Law and Economics Review vol.4,no.1(february 2009) 1998
1 500 No.93 1999114 2 195072119885021 19901991 3 Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 200720071024effective 1986 CFIUS2008831CFIUS web pageupdate - 1 - - 2 -
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5 20016 6 6 21 1849-7 - - 8 -
1 1998 23 3 23 1998 4 1 2006 2 1 1998 19992006 1 2 2006 3 20068123 81200781 4 (2006) - 9 - - 10 -
Difference in differences1998 2 2.1 10 5 6 25 30 2.2 2 23 35 2.3 19782005 1,110 200530 2005 65 200560 2.4 200033.92006 33.2 5 6 2006-11 - 7-12 -
2006 200932.5 3 3.1 21 1 1 3.2 1998 8 1998 21 2 21 3 1998 1998 9 8 9 213-13 - - 14 -
3.3 90 3.4 20052007 2005-15 - 10 11 41998 4.1 231998 1998 13 10 (2004) 11 20068123 81200781 12 (2006) 13 2008-16 -
14 23 1998 23 15 1998 1998 4.2 16 200712214,668 1998 2319 68,76519932006 14 2008 15 2006 16 http://www.hinsyu.maff.go.jp/ - 17-4.3 Differenceindifferences 18 102 1998 Differencein differences 31998 4 19981998 200519983()4( ) () ijt α α () i α () t α () it α jt ε ijt 17 difference in differenceswooldridge2001 18 α α α α α 19 ε - 18 -
10 200510 2005 α 20 31998 4( )7 7 1978 365 1998 1978 21 11993 2006 22 2 1993 2004 2005 2006 119932006 1680 4.0315 13.4803 0 216 1680 2.9780 11.0343 0 171 1680 1.9911 8.2775 0 164 1680 0.9869 4.9166 0 79 1680 44.2026 9.3246 28.585 52.807 1680 4.0269 0.6299 2.724 4.853 1680 1.3259 0.4751 0.582 1.900 1680 2.7894 2.2626 0.382 7.827 20-19 - 21 22 719861999-20 -
(10.0216) 2 18 11.8148 (18.3595) 5.6898 (11.0210) 4.0324 19932004 102 2.5204 (11.9296) 1.3570 (7.9602) 0.3284 (2.1280) 20052006 4.4 4.3 1 19932006 2 23 19981997 199820052 33 4.4.1 1 31 α 18 14.4444 (21.3106) 5.4167 (8.8588) 7.0833 (14.9807) 102 3.0196 (10.5732) 1.2745 (4.8172) 0.6373 (2.8965) α 5 1998 3.9 31 10.1435 *** 2.8851 8.7954 *** 2.2641 (2003) 2.9023 *** 1.1137 2.1849 ** 0.9945 (2004) 2.8099 2.1461 2.0652 1.9164 (2005) 3.9885 3.1742 3.6058 2.8343 (2006) 5.4942 4.4648 5.0321 3.9867 (2003) 6.7317 *** 1.8528 6.2562 *** 1.6544 (2004) 3.4572 * 1.8528 2.8477 * 1.6544 (2005) 2.8892 1.8528 3.8614 ** 1.6544 (2006) 5.4942 1.8528 0.2758 1.6544 () 0.0800 0.2715 0.0199 0.2424 ( 0.5623 1.4356 0.5743 1.2819 () 2.8673 6.3929 1.0195 5.7084 () 0.8880 1.2188 0.8976 1.0883 1.3303 3.9453 2.6506 3.4906 0.0756 0.0867 0.000 0.000 1680 1680-21 - ******1510 Hausman - 22 -
41 24 α 1 1998 4.0 α 41 4.9565 *** 1.6608 3.8389 *** 0.9554 (2003) 1.4641 * 0.8349 0.7208 0.4787 (2004) (2005) 1.6883 3.2057 1.6088 2.3795 0.3769 0.4001 0.9224 1.3643 (2006) 4.8370 3.3469 0.1951 1.9190 (2003) 3.7507 *** 1.3889 2.5056 *** 0.7963 (2004) 3.7343 *** 1.3889 0.8866 0.7963 (2005) (2006) () 0.1690 1.4598 0.1495 1.3889 1.3889 0.2035 4.0304 1.1840 0.1296 *** 0.7963 0.7963 0.1167 () 1.0357 1.0762 0.4614 0.6171 () 3.1983 4.7923 2.1788 2.7477 () 0.8739 2.0970 0.9137 2.9084 0.0238 0.5535 0.5239 1.6679 0.0439 0.000 1680 0.1053 0.000 1680 ******1510 Hausman 24-23 - 4.4.22 52 1 α 1α 51998 3.9 52 (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) 1680 1680 ******1510 Hausman - 24-10.1435 2.8284 1.0640 0.4652 6.7317 3.4572 2.8892 0.3265 0.0579 0.2734 5.0148 0.6613 *** *** *** * * 2.8850 0.9015 0.8561 0.8476 1.8486 1.8486 1.8486 1.8486 0.3553 1.5270 8.1529 0.4007 8.7954 1.8987 0.2708 0.3200 6.2562 2.8477 3.8614 0.2758 0.1361 0.1067 1.7683 0.4584 *** ** *** * ** 2.2641 0.8061 0.7655 0.7579 1.6530 1.6530 1.6530 1.6530 0.3177 1.3654 7.2901 0.3583 5.1356 4.3462 5.2988 3.8566 0.0774 0.0881 0.000 0.000
62 1 α 11998 4.0 α 62 4.9565 *** 1.6608 3.8389 *** 0.9554 (2003) 1.1449 * 0.6767 0.7539 * 0.3888 (2004) 0.0833 0.6426 0.3541 0.3692 (2005) 0.0312 0.6362 0.2888 0.3655 (2006) (2003) 3.7507 *** 1.3875 2.5056 *** 0.7973 (2004) 3.7343 *** 1.3875 0.8866 0.7973 (2005) 0.1690 1.3875 4.0304 *** 0.7973 (2006) () 1.4598 0.0044 1.3875 0.2667 1.1840 0.1404 0.7973 0.1533 () 0.4752 1.1461 0.3685 0.6586 3.8310 6.1195 2.0627 3.5163 () 0.4402 0.3008 0.0182 0.1728 3.8437 0.0458 0.000 3.2175 1.4551 0.1056 0.000 1.8489 1680 1680 ******1510 4.4.3 3 73 73 11.5458 (2005) (2005) 1.4869 () 0.1147 ( () () ******1510 Hausman 83 α 5 1998 3.0 α *** 3.5071 2.2756 0.1375 9.5359 3.1209 0.0765 *** 2.8813 1.9444 0.1175 2.8339 6.7690 1.9317 5.7750 0.0956 0.1151 0.001 0.000 240 240 Hausman - 25 - - 26 -
(2005) (2005) () () () () 83 ******1510 Hausman 5 5.1 Difference in differences1998-27 - 4.6634 0.1242 0.0673 *** 1.7825 1.1874 0.0718 4.8725 2.9967 0.0092 *** ** 1.6462 1.2749 0.0770 1.9784 3.5284 0.0466 3.7696 0.0572 0.1194 0.029 0.000 240 240 25 26 27 5.2 28 25 26 4( 6)1998 1 27 ( (2006)) 28 (2004) - 28 -
200681 2381200781 2008 3.3 29 30 29 30-29 - 5.3 6 3 2007 1999 19861999 2004 2006 2006 http://www.hinsyu.maff.go.jp/ 2006 15 17 2008 Jeffrey M. Wooldridge (2001) Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data, MIT Press - 30 -
Economic Analysis about the Revision of the Plant Variety Protection and Seed Act in 1998 About the Farmer's Personal Proliferation of Seed and Seedling Takashi Nozu Assistant Director Agricultural Production Support Planning Division, Agricultural Production Bureau Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Abstract The effects of breeder's right have come to reach the farmer's private proliferation of some kinds of plant after the revision of the Plant Variety Protection and Seed Act in 1998. This thesis shows by the measurement analysis using the panel data that the registration of the breeder's right of these plants by foreign companies has increased by the law revision although the registration by Japanese companies has not changed. Keywords: Plant Variety Protection and Seed Act, Breeder s Right, Farmer's Personal Proliferation of Seed and Seedling - 31 - - 32 -
- 33 - * 2004 20012006 2004 1. 20042006 3.3 2004190740 1 Levitt (1998) (2006) Evans (1977) (1993a,1993b,1994) (1998) (2003) (2000)Levitt (1997) Donohue and Levitt (2001) 2004 2 20012006 236237238 239240(2005b)240 328111-8-2065( 1957)241 23 4 1 (2006) 2 2004 (2005) - 34 -
2004 2 3 4 5 2. 2-1. 2004 (119) 3,300 5,500 (119) 3,300 5,500 (120) 300 500 (1202) 1,100 3,300 (1202) 3,300 (121) (1212) 1,100 ()(122) 30 50 2004 3 (2004)2004200511 1 4 2-2. 2004 2 515 520 7 6 7 715 720 10 1907402004 2004 1520 (2006) (2005)2004 2005111 3. 5 (2006) (2005b) (2005b) 3-35 - 119 4 2006 (2006) 5 Cooter and Ulen (2008) (2007) (2005a) (1998) - 36 -
6 3-1X* 7 X 2 X 1 3-2 X* (2005a) (2006) (2005) (2006) (2006) 3-2X 1 X 2 6 0 Becker (1968) 7-37 - 3-1 (1998) 4. 4-1. 2004 2004 8 ln(/ it )=β 1 +Θ 1 it +X 1it γ 1 +δ 1i +ε 1it...(a) ln(/ it )=β 2 +Θ 2 it +X 2it γ 2 +δ 2i +ε 2it...(b) ln(/ it )=β 3 +Θ 3 it +X 3it γ 3 +δ 3i +ε 3it...(c) 8 01-38 -
β 1 ~β 3,Θ 1 ~Θ 3,γ 1 ~γ 3 : X 1 ~X 3 : δ 1 ~δ 3 :(unobserved effect) ε 1 ~ε 3 :(idiosyncratic error) i: t: 4-2. 4-2-1. 9 i. ln(/10) 1011 10 ii. ln(/10);ln(/10) 12 10 9 (2006) 10 6 12316 2351 (2007) 6 11 12 246 (2005) - 39-13 14 15 16 4-2-2. i. 013 ii. Iln() 17 13 14 (2005b) 15 16 (2005b) 301223 9-14-2957( 1955) 17 20012006 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 82,868 88,252 93,955 95,699 93,752 89,016 80,848 85,969 91,287 92,765 91,074 86,382 97.6% 97.4% 97.2% 97.0% 97.1% 97.0% - 40 -
(a)(b) 100% 18 100% iii. IIln() iv. IIIln(/10) 10 19 18 19 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 203 238 284 368 469 450 23 20 20 27 16 4 180 218 264 341 453 446...p 4 7 16 5 11 11...q 97 132 190 229 301 351 q/(p+q)% 96.0% 95.0% 92.2% 97.9% 96.5% 97.0% 0 0 0 0 0 0 78 79 57 106 138 83 0 0 1 0 2 0-41 - (a)(b) v. IV ([])/([km 2 ]) 3 1400=1 7001400=0700 =120002005 2005 9 19 18 vi. V 4-1 - 42 -
/ 0.139 0.235 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.171 1.683/ 1.058 0.311 0.286 0.839 1.041 1.284 1.807 1.691 0.188 1.194 1.569 1.686 1.808 2.2414-1 Mean StdDev Min 25% Med 75% Max / 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 4.4 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 30.5 9.4 12.8 23.6 29.6 36.1 60.9 3.405 0.306 2.624 3.204 3.420 3.614 4.125 / 3.4 2.4 0.7 1.7 2.5 4.2 12.7 / 2.0 1.0 0.3 1.3 1.8 2.6 5.1 0.3 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 1.0 67.8 16.6 29.6 55.4 67.7 80.0 100.0 / 1.357 0.474 0.508 0.988 1.262 1.647 2.615 4.200 0.255 3.419 4.032 4.230 4.394 4.615 4.5 1.1 2.3 3.8 4.4 5.1 8.4 / 198.6 35.8 141.9 176.2 189.5 215.7 370.4 / 5.283 0.157 4.962 5.177 5.250 5.378 5.917 4-3. (a)0 Tobit Model unobserved effect δ 1i δ 3i (b)(c)hausman - 43-4-4. (a)4-2(b)(c) 4-3 4-2 (a)ln(/) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 0.078* 0.070 0.073* 0.039 0.044 0.010 (0.044) (0.047) (0.043) (0.048) (0.062) (0.065) - 0.042 0.168* 0.155 - - (0.096) (0.101) (0.104) 0.331** 0.348** 0.252 0.295* 0.283* 0.311* (0.163) (0.168) (0.162) (0.162) (0.166) (0.165) / 0.461** 0.440** 0.335* 0.211 0.315 0.212 (0.200) (0.204) (0.195) (0.206) (0.195) (0.204) no no yes yes yes yes * no no no no yes yes Observations 276 276 276 276 276 276 Waldχ 2 12.79*** 13.02** 20.46*** 23.66*** 33.41*** 36.27*** Log Likelihood -109.10-109.00-106.00-104.63-99.60-98.50 ***,**,*1%,5%,10%() 4-3 (b)ln(/) (c)ln(/) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) -0.081*** -0.090*** -0.061* -0.097*** -0.108*** -0.073* (0.028) (0.025) (0.035) (0.033) (0.029) (0.040) 0.192*** 0.290*** 0.284*** -0.502*** -0.387*** -0.388*** (0.057) (0.054) (0.056) (0.066) (0.062) (0.064) 0.210* 0.060 0.035 0.241 0.061 0.020 (0.127) (0.113) (0.122) (0.148) (0.130) (0.141) / 0.288-0.133-0.200 0.308-0.193-0.267 (0.188) (0.161) (0.163) (0.220) (0.186) (0.189) no yes yes no yes yes no no yes no no yes Observations 282 282 282 282 282 282 Waldχ 2 33.90*** 119.90*** 142.47*** 106.87*** 239.09*** 262.04*** R 2 0.207 0.225 0.290 0.237 0.246 0.310 4-2Hausman i. (2)(4)(6) - 44 -
1% 10% 2004 ii. (b) (c) iii. (3) 5%10%(b) (c) iv. (1)(3)5%10% i. ln(/10) 10 ii. ln() 20 (2004) 21 22 23 4-44-5 4-4 Mean StdDev Min 25% Med 75% Max 5648 7251 1354 2268 3242 5112 46102 / 197 36 142 173 187 213 374 10732 4427 5223 6753 10190 14584 17541 / 5.272 0.160 4.962 5.160 5.237 5.365 5.928 9.190 0.435 8.561 8.818 9.204 9.588 9.767 4-5. Wooldridge (2006) - 45-20 (2003) 21 (2004) 1 22 23-46 -
4-5 (b)ln(/) (c)ln(/) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) -0.079*** -0.088*** -0.060* -0.094*** -0.106*** -0.072* (0.028) (0.025) (0.035) (0.033) (0.029) (0.040) 0.193*** 0.292*** 0.285*** -0.501*** -0.385*** -0.386*** (0.057) (0.054) (0.056) (0.066) (0.062) (0.064) 0.211* 0.060 0.035 0.242 0.061 0.021 (0.127) (0.113) (0.122) (0.148) (0.130) (0.141) / 0.243-0.179-0.219 0.255-0.248-0.293 (0.192) (0.164) (0.166) (0.224) (0.189) (0.192) no yes yes no yes yes no no yes no no yes Obsevations 282 282 282 282 282 282 Waldχ 2 33.16*** 120.37*** 142.70*** 106.17*** 239.66*** 262.35*** R 2 0.206 0.223 0.290 0.236 0.244 0.310 1st stage Waldχ 2 7809*** 9560*** 10936*** 7747*** 9598*** 10897*** 4-2Hausman 1% 10% 4-6. 2004 2004 24 (2007) 24-47 - (2007) 25 26 27 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 87.8% 87.1% 89.3% 88.8% 89.8% 88.8% 25 (2007) 26 (2005b) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 48.7% 51.1% 50.3% 50.3% 54.6% 59.9% 15.7% 17.0% 19.4% 22.6% 24.9% 27.1% 27 1 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 502,949 563,177 469,483 748,224 388,307 344,273 128,798 125,098 120,350 119,000 116,072 108,609 1,099,716 1,083,362 814,677 808,226 730,929 819,675 123,836 128,485 152,855 241,349 235,524 290,337 1998200312,823,311-48 -
28 5. 2004 20012006 2004 29 2006 (2006) 31 (2006) 163,553,597 (2004) 28 29 4911628-9-393( 1974) (2006) (1988) - 49 - - 50 -
. A-1. 20012005 2006 20012005 2006 2004200620012003 20012005 2006 20012005 2006 200120042006 2002 2003 20042006-51 - 2001 20022006 20012005 2006 2001200220042005 2003 2006 20012002 20032006 A-2. 3012239-14-2957( 1955) 328111-8-2065( 1957) 4911628-9-393( 1974) BIGLOBENHK (2006)46-1, 21-31. (2000) 40, 40-65. (2005a),3. (2005b),3. (1998),4. (2007),11. (2006),5. (2007)19. - 52 -
(2006) 78-4, 98-103. (2006)46-1, 18-20. (2007)ACCS2006. (1988)11215. (2005),4. (2006)105-149. (1998) 23, 157-172. (2003) 45-7, 67-77. (1993a) 99-78, 165-230. (1993b) 99-910, 221-266. (1994) 99-1112, 169-195. (2004) 29, 10-26. (2006)46-1, 32-42. (2003) http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/hanzai/kettei/0312 18keikaku.pdf. (2007). (2006),5. (2004)http://www.bunka. go.jp/chosakuken/singikai/pdf/singi_houkokusho_1601.pdf. (2006)IP http://www.bunka.go.jp/chosakuken/singikai/pdf/sing i_houkokusho_1808.pdf. (2007)4http://www. mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/bunka/gijiroku/013/07061121.htm. (2004)15 13, 136-143. (2005)57-4, 31-93. (2005)1189, 27-53. (2006) 46-1, 86-99. Becker, Gary S. (1968) Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, The Journal of Political Economy 76-2, 169-217. Cooter, Robert and Thomas Ulen (2008) Law & Economics, 5 th ed., Boston, Massachusetts: Pearson Education. Evans, Robert Jr. (1977) Changing Labor Markets and Criminal Behavior in Japan, The Journal of Asian Studies 36-3, 477-489. Donohue III, John J. and Steven D. Levitt (2001) The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116-2, 379-420. Levitt, Steven D. (1997) Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime, The American Economic Review 87-3, 270-290. Levitt, Steven D. (1998) Juvenile Crime and Punishment, The Journal of Political Economy 106-6, 1156-1185. Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2006) Introductory Econometrics, 3 rd ed., Mason, Ohio: Thomson South- Western. - 53 - - 54 -
Empirical reserch on effects of raising statutory penalty for copyright crimes -Compared to robbery- Atsushi Ushiyama The Legislative Bureau of The House of Representatives Abstact In this paper, we analyse the effects of raising statutory penalty for copyright crime and robbery in 2004, using prefectural panel data from 2001 to 2006. We find that increase of statutory penalty did not reduce copyright criminal, while reduced robbery criminal. Key words: statutory penalty, crime, copyright, robbery - 55 - - 56 -