Tezukayama RIEB Discussion Paper Series No. 7 地方政府間の距離が財政調整に対する態度に与える影響 - 独裁者ゲーム実験からの示唆 - 竹本亨 小川一仁 高橋広雅 鈴木明宏 伊藤健宏 帝塚山大学 関西大学 広島市立大学 山形大学 岩手県立大学 経済学部 社会学部 国際学部 人文学部 総合政策学部 2013 年 11 月 Tezukayama University Research Institute for Economics and Business 7-1-1 Tezukayama, Nara 631-8501, Japan
2013 11 3 (1) (2) 1 1 2 (C) :18530226 E-mail: takemoto@tezukayama-u.ac.jp E-mail: kz-ogawa@kansai-u.ac.jp E-mail: htaka@intl.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp E-mail: asuzuki@human.kj.yamagata-u.ac.jp E-mail: t itoh@iwate-pu.ac.jp 1 (1998) (2005) 2 (2003) 1
(Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986)) 2 (1) 3 (2) (1) (2) 2 1 expectation of reciprocity 1 ( Luhan, Kocher and Sutter (2006)) 2 3 4 5 6 2 (1998) (2000) (2001) (1985) (1988) 2
(1992) 3 (1985) (1988) (1992) 1983 1987 1983 84 (1996) 4 1970 80 Kahneman et al. (1986) Camerer (2003) 2 1 13% 50% Hoffman, McCabe and Smith (1996) Rankin (2006) Johannesson and Persson (2000) Johannesson and Persson (2000) 3 (2006) 4 (1992) 3
5 Cason and Mui (1997) Luhan et al. (2006) Hoffman et al. (1996) Rankin (2006) ( ) Face to Face 2 2 8 ( ) Face to Face 6% 26.3% Face to Face 39% Face to Face 27% ( ) Face to face Johannesson and Persson (2000) ( ) 1/3 expectations of reciprocity 5 Cason and Mui (1997) 2 1 Cason and Mui (1997) PAT (Persuasive Arguement Theory) SCT (Social Comparison Theory) 1 2 ID 2 5 Cason and Mui (1997) PAT self-regarding SCT other-regarding PAT 5 1 4
SCT Luhan et al. (2006) Cason and Mui (1997) 3 1 DG 2 3 3 DG 1 19% 2 11% 3 13% 1 2 1 3 2 3 Cason and Mui (1997) ( ) (2005) 6 ( ( ) ( ) (27) (9) 07.10.23 H-H (24) (8) 07.10.10 Y-Y (27) (9) 07.11.14 H-Y (24) (8) 07.11.14 Y-H 1: 3 2007 10 11 ( ( 1) 136 7 z-tree Fischbacher (2007) 6 Hillman (2003), 5 7 5
( ) 1. 2. 3. 800 ( 7 ) ( ) 8 4. 9 5. 10 1. 2. 11 1,000 3 i=1 (800 S i) 3 i=1 j S ij +1000 S i i S ij i 8 Cason and Mui (1997) 9 10 11 6
D \ R H Y H H-H H-Y Y Y-H Y-Y 2: j 90 100 2 2 2 H Y H-Y H-H Y-Y H-Y Y-H 4 H-Y Y-H deception 1,000 Hey (1998) deception McDaniel and Starmer (1998) deception 2 1 1 deception deception Hey (1998) McDaniel and Starmer (1998) 7
deception 4 1 2 (1) (2) 3 3 12 13 ( ) 25 20 15 Y-Y H-H H-Y 10 Y-H 5 0 round1 round2 round3 1: : 4 1 ( 1 2 3 H-H 9 9 9 27 H-Y 9 9 9 27 Y-H 7 8 8 23 Y-Y 8 8 8 24 33 34 34 101 3: 12 1 11/14 7 13 1 2 8
\ 1 2 3 H-H 16.25 13.19 5.28 11.57 Y-Y 21.25 12.19 8.28 13.91 H-Y 13.90 5.15 1.26 6.77 Y-H 11.61 4.67 0.78 5.43 4: ) 5 (2) 5 1 4.2 (1) 1 H-H Y-Y H-Y Y-H (1) H-H H-Y Y-Y Y-H H-H Y-Y H-Y Y-H 4.1 4 2 P (T) 100 19766.32 197.663 2 2371.219 1185.609 6.546 0.002 3 1113.545 371.182 2.049 0.113 6 112.8624 18.8104 0.104 0.996 (E) 89 16119.56 181.119 5: 4.1 (1) (1) H-H Y-Y H-Y Y-H 6 H-H vs. Y-Y H-Y vs. Y-H t P H-H vs. Y-Y 11.574 13.906-2.33 0.6177 0.538 H-H vs. H-Y 11.574 6.773 4.801 1.3107 0.193 H-H vs. Y-H 11.574 5.435 6.139 1.6077 0.111 Y-Y vs. H-Y 13.906 6.773 7.133 1.8893 0.062 Y-Y vs. Y-H 13.906 5.435 8.471 2.1572 0.033 H-Y vs. Y-H 6.7731 5.435 1.338 0.3505 0.727 6: 89 9
H-H Y-Y H-Y Y-H H-H Y-Y H-Y Y-H \ 1 2 3 18.601 12.721 6.691 12.898 4.934 1.037 15.837 8.827 3.864 7: P 100 19766.32 197.6632 ( ) 1 1030.316 1030.316 6.008376 0.0161 ( ) 2 2379.344 1189.672 6.937675 0.0015 2 25.05548 12.52774 0.073057 0.9296 95 16290.59 171.4799 8: 7 8 7 1 t P 1 2 15.83712 8.827206 7.009915 2.1906 0.031 1 3 15.83712 3.863971 11.97315 3.7416 0.003 2 3 8.827206 3.863971 4.963235 1.5627 0.121 9: 10
4.2 (2) (2) 9 8 15% 2 4.3 10 Round Place 1 0 Shinrai Kanjinkan Ohitoyoshi Kouheikan jodosei GenderComp 1 2 AverageGrade Chat 10: 11 MODEL1 MODEL2 10 AIC MODEL3 MODEL4 11
Model 1 Model 2 Coefficient t-value P -value Coefficient t-value P -value Round -5.14635-3.4146 0.0010-5.18958-3.4871 0.0007 Place 9.215343 1.4626 0.1471 4.86273 1.7918 0.0764 Kanjinkansyakudo 14.52057 2.0720 0.0411 17.95828 2.8365 0.0056 Ohitoyoshi -4.7789-2.3935 0.0188-4.41045-2.3861 0.0190 Kouheikan 3.541746 1.6937 0.0938 3.658298 1.8647 0.0653 Shinraikan 2.781045 0.6857 0.4947 Joudousei 3.894607 0.7342 0.4647 AverageGrade 1.302568 0.6622 0.5095 Chatlength*ChatType 0.256113 2.8223 0.0059 0.243405 2.8357 0.0056 GenderComp -2.92543-0.8734 0.3848 Constant -51.2993-2.1241 0.0364-41.9287-1.9778 0.0509 Adjusted R-square 0.2554 0.2713 DW ratio 2.5087 2.5009 AIC 803.1350 797.3447 Model 3 Model 4 Coefficient t-value P -value Coefficient t-value P -value Round -5.39299-3.3967 0.0010-5.40955-3.4331 0.0009 Place 5.863795 2.1320 0.0356 5.229053 2.0134 0.0468 Kanjinkansyakudo Ohitoyoshi Kouheikan Shinraikan Joudousei AverageGrade 0.722249 0.3757 0.7080 Chatlength*ChatType 0.184546 2.0157 0.0467 0.175666 2.0044 0.0478 GenderComp -2.88504-0.8612 0.3913 Constant 12.46113 2.4268 0.0171 13.68741 3.2237 0.0017 Adjusted R-square 0.1716 0.1818 DW ratio 2.3337 2.3543 AIC 809.3707 806.2200 11: 12
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 1. 2. (Camerer (2003) Luhan et al. (2006)) 3. 14 4. ANOVA 5. 5 5.1 (1996) 5.2 Johannesson and Persson (2000) 2 Johannesson and Persson (2000) Johannesson and Persson (2000) 8 Johannesson and Persson (2000) 14 13
Johannesson and Persson (2000) 5.3 15 16 17 18 1 15 2 Luhan et al. (2006) 5.4 16 long-run player chain-store game 17 Marlowe (2004) 18 14
2 19 5.4 Luhan et al. (2006) 3 1 Luhan et al. (2006) Camerer (2003) Luhan et al. (2006) Luhan et al. (2006) 40% 20% Luhan et al. (2006) 20 19 2 2 20 15
6 (1) (2) Johannesson and Persson (2000) 16
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39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. Camerer, C. (2003) Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction: Princeton University Press Princeton:. Cason, T. N. and V. L. Mui (1997) A Laboratory Study in Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game, The Economic Journal, Vol. 107, No. 444, pp. 1465 1483. Fischbacher, U. (2007) z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments, Experimental Economics, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 171 178. Hey, J. D. (1998) Experimental economics and deception: A comment, Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 397 401. Hillman, A. L. (2003) Public Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limitations of Government: Cambridge University Press. Hoffman, E., K. McCabe, and V. L. Smith (1996) Social Distance and Other-Regarding Behavior in Dictator Games, The American Economic Review, Vol. 86, No. 3, pp. 653 660. Johannesson, M. and B. Persson (2000) Non-reciprocal altruism in dictator games, Economics Letters, Vol. 69, No. 2, pp. 137 142. Kahneman, D., J. L. Knetsch, and R. H. Thaler (1986) Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, The Journal of Business, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 285 300. Luhan, W. J., M. G. Kocher, and M. Sutter (2006) Group Polarization in the Team Dictator Game reconsidered, Discussion Paper TI2006-099/1, Tinbergen Institute. 21
Marlowe, F. (2004) Dictators and Ultimatums in an Egalitarian Society ofhunter-gatherers: The Hadza of Tanzania, Foundations of Human Sociality: Economic Experiments and Ethnographic Evidence from Fifteen Small-Scale Societies. McDaniel, T. and C. Starmer (1998) Experimental economics and deception: A comment, Journal of Economic Psychology, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 403 409. Rankin, F. W. (2006) Requests and social distance in dictator games, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 60, No. 1, pp. 27 36. (2003) : (2005) 42 1 67 80 (1992) 23 128 145 (2005) (2001) 11 2 27 68 (2000) 33 2 105 119 (1998) - (1988) (1996) 40 20 36 (2006) 3 2 6 24 (1985) 39 3 57 73 (1998) 21 2 15 30 22