1930 Modigliani and Miller [1958] 170 1930 2008 7 16 I E-mail: takashi.nanjou@boj.or.jp E-mail: cc00881@srv.cc.hit-u.ac.jp //2009.7 81
1. 1 2 M&A 3 4 1965 1969 1995 1995 1993 1 2008 2008 1985 2006 10 ROA Aoki, Jackson, and Miyajima [2007] 2005 2 2007 3 M&A 2007 2005 TCI J 2008 TCI J 4 1993 Hoshi and Kashyap [2001] Miwa and Ramseyer [2002] 2007 M&A 1900 13 1920 1930 3 82 /2009.7
5 1999, 2006 1993, 20062000 2006 2006 6 1930 2 3 1930 170 4 5 2006 6 2006 83
2. 1 7 Modigliani and Miller [1958] MM 8 MM 0% 100% 9 10 1 7 1992 1991 8 197319912002 Brealey, Myers, and Allen [2005] Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe [2005]2005 9 Myers [2003] MM 4 10 2% 3% 40% 2% 3% C 5% 5%.1 0:4/ D 3% 5% 84 /2009.7
1 11 2 12 11 Weighted Average Cost of Capital: WACC CAPM 1965 4 8 4 6 10 5 32 1936 10% 6% 12 Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe [2005] 1991 Myers [2003] 85
2 3 13 0% 100% 14 13 Jensen and Meckling [1976] 1989 2009 14 86 /2009.7
3 15 15 1992 Fukuda and Hirota [1996] 2008 2003 1980 99 823 2008 2003 1990 2008 20082008 87
1 16 2 3 19841989 1934 1 1922 6 17 1923 31 18 1939 4 1942 4 1938 1937 1984 4 1923 37 4 1 1923 27 19 2 20 21 2 1928 31 22 1930 16 Harris and Raviv [1991] 2002 17 5 18 1977 78 1995 174 201 2004 83 102 19 1923 27 20 21 200 1927 3 2 9 22 1928 31 1923 27 1995 57 88 /2009.7
4 1923 37 A B C D E A E 1923 27 4,205 12,765 1928 31 4,158 8,645 1932 34 0 2,380 1935 37 23,390 25,532 22,116 (10,616) 19,242 ( 5,742) 20,000 ( 0) 8,333 ( 0) 9,351 ( 251) 10,597 ( 5,872) 22,380 (11,606) 33,865 ( 1,811) 1,839 901 1,232 17,264 915 1,069 2,313 17,100 307 1,033 5,117 3,463 2,767 1,514 8,550 10,689 1 1 2 11 10 3 4 5 1984 3 1932 34 1931 12 1933 372 373 23 4 1935 37 1935 4 1937 7 4 24 23 1929 116 1933 4 24 1935 154 89
2 1906 1 25 1930 1940 1989 2 200 1989 325 1940 1941 1942 1989 1930 26 330 1942 1989 334 3 1920 8 1934 1920 33 385 1934 1923 387 8 1920 1,000 1926 2,000 1929 4,000 1920 100 1933 1,800 25 1906 1908 8 26 1940 90 /2009.7
1934 ffl 1928... 388 ffl 393 27 ffl 394 3 200 3 3. 1930 1 2 2 27 1932 1,050 1934 388 394 91
1936 1932 1930 1987 1930 1937 1936 1936 1932 1936 1932 1936 2 28 2004 1993 1993 2. 1936 172 112 60 1932 173 107 66 114 3 1936 165 106 59 1932 28 1983 1983 1989 92 /2009.7
127 76 51 97 2. 29 30 1932 1936 31 32 33 1992 65 34 35 29 2004 30 31 1977 5% 10% 100 10 4% 100 20 10% 100 30 20% 32 2004 1 C 10% 2 40% 172 33 34 19891992 2002 2008 Hirota [1999] 2008 35 93
19922002 2002 Rajan and Zingales [1995] Hirota [1999] 36 37 D=A D ff C fi 1 S C fi 2 E C fi 3 R C fi 4 F C fi 5 L C fi 6 Z C fl Dummy C ": D=A 38 1 ff 2 S log 2 39 3 E 1930 2004 1932 40 1932 4 R 41 36 Rajan and Zingales [1995] 4 1991 7 37 2002 4 38 2002 39 1922 1993 Acharya and Sundaram [2005] 40 1932 41 94 /2009.7
5 F 42 Rajan and Zingales [1995] 6 L 43 1992 44 2000 7 Z 1 0 45 Brealey, Myers, and Allen [2005] Ross, Westerfield, and Jaffe [2005] 42 2004 43 44 1993 1930 1950 45 1993 2004 95
1993 1993 1935 10 105 46 47 8 1 2002 319 48 OLS t 3. 5 1936 33.5% 2.0% 77.2% 17.0% 59.7 1.4% 3.2% 59.4% 14.9% 1932 36.8% 1.0% 92.2% 46 2006 2003 47 Miwa and Ramseyer [2002] 48 19902002 96 /2009.7
5 1 1936 172 % % % % % 33.5 59.7 1.4 3.2 59.4 14.9 17.0 98.8 1.0 1.7 20.6 22.3 2.0 1.9 0.0 0.8 7.3 0.0 77.2 924.0 5.0 10.8 95.0 90.7 2 1932 173 % % % % 36.8 43.9 2.1 65.3 8.2 19.7 60.8 2.0 19.6 11.1 1.0 1.7 1.7 6.8 0.0 92.2 386.3 12.5 97.3 51.5 19.7% 43.9 2.1% 65.3% 8.2% 1936 1932. 6 1936 1 log fi 1 fi 2 log log 2 log log 1 fi 3 fi 4 fi 5 97
6 1936 1932 1 2 3 4 5 t t t t t ff 35.7*** 3.16 44.4*** 4.66 39.9*** 3.67 9.3 0.64 19.4 1.21 log fi 1 6.4*** 2.91 5.8*** 2.68 11.6*** 4.34 10.0*** 3.38 log 5.4** 2.27 6 fi 8.9** 2.53 8.5** 2.42 8.6** 2.34 8.5*** 3.04 8.0** 2.45 0.60 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.51 1OLS 2 *** ** * 1% 5% 10% 3 2 fi 3 fi 2.1 1.45 2.8* 1.89 2.1 1.44 4.7*** 4.40 5.2*** 4.56 5.0*** 4.67 3.0*** 3.58 3.8*** 4.41 4 fi 5 fi 0.17*** 2.82 0.14** 2.45 0.16*** 2.62 0.23*** 3.17 0.19** 2.50 0.10** 2.11 0.09* 1.89 0.49*** 4.61 98 /2009.7
49 3 fi 6 8:9 8.9% 50 1932 4 log 1936 1936 log 1932 1936 5 1% 5% 4. 49 50 1996 1982 91 551 Hirota [1999] 1977 1982 1987 1992 500 99
51 52 M&A 1 6 1 1 53 D log D C 54. 7 1936 34.0% 2.4% 94.1% 19.2% 69.3 1.4% 3.0% 64.0% 14.6%1932 45.8% 3.3% 96.9% 24.6% 45.7 2.2% 85.5% 51 1990 2 228 52 19692009 53 1 50 25 12.5 1 1 54 100 /2009.7
7 1 1936 165 % % % % % 34.0 69.3 1.4 3.0 64.0 14.6 19.2 110.0 1.0 1.5 40.6 22.2 2.4 0.7 0.0 1.8 5.3 0.0 94.1 931.2 5.0 8.5 394.4 90.7 2 1932 127 % % % % 45.8 45.7 2.2 85.5 19.2 24.6 55.8 1.8 39.5 26.0 3.3 0.7 2.3 5.6 0.0 96.9 277.1 10.1 221.7 98.0 19.2% 1932. 8 1936 6 log log log 7 8 log Rajan and Zingales [1995] 1991 97 2002 101
8 1936 1932 6 7 8 9 10 t t t t t ff 21.3 1.26 30.5*** 2.78 26.0 1.49 22.4 1.04 28.2 1.31 log fi 1 5.5* 1.80 4.9 1.56 7.7** 2.09 6.6 1.70 log 4.7* 1.82 6 fi 10.1** 2.33 10.1** 2.36 10.1** 2.14 13.3*** 3.03 12.2*** 2.78 0.56 0.56 0.54 0.60 0.57 1OLS 2 *** ** * 1% 5% 10% 3 2 fi 3 fi 2.8 1.51 3.3* 1.70 3.0 1.53 5.2*** 2.95 5.5*** 3.26 5.4*** 3.04 6.4*** 4.28 6.9*** 4.78 4 0.10*** 3.07 0.09*** 2.64 0.11*** 3.05 0.05 0.55 0.08 1.00 fi 5 0.15*** 2.66 0.13** 2.47 0.19** 2.10 fi 102 /2009.7
90 178 1932 9 1936 1936 1936 4. 1930 2006 103
55 2 2 55 104 /2009.7
1995 219 271 1992 39 71 2008 1999 25 1 2006 41 51 1920 1920 1983 85 121 1989 1993 97 144 25 1 2006 53 57 1993 1 33 2008 225 243 CIRJE CIRJE- J-152 2006 2005 2003 129 157 19 1 1984 1995 2004 2007 105
1989 89 120 2005 1973 2005 13 15 B 2004 169 198 TCI 2008 1969 2008 201 223 1977 1920 1920 1983 329 371 3 2 1987 217 353 1993 34 57 1965 83 105 2002 1993 61 95 25 1 2006 13 40 1934 1935 10 26 1935 Vol. 56 No. 1 2008 78 92 6 1989 275 322 25 1 2006 105 144 106 /2009.7
1930 28 1 2009 47 71 No. 04-J-15 2004 22 1 2003 161 199 25 1 2006 1 12 1933 1 2 3 27 2 28 1 28 2 1977 78 2009 55 82 1989 37 57 2000 1991 1993 2002 163 185 4 1929 2008 169 199 1990 225 237 2004 M&A 2007 20 2008 281 313 1930 40 1 2003 107
1996 49 63 Acharya, Viral V., Kose John, and Rangarajan K. Sundaram, Cross-Country Variations in Capital Structures: The Role of Bankruptcy Codes, Working Paper, London Business School, 2005. Aoki, Masahiko, Gregory Jackson, and Hideaki Miyajima, eds. Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Brealey, Richard A., Stewart C. Myers, and Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance, McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2005. Fukuda, Atsuo, and Shinichi Hirota, Main Bank Relationships and Capital Structure in Japan, Journal of the Japanese and International Economics, Vol. 10, 1996, pp. 250 261. Harris, Milton, and Artur Raviv, The Theory of Capital Structure, Journal of Finance, Vol. 46, 1991, pp. 297 355. Hirota, Shinichi, Are Corporate Financing Decisions Different in Japan? An Empirical Study on Capital Structure, Journal of the Japanese and International Economics, Vol. 13, 1999, pp. 201 229. Hoshi, Takeo, and Anil Kashyap, Corporate Financing and Governance in Japan: The Road to the Future, MIT Press, 2001. Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1976, pp. 305 360. Miwa, Yoshiro, and J. Mark Ramseyer, Bank and Economic Growth: Implications from Japanese History, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. XLV, 2002, pp. 127 164. Modigliani, Franco, and Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, American Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 3, 1958, pp. 261 297. Myers, Stewart C., Financing of Corporations, in George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris, and Rene M. Stulz eds. Handbook of the Economics of Finance, Vol. 1Cor- porate Finance, Elsevier, 2003. Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales, What Do We Know about Capital Structure?: Some Evidence from International Data, Journal of Finance, Vol. 50, No. 5, 1995, pp. 1421 1460. Ross, Stephen A., Randolph W. Westerfield, and Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Corporate Finance, McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 2005. 108 /2009.7