経営不振に陥った中小企業の存続期間と債務構成

Similar documents
取引銀行の破綻が企業経営に及ぼす影響について-阪和銀行破綻の事例分析-

Y-...W

M&A の経済分析:M&A はなぜ増加したのか

わが国企業による資金調達方法の選択問題

290 新潟大学経済論集第 92 号 2011-Ⅱ AC 3 A 3 B C

戦間期日本企業の資金調達、資本コスト、資本構成:最適資本構成理論からみた1930年代における企業財務

デフレの定義(最新版).PDF

, 3, 1999, 4,,

野村資本市場研究所|アジアの金融競争力(PDF)

株式保有構成と企業価値 ─コーポレート・ガバナンスに関する一考察─

日本の高齢者世帯の貯蓄行動に関する実証分析

ボーナス制度と家計貯蓄率-サーベイ・データによる再検証-


<4D F736F F D20E3EF92DF9363E5CD C985F95B62E646F63>

bosai-2002.dvi


Ł\”ƒ1PDFŠp

〈論文〉組織改革の成果に関する予備的調査--社内カンパニー制導入が財務的業績に与える影響

アジアの資本移動の変化に関するクラスター分析 アジア域内の証券投資活性化に向けて

銀行の不良債権問題と資本市場の経営監視機能 鹿野嘉昭

2 / 24

RIETI Highlight VOL.25

橡motonishi.PDF

6) 7) MBO management buy-out 2 necessity sufficiency ) 21

論文08.indd

表紙_目次.PDF

遺産相続、学歴及び退職金の決定要因に関する実証分析 『家族関係、就労、退職金及び教育・資産の世代間移転に関する世帯アンケート調査』

Studies of Foot Form for Footwear Design (Part 9) : Characteristics of the Foot Form of Young and Elder Women Based on their Sizes of Ball Joint Girth

IMES Discussion Paper Series 98-J

デフレ不況下の金融政策をめぐる政治過程

わが国証券市場、証券業界の戦後70年

OECD INVEST JAPAN jp/ij/index.htm

29 Short-time prediction of time series data for binary option trade

高齢化とマクロ投資比率―国際パネルデータを用いた分析―


企業価値重視、効率化経営の時代到来へ

43 2 PD DR Sommar and Shahnazarianka [19] Simons and Rolwes [17] GDP Figlewski, Frydman and Liang [7] GDP Bonfim [2] 3 Bhattacharjee et al. [1] 2002 [

大規模データベースを用いた信用リスク計測の問題点と対策(変数選択とデータ量の関係)

46−ª3�=4�“ƒ‚S“·‚Ö‡¦

...v..&.{..&....

16

[17]Holmström and Tirole (2000) (1) (2) (1) (2) 1 1 2

上場変更と株価:株主分散と流動性変化のインパクト

「リストラ中高年」の行方

(1) (Karlan, 2004) (1) (1973) (1978) (1991) (1991) 1

橡同居選択における所得の影響(DP原稿).PDF

untitled

..,,...,..,...,,.,....,,,.,.,,.,.,,,.,.,.,.,,.,,,.,,,,.,,, Becker., Becker,,,,,, Becker,.,,,,.,,.,.,,

untitled

,

Microsoft Word - Šv”|“Å‘I.DOC

autocorrelataion cross-autocorrelataion Lo/MacKinlay [1988, 1990] (A)

Title ベンチャー企業の研究開発支出の決定要因 日本と台湾の事例を中心に Author(s) 蘇, 顯揚 Citation 經濟論叢 (1996), 158(1): Issue Date URL Right

untitled

GDPギャップと潜在成長率

3 - i


untitled

_’¼Œì

開発金融増刊号

130 Oct Radial Basis Function RBF Efficient Market Hypothesis Fama ) 4) 1 Fig. 1 Utility function. 2 Fig. 2 Value function. (1) (2)

untitled

相互取引に伴う債権債務の依存構造を考慮した金融機関の与信評価について


物価変動の決定要因について ― 需給ギャップと物価変動の関係の国際比較を中心に―


Ł\”ƒ.eps

わが国のレポ市場について―理論的整理と実証分析―

<96D889BA904D2E696E6464>

11モーゲージカンパニー研究論文.PDF

JMP V4 による生存時間分析

小塚匡文.indd

Vol.57 No.4 March 2008 : () 1 () () (1 ) (2 ) ( ) 1 Takagi (1989)Hamao (1992) (1998)


わが国銀行業の将来像― 預金通貨需要からのアプローチによるマクロ的サイズの検討―

関西における地域銀行について

I- Fama-French 3, Idiosyncratic (I- ) I- ( ) 1 I- I- I- 1 I- I- Jensen Fama-French 3 SMB-FL, HML-FL I- Fama-French 3 I- Fama-MacBeth Fama-MacBeth I- S

_03.indd

日本の世帯属性別貯蓄率の動向について:アップデートと考察

OECD Benartzi and Thaler Brown et al. Mottla and Utkus Rooiji et al. Atkinson et al. MacFarland et al. Elton et al. Tang et al. Benartzi and Thaler Br


公的機関が関与した企業再生支援

中京大学経済学論叢 23 号 2012 年 3 月 審査論文 1 Keywords: JEL Classi cation: L13, L22, L33 1 * *1 Inoue, Kamijo, and Tomaru (2009) Mukherjee and Suestrong

財政赤字の経済分析:中長期的視点からの考察

bottleneckjapanese.dvi

1 CAPM: I-,,, I- ( ) 1 I- I- I- ( CAPM) I- CAPM I- 1 I- Jensen Fama-French 3 I- Fama-French 3 I- Fama-MacBeth I- SMB-FL, HML-FL Fama-MacBeth 1 Fama-Fr

text.dvi

2) 3) 2) Ohkusa, 1996 ; 1999 ; Ohtake and Ohkusa, 1994 ; La Croix and A. Kawamura, Reject American Economic Review, Journal of Political Econom

,,.,,.,..,.,,,.,, Aldous,.,,.,,.,,, NPO,,.,,,,,,.,,,,.,,,,..,,,,.,

SNAと家計調査における貯蓄率の乖離-日本の貯蓄率低下の要因-

【表紙】経済学論叢_18号/表1・3・背

ミクロ・データによる家計行動分析: 将来不安と予備的貯蓄

Ishi

TECMO,LTD. 2003

金融コングロマリットと範囲の経済:収益面の分析( )

60 Vol. 44 No. 1 2 準市場 化の制度的枠組み: 英国 教育改革法 1988 の例 Education Reform Act a School Performance Tables LEA 4 LEA LEA 3

NIES ASEAN4.. NIES.....EU.. ASEAN4 NIES

表紙参照.PDF

新製品開発プロジェクトの評価手法

PFI

Transcription:

RIETI Discussion Paper Series 06-J-009

RIETI Discussion Paper Series 06-J-009 RIETI CRD 2001 Credit Risk Database CRD

1 90 Xu (2004a, 2004b) (2005) (2003) (2004) Helwege and Packer (2003) Kang and Stlutz (2000) duration 1 (duration analysis) 1 1

2001 Credit Risk Database CRD CRD CRD 130 2 17 2

3 CRD 4 5 2. (duration analysis) Gilson (1990) James (1995,1996) (2005) 3

Gilson (1997) (von Thadden, Berglof, and Roland 2003; Franks and Sussman, 2005) (coordination failure) (hold-out) (coordination failure) (hold-out) Diamond (1993) Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) Welch (1997) Weiss 1990, Xu 2004a, b Petersen 4

and Rajan 1997 2 3. 2001 Credit Risk Database CRD CRD CRD 130 2 17 1996 2002 3 2 2 1 1 (Analysis Time) 2 Ono (2001) Tsuruta (2004) (2004) 3 2003 5

/ / / 0.1% 0.1% 2 Table 1 1996 2 11,491 357 11,134 2002 4,047 1997 2 363 6394 2002 9,791 1998 2 20,014 351 12,440 7,223 2002 1999 2 12,465 2002 14,254 2002 506 2000 2 32,098 18,699 3 458 12,941 2001 2001 2 36,650 26,125 10,025 2 500 32,078 2002 2 1 247 2 CRD Table 1 2 2 3 4 5 Table 2 2 6

ROA (TS_A total sales/assets / ) 4. Trade Payables Total Liability ratio CRD Total Loans Total Liability ratio 4 4 Trade Loans Total Liability ratio Trade Payables Total Liability ratio -0.5722 7

Notes payable / Trade Payables 5 (Ordinary Income/Assets) (Ordinary Income/Assets * Log (Assets)) / (Cash/Total Liability) 5 8

(( + ) / (Land+Buildings)/Total Liability) 6 (Interest Rate) 7 (Interest Rate) ( 8 ) ( ) 9 6 CRD " " " " 7 8 ( ) 3 2 ( 3 ) 5,000 1,000 9 9

10 CRD 11 (Credit guarantee) 1 1999 2000 1 (SG dummy) (SG dummy) Credit guarantee* SG Dummy Caves (1988) Mata and Portugal (1994) Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) 1.8% 80% 3 8 ( 1 8 ) 1 ( ) 10 2 8 1,250 2 (6 3 ) 8 1,250 1.0% 11 (selection biases) 10

2 2 (2004) (Industry Dummy) (Regional Dummy) (Year Dummy) Table 3 Table 4 Kernel Density Function Figure 1 Figure 2 Table 5 1 1 0 (1) (3) (6) (7) / (Trade Payables-Total Liability ratio) 12 (Trade Payables-Total Liability ratio (at the year of becoming distressed)) (2) 12 11

(Notes Payable / Trade Payables) (credit run) - / ( (3)) (4) (5) / / (Total Loans Total Liability ratio / / 1 (5) - / 12

10 (2006) 1 (Ordinary Income/Assets * Log (Assets)) 5 1 13

Table 5 1 1 1 Caves (1988) Mata and Portugal (1994) Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) (2004) 2 2 (Log(1+Firm Age)) 10 ( ) ( ) 14

Table5 1 1 Table 5 (6) 1 2 t Semi-parametric Cox Proportional Hazard Model 14 lnh(t) = lnh0(t) + X(t) 14 H(t X(t))= h0(t) exp(x(t) ) H(t X(t)] 2 (3 ) t (Hazard rate) (hazard rate) h(t)=lim t 0 + P(t<=T<=T+ t T>=t)/ t =f(t)/s(t) T S(t) t (survival function) f(t) (density function) h0(t) (Baseline hazard) Mata and Portugal (1994) 15

X Table 6 2 2 logit (robustness) Semi-parametric Cox Proportional Hazard Model Weibull Distribution h(0)=λρ( ρt) λ-1 (Parametric Hazard Model) Table7 10 Schmidt and Witte (1989) Split 16

Population 15 Table8 Semi-parametric Cox Proportional Harzard Model (robust) 6. 2001 Credit Risk Database CRD 2 15 Split population i i =1/(1+e Xia ) t t lnt i i t P i (1- i ) + i ((Xib-lnt i )/ ) Xi a b Schmidt and Witte (1989) 17

(robust) RIETI CRD CRD RIETI 18

DP Asquith, P., Gertner, R., and Shcafstein D. (1994). Anatomy of financial distress: an examination of junk-bond issuers, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 625-658. Audretsch, David B. and Mahmood, Talat (1995), New firm survival: new results using a hazard function, The Review of Economics and Statistics 77, 97-103 Caves, Richard E.(1998) Industrial Organization and New Findings on the Turnover and Mobility of Firms; Journal of Economic Literature 36, 1947-82 Diamond, Douglas W(1993). Seniority and Maturity of Debt Contracts, Journal of Financial Economics 33, 341-68. Diamond, Douglas W.; Rajan, Raghuram G(2000).A Theory of Bank Capital; By Diamond, Douglas W.; Rajan, Raghuram G.; Journal of Finance 55, pp. 2431-65 Diamond, Douglas W.; Rajan, Raghuram G.(2001) Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A Theory of Banking; Journal of Political Economy 109, pp. 287-327 Franks, Julian and Oren Sussman (2005). Financial Distress and Bank Restructuring of Small to Medium Size UK Companies, Review of Finance, 9, 65-96. Gilson, Stuart C. (1990). Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and block holders, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 355-387. Gilson, Stuart C. (1997). Transactions Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms, Journal of Finance, March 199752, 161-196. Gilson, Stuart C., Kose John and Lang, Larry, H.P. (1990). Troubled debt restructurings, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 315-353. Helwege, Jean and Frank Packer. (2003) Determinants of the choice of bankruptcy procedure in Japan, Journal of Financial Intermediation, 12, 96-120. 19

James, Christopher (1995), When do banks take equity? An analysis of bank loan restructuring and the role of public debt, Review of Financial Studies 85, 567-585. James, Christopher, (1996), Bank debt restructuring and composition of exchange offers in financial distress, Journal of Finance 51,711-727. Kang, Jun-Koo and Rene M, Stultz (2000). Do banking shocks affect borrowing firm performance? An analysis of the Japanese experience, Journal of Business, 73, 1-23. Mata, Jose; Portugal, Pedro (1994), Life Duration of New Firms; Journal of Industrial Economics 42, 227-45 Ono, Masanori. (2001), Determinants of Trade Credit in the Japanese Manufacturing Sector, Journal of the Japanese and International Economies 15,160-177. Petersen, Mitchell A.; Rajan, Raghuram (1997), Trade Credit: Theories and Evidence; Review of Financial Studies 10, pp. 661-91 Pulvino, Todd C. (1998), Do Asset Fire Sales Exist? An Empirical Investigation of Commercial Aircraft Transactions; Journal of Finance 53, 939-78 Schimidt, Peter and Witte, Ann Dryden (1989), Predicting Criminal Recidivism Using Split Population Survival Time Model, Journal of Econometrics 40, pp. 141-159 Shleifer, Andrei and Vishny, Robert W.(1992) Liquidation Values and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium Approach; Journal of Finance 47, pp. 1343-66 von THADDEN, Ernst-Ludwig VON; BERGLOF, Erik; ROLAND, Gerard (2003), Optimal Debt Design and the Role of Bankruptcy; Discussion Paper, Université de Lausanne, Ecole des HEC, DEEP, Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'econométrie etd'economie politique (DEEP) Tsuruta, Daisuke. (2004), Bank Information Monopoly and Trade Credit: Does Only Bank Have Information? Evidence from Panel Data of Small Businesses in Japan, COE Discussion Paper Series, The University of Tokyo. Weiss, Lawrence A.(1990), Bankruptcy resolution, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 285-314. Welch, Ivo ( 1997), Why Is Bank Debt Senior? A Theory of Asymmetry and Claim Priority Based 20

on Influence Costs; Review of Financial Studies 10, 1203-36 Xu, Peng (2004a). Bankruptcy Resolution in Japan: Corporation Reorganization vs. Civil Rehabilitation, RIETI Discussion Paper 04-E-010 Xu, Peng (2004b), Increasing Bankruptcies and the Legal Reform in Japan, Journal of Restructuring Finance, Vol.1, No. 2, 417 434, 2004 (2004) RIETI Discussion Paper Series 04-J-001 (2004) RIETI Discussion Paper Series 04-J-004 (2003) (2005) RIETI Discussion Paper Series (2006) RIETI Discussion Paper Series 21

Table 1: The Number of Bankrupt Firms and Surviving Firms the year when firms suffer distressed 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total Bankrupt Firms 357 363 351 506 458 500 247 2,782 go bankrupt in less than 1 year 30 24 21 77 135 263 247 797 go bankrupt in 1-2 years 41 36 58 148 193 237 713 go bankrupt in 2-3 years 62 63 92 155 130 502 go bankrupt in 3-4 years 47 92 103 126 368 go bankrupt in 4-5 years 58 76 77 211 go bankrupt in 5-6 years 73 72 145 go bankrupt in over 6 years 46 46 Surviving firms 11,134 16,185 19,663 26,719 31,640 36,150 31,831 173,322 Not-censored samples 4,047 6,394 7,223 12,465 18,699 26,125 31,831 106,784 Censored samples 7,087 9,791 12,440 14,254 12,941 10,025 66,538 Table 2: Performance during financial distress --------------------------------------------------------------------------- year after event samples med(roa) med(tp/tl) med(ta/tl) med(ts/a) ----------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 0 176,116 -.0880041.0611278.1913675 1.703074 1 107,936 -.0201037.063544.1970308 1.679675 2 70,399 -.0052132.060774.1997036 1.625311 3 44,849.0004177.0590376.1933921 1.571306 4 26,536.0053622.0549417.1895058 1.51975 5 15,154.0066069.0522343.1912728 1.426229 6 5,383.0057554.0451124.2135289 1.329608 Total 446,373 -.0400394.0604091.1944187 1.646643 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Note: ROA=(operating income+interest receivables+dividend)/assets, TP_TL=trade payables/total liability, TA_TL=tangible assets/total liability TS_A=total sales/assets 22

Figure 1: Kernel Density Function: Trade Payables-Total Liablity Ratio before Bankruptcy density 0 1 2 3 4 0.2.4.6.8 1 apdebt preyear=0 preyear=2 preyear=1 preyear=3 Figure 2: Kernel Density Function: Trade Payables-Total Liablity Ratio before Bankruptcy (for Firms whose sales is more than 500 billion yen.) density 0 1 2 3 4 0.2.4.6.8 1 apdebt preyear=0 preyear=2 23 preyear=1 preyear=3

Table 3: Expected Signs Explanatory Variables Expected Signs Log(Assets) + or - Interest Rate + Trade Payables/Total Liability + Total Loans/Total Liability - Notes Payable/Trade Payables + (Land Buildings)/Total liability - Cash/Total liability - Ordinary Income/Assets - Sales/Assets - Credit Guarantee - Special Credit Guarantee - Table 4: Summary Statistics Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min 25% 50% 75% Max Legal Bankruptcy 270,269 0.007 0.085 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 Log Assets) 270,269 10.895 1.460 0.000 9.908 10.761 11.728 20.602 Log 1+Firm Age) 249,900 3.028 0.661 0.000 2.565 3.091 3.555 7.602 Interest Rate 229,958 2.735 34.983 0.000 1.539 2.436 3.230 15828.950 Trade Payables-Total Liability ratio 250,085 0.112 0.141 0.000 0.010 0.060 0.161 1.000 Trade Payables Growth 234,122 0.013 2.155-13.274-0.031 0.000 0.014 863.509 Total Loans-Total Liability ratio 250,085 0.754 0.204 0.000 0.649 0.810 0.912 1.000 Total Loan Growth 234,122 0.154 30.917-126.695-0.096-0.017 0.078 14261.590 Notes Payable/Trade Payables 250,089 0.243 0.349 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.547 1.000 (Land+Buildings)/Total Liability 249,614 0.319 8.726 0.000 0.074 0.196 0.400 4259.500 Cash/Total Liability 266,260 0.085 0.148 0.000 0.018 0.050 0.114 42.387 Ordinary Income/Assets 250,083-0.077 6.920-3403.500-0.104-0.007 0.043 22.895 Sales/Assets 270,269 2.163 11.146 0.000 0.891 1.611 2.681 4792.718 Credit Guarantee 270,269 0.490 0.500 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 Special Credit Guarantee 270,269 0.143 0.350 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 24

Table 5: Logit Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Logit Model Sample:Excess of debts and ordinary loss for more than two consecutive terms Trade Payables-Total Liability ratio 1.523 1.328 1.583 1.510 (0.183) (0.203) (0.188) (0.184) Trade Payables-Total Liability ratio 0.894 (at the year of becoming distressed) (0.183) Trade Payables Growth 0.752 if Growth Rate is Positive (0.215) Trade Payables Growth -1.472 if Growth Rate is Negative (0.350) Total Loans-Total Liability ratio -0.671-0.684 (0.152) (0.155) Total Loan Growth -0.073 if Growth Rate is Positive (0.152) Total Loan Growth -0.232 if Growth Rate is Negative (0.186) Log Assets) 0.373 0.388 0.382 0.395 0.401 0.376 0.365 (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) Log 1+Firm Age) 0.051 0.031 0.062 0.027 0.021 0.047 0.049 (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047) (0.046) Interest Rate 0.123 0.134 0.122 0.128 0.126 0.124 0.123 (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) Notes Payable/Trade Payables 0.661 0.713 0.620 0.757 0.741 0.638 0.665 (0.077) (0.077) (0.079) (0.075) (0.077) (0.079) (0.077) (Land+Buildings)/Total Liability -1.046-1.043-1.009-1.149-1.143-1.036-1.015 (0.118) (0.119) (0.118) (0.119) (0.121) (0.119) (0.117) Cash/Total Liability -8.089-7.804-7.972-7.810-7.757-8.063-8.097 (0.533) (0.526) (0.545) (0.525) (0.538) (0.546) (0.532) Ordinary Income/Assets -0.731-0.682-0.737-0.667-0.713-0.768 1.767 Ordinary Income/Assets*Log(Assets) (0.107) (0.107) (0.109) (0.107) (0.111) (0.108) (0.728) -0.251 (0.069) Sales/Assets -0.131-0.101-0.153-0.103-0.113-0.141-0.123 (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.026) Credit Guarantee -0.264-0.242-0.327-0.256-0.314-0.241-0.267 (0.057) (0.057) (0.060) (0.057) (0.060) (0.066) (0.057) Credit Guarantee*SG dummy -0.414 (0.150) Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Regional Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Sample 205,488 205,488 199,348 205,488 199,376 205,488 205,488 Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Interest rate is the ratio of a firm s interest expenses to the sum of its short-term debt, long-term debt, and discounted notes receivable. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does not change if we truncate at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample. Significant at 1% level. Significant at 5% level. Significant at 10% level. 25

Table 6: Cox Proportional Hazards Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Cox Proportional Hazards Model Sample:Excess of debts and ordinary loss for more than two consecutive terms Trade Payables-Total Liability ratio 1.483 1.304 1.482 1.475 (0.179) (0.199) (0.179) (0.179) Trade Payables-Total Liability ratio 0.930 (at the year of becoming distressed) (0.178) Trade Payables Growth 0.675 if Growth Rate is Positive (0.209) Trade Payables Growth -1.339 if Growth Rate is Negative (0.345) Total Loans-Total Liability ratio -0.658-0.670 (0.149) (0.153) Total Loan Growth -0.129 if Growth Rate is Positive (0.152) Total Loan Growth -0.167 if Growth Rate is Negative (0.184) Log Assets) 0.365 0.379 0.374 0.387 0.392 0.365 0.357 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) Log 1+Firm Age) 0.038 0.022 0.058 0.015 0.018 0.035 0.036 (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045) Interest Rate 0.115 0.125 0.114 0.121 0.119 0.115 0.114 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) Notes Payable/Trade Payables 0.661 0.705 0.619 0.754 0.733 0.662 0.666 (0.076) (0.076) (0.078) (0.074) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (Land+Buildings)/Total Liability -0.996-0.994-0.977-1.101-1.114-0.993-0.966 (0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.119) (0.115) (0.115) Cash/Total Liability -7.923-7.660-7.829-7.653-7.619-7.923-7.932 (0.528) (0.522) (0.541) (0.521) (0.534) (0.528) (0.528) Ordinary Income/Assets -0.721-0.674-0.719-0.658-0.706-0.720 1.472 Ordinary Income/Assets*Log(Assets) (0.105) (0.105) (0.107) (0.106) (0.109) (0.105) (0.640) -0.219 (0.060) Sales/Assets -0.128-0.100-0.147-0.101-0.109-0.128-0.120 (0.026) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) Credit Guarantee -0.325-0.305-0.363-0.320-0.352-0.249-0.325 (0.058) (0.058) (0.061) (0.058) (0.061) (0.064) (0.058) Credit Guarantee*SG dummy -0.384 (0.144) Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Regional Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Sample 205,488 205,488 199,348 205,488 199,376 205,488 205,488 Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Interest rate is the ratio of a firm s interest expenses to the sum of its short-term debt, long-term debt, and discounted notes receivable. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does not change if we truncate at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample. Significant at 1% level. Significant at 5% level. Significant at 10% level. 26

Table 7: Parametric Hazard Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Parametric Hazards Model (Weibull Distribution) Sample:Excess of debts and ordinary loss for more than two consecutive terms Trade Payables-Total Liability ratio 1.543 1.357 1.543 1.538 (0.179) (0.198) (0.179) (0.178) Trade Payables-Total Liability ratio 0.869 (at the year of becoming distressed) (0.176) Trade Payables Growth 0.728 if Growth Rate is Positive (0.207) Trade Payables Growth -1.266 if Growth Rate is Negative (0.345) Total Loans-Total Liability ratio -0.684-0.698 (0.149) (0.153) Total Loan Growth -0.148 if Growth Rate is Positive (0.152) Total Loan Growth -0.128 if Growth Rate is Negative (0.183) Log Assets) 0.342 0.359 0.349 0.366 0.368 0.342 0.334 (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) Log 1+Firm Age) -0.038-0.058-0.015-0.064-0.056-0.041-0.042 (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046) Interest Rate 0.112 0.124 0.111 0.118 0.117 0.112 0.110 (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) Notes Payable/Trade Payables 0.634 0.690 0.594 0.732 0.710 0.635 0.639 (0.076) (0.076) (0.078) (0.074) (0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (Land+Buildings)/Total Liability -0.996-0.990-0.977-1.106-1.120-0.991-0.962 (0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.119) (0.115) (0.115) Cash/Total Liability -7.582-7.278-7.472-7.297-7.247-7.581-7.597 (0.524) (0.517) (0.536) (0.516) (0.529) (0.524) (0.523) Ordinary Income/Assets -0.776-0.726-0.780-0.711-0.764-0.776 1.702 Ordinary Income/Assets*Log(Assets) (0.102) (0.102) (0.104) (0.102) (0.106) (0.102) (0.647) -0.247 (0.061) Sales/Assets -0.127-0.095-0.146-0.100-0.107-0.128-0.119 (0.026) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) Credit Guarantee -0.087-0.062-0.110-0.079-0.095-0.019-0.088 (0.058) (0.059) (0.061) (0.058) (0.061) (0.064) (0.058) Credit Guarantee*SG dummy -0.356 (0.143) Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Regional Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Sample 205,488 205,488 199,348 205,488 199,376 205,488 205,488 Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Interest rate is the ratio of a firm s interest expenses to the sum of its short-term debt, long-term debt, and discounted notes receivable. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does not change if we truncate at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample. Significant at 1% level. Significant at 5% level. Significant at 10% level. 27

Table 8: Split-Population Hazard Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Sample:Excess of debts and ordinary loss for more than two consecutive terms Trade Payables-Total Liability ratio 1.597 1.413 1.662 1.575 (0.194) (0.214) (0.198) (0.195) Trade Payables-Total Liability ratio 0.971 (at the year of becoming distressed) (0.196) Trade Payables Growth 0.726 if Growth Rate is Positive (0.220) Trade Payables Growth -1.509 if Growth Rate is Negative (0.354) Total Loans-Total Liability ratio -0.699-0.715 (0.158) (0.161) Total Loan Growth -0.064 if Growth Rate is Positive (0.153) Total Loan Growth -0.217 if Growth Rate is Negative (0.192) Log Assets) 0.397 0.420 0.402 0.428 0.429 0.395 0.389 (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) Log 1+Firm Age) 0.050 0.028 0.061 0.024 0.018 0.046 0.046 (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) Interest Rate 0.133 0.147 0.130 0.138 0.135 0.131 0.133 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) Notes Payable/Trade Payables 0.668 0.721 0.621 0.773 0.754 0.641 0.668 (0.080) (0.081) (0.081) (0.078) (0.080) (0.081) (0.080) (Land+Buildings)/Total Liability -1.101-1.112-1.056-1.221-1.208-1.083-1.069 (0.124) (0.126) (0.124) (0.127) (0.129) (0.125) (0.124) Cash/Total Liability -8.226-7.963-8.084-7.981-7.900-8.172-8.230 (0.542) (0.538) (0.554) (0.537) (0.549) (0.554) (0.542) Ordinary Income/Assets -0.736-0.700-0.744-0.679-0.718-0.768 2.439 (0.109) (0.110) (0.110) (0.110) (0.113) (0.110) (1.038) Ordinary Income/Assets*Log(Assets) -0.112-0.321 (0.027) (0.102) Sales/Assets -0.131-0.101-0.155-0.102-0.332-0.142-0.123 (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.026) (0.062) (0.028) (0.027) Credit Guarantee -0.278-0.256-0.341-0.272-0.261-0.281 (0.059) (0.059) (0.061) (0.059) (0.067) (0.059) Credit Guarantee*SG dummy -0.389 (0.151) Industry Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Year Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Regional Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes Sample 205,488 205,488 199,348 205,488 199,376 205,488 205,488 Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Interest rate is the ratio of a firm s interest expenses to the sum of its short-term debt, long-term debt, and discounted notes receivable. When variables include outliers, they are truncated at their 0.5th percentiles or 99.5th percentiles of the sample. This result does not change if we truncate at their 1st percentiles or 99th percentiles of the sample. Significant at 1% level. Significant at 5% level. Significant at 10% level. 28