 1 3 1.1....................................... 3 1.2.................................. 5 2 DSGE 6 2.1.............................. 6 2.2.....................................
More information本 ディスカッションペーパーの 内 容 や 意 見 は 全 て 執 筆 者 の 個 人 的 見 解 であり 金 融 庁 あるいは 金 融 研 究 センターの 公 式 見 解 を 示 すものではありません
FSA Institute Discussion Paper Series エージェントシミュレーションを 用 いた 価 格 規 制 と ネイキッド ショート セ リングの 禁 止 の 有 効 性 の 検 証 大 井 朋 子 DP 2012-5 2012 年 12 月 金 融 庁 金 融 研 究 センター Financial Research Center (FSA Institute) Financial
More information2 I- I- (1) 2 I- (2) 2 I- 1 [18] I- I-. 1 I- I- Jensen [11] I- FF 3 I- FF 3 2 2.1 CAPM n ( i = 1,..., n) M t R i,t, i = 1,..., n R M,t ( ) R i,t = r i
1 Idiosyncratic,, Idiosyncratic (I- ) I- 1 I- I- Jensen I- Fama-French 3 I- Fama-French 3 1 Fama-French (FF) 3 [6] (Capital Asset Pricing Model; CAPM [12, 15]) CAPM ( [2, 10, 14, 16]) [18] Idiosyncratic
More informationMicrosoft Word - Šv”|“Å‘I.DOC
90 ª ª * E-mailshinobu.nakagawa@boj.or.jp i ii iii iv SNA 1 70 80 2 80 90 80 80 90 1 80 90 98 6 1 1 SNA 2 1 SNA 80 1SNA 1 19931998 1 2-190 1,2 2 2-2 2-3,4 3 2-5 4 2030 2-3 3 2-15 97 20 90 2-15 9198 1.
More informationデフレの定義(最新版).PDF
DP/01-1 Director General for Economic Assessment and Policy Analysis CABINET OFFICE E-mail : naoki.okamoto@mfs.cao.go.jp 1 2 3 i (ii) 4 5 Deflation defined as at least two consecutive years of price decreases.
More information株式保有構成と企業価値 ─コーポレート・ガバナンスに関する一考察─
q E-mail: kenji.nishizaki@boj.or.jp E-mail: kurasawa@ynu.ac.jp OECD Vives Tirole Shleifer and Vishny q %% %% % % Allen and Gale %% % Admati, Pfreiderer and Zechner Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi Cremer 1995Pagno
More informationPublic Investment, the Rate of Return, and Optimal Fiscal Policy Economic Growth Pioneering Economic Theory Mathematical Theories of Economic Growth Review of Economic Studiesvol.27 Econometrica vol.34
More information山形大学紀要
x t IID t = b b x t t x t t = b t- AR ARMA IID AR ARMAMA TAR ARCHGARCH TARThreshold Auto Regressive Model TARTongTongLim y y X t y Self Exciting Threshold Auto Regressive, SETAR SETARTAR TsayGewekeTerui
More information本文/もくじ(表2)
NO. 32 1 2 4 6 10 12 14 18 20 22 24 27 29 30 33 34 39 41 42 43 44 45 46 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 κ βα 14 15 µκδ µ κ κ 16 17 18 19 α 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 Nature Nature 2001 ; 413 : 379 380 27 28 29
More informationカルマンフィルターによるベータ推定( )
β TOPIX 1 22 β β smoothness priors (the Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM) CAPM 1 β β β β smoothness priors :,,. E-mail: koiti@ism.ac.jp., 104 1 TOPIX β Z i = β i Z m + α i (1) Z i Z m α i α i β i (the
More information66-5 足代訓史.pwd
plate-forme ICT BP p. 270 p. 135 pp. 135 136 JSPS SPACE ALC plateau : http://eow.alc.co.jp/search?q=plateau&ref=sa p. 136 SNS p. 222 Negoro and Ajiro 2013 4 AV p. 5 p. 5 p. 5 OS p. 5 p. 81 Eisenmann, Parker
More information330
330 331 332 333 334 t t P 335 t R t t i R +(P P ) P =i t P = R + P 1+i t 336 uc R=uc P 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 π π β τ τ (1+π ) (1 βτ )(1 τ ) (1+π ) (1 βτ ) (1 τ ) (1+π ) (1 τ ) (1 τ ) 344 (1 βτ )(1
More informationAn Empirical Study of the Securities Firms' Dilemma on Financial Innovation through Diffusion of Internet Deals Yasugi Satoshi Bower, J. L., 1999, Disruptive technologies: Catching the wave,
More informationAttendance Demand for J-League õ Shinsuke KAWAI* and Takeo HIRATA* Abstract The purpose of this study was to clarify the variables determining the attendance in J-league matches, using the 2,699 J-league
More information通し組/2.論説:大橋克成
Brander and Spencer, 1983 ; Fudenberg and Tirole, 1984 ; Bulow et al., 1985 d Aspremont and Jacquemin R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D R&D Kamien et al.suzumuraleahy and Neary Salant and Shaffer R&D
More informationseminar0220a.dvi
1 Hi-Stat 2 16 2 20 16:30-18:00 2 2 217 1 COE 4 COE RA E-MAIL: ged0104@srv.cc.hit-u.ac.jp 2004 2 25 S-PLUS S-PLUS S-PLUS S-code 2 [8] [8] [8] 1 2 ARFIMA(p, d, q) FI(d) φ(l)(1 L) d x t = θ(l)ε t ({ε t }
More informationStata 11 Stata ts (ARMA) ARCH/GARCH whitepaper mwp 3 mwp-083 arch ARCH 11 mwp-051 arch postestimation 27 mwp-056 arima ARMA 35 mwp-003 arima postestim
TS001 Stata 11 Stata ts (ARMA) ARCH/GARCH whitepaper mwp 3 mwp-083 arch ARCH 11 mwp-051 arch postestimation 27 mwp-056 arima ARMA 35 mwp-003 arima postestimation 49 mwp-055 corrgram/ac/pac 56 mwp-009 dfgls
More information商学 66‐1☆/16.田口
251 1 2, 3 4, 5 2 1 2005 stakeholder agent p.13 2005 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013 b, 2014 Taguchi et al.2013 Aoki2001, 201019962010 2014 2013! 252 2 " " " " 6 " " " " 7 2! 3 p.5 2013 2011201120132012 Aoki20012004
More informationBecker 1965 Gronau a a a
1 1 1 1 1 3.3 6 0.43 0.45 2 2002 Becker1965 Gronau1977 1 a 3.3 3.6 6.0 4.9 4.8 3.6 a 7.4 8.4 8.1 7.6 7.5 6.5 0.45 0.43 0.74 0.64 0.64 0.55 1995 a Vol. 42 No. 2 II III IV V VI VII 1 1998Nishioka 199820022002
More information10 2016 5 16 1 1 Lin, P. and Saggi, K. (2002) Product differentiation, process R&D, and the nature of market competition. European Economic Review 46(1), 201 211. Manasakis, C., Petrakis, E., and Zikos,
More information産業・企業レベルデータで見た日本の経済成長.pdf
2003 11 10 IT IT JIP JCER ) 2003 CD-ROM http://www.esri.go.jp/jp/archive/bun/bun170/170index. html 1 JIP Jorgenson, Mun, andstiroh (2002) GDP 2 3 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981
More informationサイバニュース-vol134-CS3.indd
NEWS 2012 WINTER 134 No. F=maF ma m af Contents N, X θ 1,θ 2 θ N 0θ i π/2 X i X 0 Θ i Θ 1 = 2θ 1 Θ 2 = 2(θ 1 θ 2) NX N X 0 Θ N N Θ N = 2{θ 1 θ 2θ 3 θ N } Θ N = 2π A 1A 2B 2B 1 mm 3 α α = π /m A 1A
More informationDSGE Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model DSGE 5 2 DSGE DSGE ω 0 < ω < 1 1 DSGE Blanchard and Kahn VAR 3 MCMC 2 5 4 1 1 1.1 1. 2. 118
7 DSGE 2013 3 7 1 118 1.1............................ 118 1.2................................... 123 1.3.............................. 125 1.4..................... 127 1.5...................... 128 1.6..............
More informationCHUO UNIVERSITY 3
2 CHUO UNIVERSITY 3 4 CHUO UNIVERSITY 5 6 CHUO UNIVERSITY 7 8 Journal of Economic Behavior and Orgnanization Games and Economic Behavior Journal of Comparative Economics CHUO UNIVERSITY 9 10 CHUO UNIVERSITY
More information46−ª3�=4�“ƒ‚S“·‚Ö‡¦
463420101 1. 1989, Yoshida and Rasche1990, Rasche1990, 19921997, Fujiki and Mulligan1996, 1996, Sekine1998, 2001, Fujiki2002, 2003, 2004 Bahmani-Oskooee and Shabsigh1996, Amano and Wirjanto2000, Bahmani-Oskooee
More informationJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization Quarterly Journal of Economics Review of Economics and Statistics Internal Labor Markets and Manpower Analysis Economics of Education Review Journal of Political
More information