(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) S&L (1) (2) (3) S&L (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) 2 New York

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Transcription:

S C B SHINKIN CENTRAL BANK 104-0031 3-8-1 TEL.03-3563-7541 FAX.03-3563-7551 http://www.scbri.jp/ FDIC New York 15-5 2004.2

(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) S&L (1) (2) (3) S&L (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) 2 New York 15-5 2004

1 2003 ROA 1.37% 9,000 10 80 90 3,000 2 9,000 100 3 1,900 21 4 80 10 3 New York 15-5 2004

1980 2002 5 6 1988 1991 15 1989 500 FDIC 1997 1980 1994 1,600 1,300 S&L 363 S&L 7 1,601 17.6 S&L 1,321 14.5 8 8090 1930 4 New York 15-5 2004

80 90 82 86 91 2001 90 80 1980 (ID) NV 5 New York 15-5 2004

29 4 214 13 18 4 20 28 14 29 84 27 15 17 42 99 53 69 162 157 7 68 34 69 134 31 28 24 18 49 60 18 29 15 120 30 14 851 10 2 39 19 52 8 5 6 61 44 1 21 : FDIC 6 6 New York 15-5 2004

80 S&L 80 90 S&L 80 70 OPEC 80 80 S&L SL 80 70 MMMF 7 New York 15-5 2004

S&L FHLB FISLIC TX MMMMF CP 8 New York 15-5 2004

FDIC GDP GDP GDP GDP S&L S&L 9 New York 15-5 2004

80 10 19801994 39 40 44 19871989 71 491689 11 1987 25 4,730 53 80 90 10 S&L FDIC 19801994 10 80 10 New York 15-5 2004

1973 1979 1973 2.75 1981 36.95 60 OPEC OPEC 1981 1986 10 4,0001981 7571986 1981 13 (20) 50 19811983 8 20 11 New York 15-5 2004

14 1986 15 1986 1977 1993 36 16 12 New York 15-5 2004

1982 S&L 17 80 1876 1956 1970 1988 40 1987 13 New York 15-5 2004

50 3 18 FRB 50 8090 80 10 FDIC1998 1987 11 FDIC 20 FDIC FDIC 38 4,180 FDIC 1989 M 36 14 New York 15-5 2004

FDIC 1988 1987 31 1988 FDIC FDIC 1990 1992 10 JP FDIC FDIC FDIC FDIC1997 1984 1986 80 1980 25 FDIC 15 New York 15-5 2004

1975 770 250 21 15 30 (SBA) 1961 16 New York 15-5 2004

922 166 42 1112 50 80 22 70 100 100 1968 7 370 50 8 150 100 6080 17 New York 15-5 2004

7.5 87 93 23 YMCA 30 20 95 18 New York 15-5 2004

1990 1981 80 90 FDIC FDIC 19 New York 15-5 2004

24 50 ( ) 20 New York 15-5 2004

80 90 19801994 10 10 21 New York 15-5 2004

26 27 S&L 80 1987 1983 1989 1983 1986 12 25 51 83 89 81 86 22 New York 15-5 2004

80 1990 1718 1988 1991 22 1989 80 240 PNC 1991 230 FDIC too big too fail 28 FDIC FDICIA (2) 1990 29 S&L S&L S&L 30 1816 95 S&L 1930 23 New York 15-5 2004

31 7982 MMMF 1980 107 1980 (123 )81 17 100 MMMF 1981 FDIC 25 FDIC FDIC 32 24 New York 15-5 2004

1990 1994 34 672 88 13 41 396 10 1984 1990 77 17 22 7.5 24/319 1985 35 ROE= ROE=ROA ROA= 25 New York 15-5 2004

ROE 8389 13.4 (Co-operative Bank) 74 37 38 S&L S&L FDIC 26 New York 15-5 2004

The Co-operative Central Bank 1932 SIF FDIC 10 1,100 FDIC 10 SIF 74 200 1.2 1934 1995 1985 19951997 10 FDIC 10 27 New York 15-5 2004

30 95 2002 2.2 BIS 42 10.5 10 8 70 91 100 90 28 New York 15-5 2004

FDIC FDIC 10 FDIC FDIC 100 90 FDIC 10 FDIC 20 FDIC 90 10 80 FDIC 18 FDIC FDIC 20 FDIC FDIC FDIC ( ) 8090 ROE 2003 29 New York 15-5 2004

20 30 New York 15-5 2004

19992000 ROE EPS P/E 43 44 31 New York 15-5 2004

80 S&L 1990 1990 2000 80 46 1983 1989 2.7% 8.1% 17 80 0.97 2.28% 1979 10 575 m 2 1,296 m 2 1980 S&L 47 1980 240 1980 1989 299 10 2 80 1991 45 1986 32 New York 15-5 2004

50 60 70 1930 1990 12 1990 1994 75 6 39 12 65 S&L S&L 80 S&L 19901994 47 3,850 564 620 47 29 80 90 90 91 FDIC1997 47 39 48 33 New York 15-5 2004

90 90 2000 34 New York 15-5 2004

35 New York 15-5 2004

S&LSavings and Loan Association 19 S&L S&L Savings Bank S&L S&L 1930 S&L FDIC1997 19801994 1,600 1,300 363 $1=110 S&L 1,601 17.6 S&L 1,321 14.5 53 S&L 1982 85 88 89 82 S&L 89 S&L 36 New York 15-5 2004

1980 1994 S&L S&L 1980 318 S&L 2003 11 S&L 13 110 S&L 96 S&L S&L S&L 2 S&L 2030 S&L ( It s a Wonderful Life) S&L S&L S&L 3-6-3 CEO 54 S&L 70 37 New York 15-5 2004

55 70 OPEC 1980 S&L FSLIC S&L 4,000 6,040 S&L 56 590 S&L 1989 S&L FHLB FRB S&L FHLB S&L DC FHLBB S&L S&L S&L FSLIC FHLBB FDIC S&L FHLBB S&L S&L S&L FHLB FHLB S&L FHLB S&L 57 70 80 2 1978 6.3% 1981 38 New York 15-5 2004

58 16.3 10% 70 MMMF S&L S&L 10 78 MMMF S&L S&L 19801983 169 1979 FSLIC S&L 4 S&L 532 9%FSLIC 35 45 143 S&L FSLIC 259 S&L 59 S&L 80 DIDMCA82 (GS ) S&L S&L S&L GS S&L S&L 30 40 11 3 S&L S&L S&L 60 1986 83 DIDMCA 10 100 39 New York 15-5 2004

S&L 61 1980 S&L DIDMCA FHLBB FHLBB 1980 1982 FHLBB 80 GAAP S&L Regulatory Accounting Principles(RAP) S&L GAAP RAP 10 FHLBB S&L S&L S&L S&L S&L 1984 RAP S&L 71 RAP GAAP S&L 374 GAAP S&L 242 4 S&L S&L 1984 RAP 3.7 GAAP 2.6 0.3 62 S&L 80 S&L 80 S&L 198283 S&L S&L S&L S&L DIDMCA GS S&L 63 S&L 40 New York 15-5 2004

S&L S&L FSLIC S&L 64 1983 1985 S&L 1984 GDP 8.6 4 S&L 19.9 65 1982 1985 184 65 31 48 78 S&L 78 86 56 S&L S&L 10 66 1982 FHLBB S&L S&L S&L 10 25% 400 75 S&L 67 S&L S&L S&L 19831985 FSLIC 268 S&L S&L119 68 1983 1985 257 S&LFSLIC S&L S&L 41 New York 15-5 2004

S&L S&L 69 S&L S&L S&L 1980 FHLBB 1981 1,385 FHLBB 1984 1,337 1980 3,210 S&L 0.8 1984 2,347 0.75 70 FHLB 1983 FRB 48 11 S&L S&L 1983 1985 71 80 S&L 1984 S&L FHLBB 24,775 OCC 30,764FDIC 32,505FRB 37,900 FHLBB S&L 72 S&L FHLBB FHLBB S&L 84 42 New York 15-5 2004

85 S&L FHLBB 73 FHLBB 1985 FHLBB S&L 1986 S&L 6 88 FHLBB BIS 74 1984 S&L 1987 S&L 80 S&L 1984 1981 1986 75 80 1986 1989 1990 S&L S&L 1989 S&L FSLIC 1986 76 FSLIC S&L S&L 19871988 S&L S&L S&L 43 New York 15-5 2004

S&L FSLIC S&L 77 S&L 50 S&L S&L FSLIC FSLIC S&L P&A FSLIC P&A ( FDIC 78 ) 1988 FSLIC 179 S&L P&A 373 47 79 FHLBB 1991 S&L S&L S&L S&L FHLBB FHLBB 12 1987 RAP GAAP FSLIC 1986 S&L 44 New York 15-5 2004

1984 S&L 1985 1980 S&L S&L US League of Savings Institutions 87 10 Competitive Equality Banking Act 1989 FIRREA(Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989) S&L FHLBB FSLIC S&L OTS S&L RTC S&L FHLB OTS S&L FHLB FHLBB FHFB S&L QTL S&L 1998 QTL FHLB S&L S&L S&L S&L S&L S&L S&L S&L 80 1,321 1991 FDICIA S&L S&L S&L S&L S&L 45 New York 15-5 2004

S&L S&L S&L 1984 S&L 36 70 1986 FHLB S&L 131 FHLBB S&L S&L 1987 FHLBB S&L S&L FHLB 81 82 S&L S&L 250 2 1989 S&L 83 12 10 70 84 S&L S&L S&L 46 New York 15-5 2004

85 Grant1996 1987 100 S&L 80 S&L 2001 86 USAA S&L S&L: S&L S&L S&L 100 S&L S&L S&L S&L 23 Savings and Loan 37 Savings and Loan S&L S&L 87 FHLBB 1991 1980 S&L S&L 1980 S&L S&L 47 New York 15-5 2004

S&L FDIC1997 S&L S&L S&L S&L 18 S&L S&L S&L S&L 80 S&L White1991 FDICIA 48 New York 15-5 2004

FSLIC 88 FHLBBFHLB S&L S&L 70 S&L 82 S&L S&L 100 7080 S&L S&L S&L 89 49 New York 15-5 2004

80 1989 FIRREA 1991 FDIC FDICIA S&L 80 19931994 1997 1980 2002 S&L 1994 80 90 GDP 90 50 New York 15-5 2004

92 80 90 90 1 80 2001 19972002 93 FDIC Duncan2003 1997 2002 34 FDIC 34 94 51 New York 15-5 2004

1997 2002 34 FDIC 21.3 80 95 453 1999 1,100 1,200 $1= 110 1994 163 52 New York 15-5 2004

50 1998 ROA 7.25 ROA 3.8 400 27 FDIC 72 34 FDIC 70 97 2002 669 736 98 FDIC FDIC 53 New York 15-5 2004

2003 10 FDIC 99 ROA 100 FDIC 101 54 New York 15-5 2004

21 FDIC FDIC FDIC 102 BIS 55 New York 15-5 2004

80 80 103 S&L FSLIC 1993 104 56 New York 15-5 2004

FDIC 105 1980 1999 2000 REIT 1990 80 GDP 57 New York 15-5 2004

S&L 1980 DIDMCA S&L S&L 2003 7080 58 New York 15-5 2004

S&L S&L S&L 59 New York 15-5 2004

Myers & Spong2003 1980 S&L 106 1980 ALM 60 New York 15-5 2004

61 New York 15-5 2004

FDIC 80 1980 2002 GDP 107 X =-159.1+563G + 0.56N + 68.0R + 196.1U R 0.685 G: GDP (0.336)N:X-3 (0.003)R:X-3 0.785U: 0.221 P GDP 95 R 70 62 New York 15-5 2004

FDIC Adams, J. R., The Big Fix: Inside the S&L Scandal: How an Unholy Alliance of Politics and Money Destroyed America s Banking System, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1990 Chicago Tribune, State Conviction of S&L Boss Keating Over Turned He'll Remain in Jail under Federal Sentence, Chicago, Ill. Apr 4, 1996 Duncan, M.C. et al (FDIC), The Root Causes of Bank Failures, FDIC Working Paper, 2003 Eccles, J.L. & O Keefe, J. P., Understanding the Experience of Converted New England Savings Banks, FDIC Banking Review Vol.8 No.1, 1995 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), History of the Eighties Lessons for the Future, 1997 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC Experience, 1998 Grant, J. M. The Great Texas Banking Crash: An Insider s Account, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1996 Los Angeles Times, Keating Released After Five-Day Incarceration: Courts: Former Lincoln Savings Operator had stomach pumped after innately drinking shampoo, attorney says. Apr 2, 1998 Los Angeles Times, O.C. BUSINESS PLUS; High Court Leaves Keating's Victory in S&L Case Intact; Fraud: Former executive of Irvine-based Lincoln Savings wins his bid against state's attempt to reinstate convictions, Los Angeles, Calif. Oct 3, 2000 Myers, F & Spong, K., Community Bank Performance in Slower Growing Markets: Finding 63 New York 15-5 2004

Sound Strategies for Success, Financial Industry Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, October 2003 Salmon, R. et al (FDIC), Costs Associated With Bank Failures, FDIC Working Paper 2003 White, L. J., The S&L Debacle Public Policy Lessons for Bank and Thrift Regulation, Oxford University Press, 1991 White, S. M.(FDIC), Impact of New Activities and Structures on Bank Failures, FDIC Working Paper 2003 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002 New York 55 2003 New York 56 2003 New York 15-2 2003 New York 153 2003 New York 154 2003 64 New York 15-5 2004