株式保有構成と企業価値 ─コーポレート・ガバナンスに関する一考察─

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Transcription:

q E-mail: kenji.nishizaki@boj.or.jp E-mail: kurasawa@ynu.ac.jp

OECD Vives Tirole Shleifer and Vishny

q

%% %% % % Allen and Gale

%%

%

Admati, Pfreiderer and Zechner Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi Cremer 1995Pagno and Röell 1998Rajan 1992

1 0 1 e r e r e r e r (e)> 0, r (e) < 0. e c e c(e) c (e)> 0, c (e) > 0. e

ec e e r (e) r (e) (0 1) (1 ) r (e) r (e) r (e) ( ) r (e) ( ( ))r(e) ( ) ( )> 0, ( ) < 0, (0) = 0, (0) = 1, (1) = 0. 0 < 1 0 < ( ) < 1 e r (e) ( ) r (e) ( ) r (e) (0 < 1) h (, ) h (0, )= 0, h (, )> 0, h (, )> 0, h (, )< 0, h (, )< 0. h h Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi

(1 ) r (e) (1 ) r (e) 1 e α ( )< 0 α ( )= 0Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi

er (e) { ( )(1 )+ (1 ) ( )}r (e) c (e), e max ( )(1 )+ (1 ) ( ). [0, 1] {(1 ( ))(1 )+ ( ) h(, )}r (e), e r (e) r (e) max (1 ( ))(1 )+( ) h(, ). [0, 1] 1 1 = 0 0 < 1 (1 ) ( )= ( ), {(1 ( ))(1 )+( )} h(, ) h(, )/h(, )

h (0, )= 0 ( )=h (, ), h (0, )= 0 0 < <1 0 < <1 M S S A M O

A h MM h h (, )< 0 M S S M B A D C O

S S A C M SM S D h h D e e e max (, ) r (e) c(e). e (, ) (1 ) +(1 ) ( ), (, ) r (e) =c (e). e

r (e) = c (e) e e (, ) e e c e r e r e O e e e e = (1 ) ( ), <0 >0 <0de d <0dr (e) d <0 e r (e) e e=e = 0 = 0 (, ) (1 )+ (1 ) ( )<1. (1 )+1. = 1

v F v F v F F (, ) r (e). F (, ) (1 )+( ) v F v F v F F r = r + F. r v F r v F F (, ) r r v F F (, ) rv F r v F F (, ) v F r v F F (, ) F (, ) = ( ) (1 ( )). v F ch

h F (, ) v F v S v T v s s (, ) r (e), v T T ( ) r (e). e r v F +?? / 0 / > 0 Fluck Fluck

s (, ) (1 )(1 )+( ) T ( ) (1 )+ ( ) v s v T v T hc v F v T v F v S v S v F v > > T. q v F q v S v S > 0 > v F v S v F v S v F

%

q McConnell and Servaes q Nickell, Nicolitsas and Dryden

Lichtenberg and Pushner q q

q q < 10,10 < q q it = 1 i,t + 2 i,t 1 +. Timedum +. Share i, t 1 + c + i, t. qq TimedumSharec, Timedum,, Share, c q q

Timedum Share KinyuHoujin KaigaiKojin Kinyu HoujinKojin Kinyu Houjin Kaigai Blockholder Kinyu Kaigai KojinHoujin KaigaiKojin c q % Kinyu HoujinKojin

q Blockholder Kinyu Houjin Kaigai Kojin q t 1 Blockholder t 1 Kinyu t 1 Houjin t 1 Kaigai t 1 Kojin t 1 q t 1 Blockholder t 1 Kinyu t 1 Houjin t 1 Kaigai t 1 Kojin t 1 random effect fixed effect % FGLS feasible generalized least squares Baltagi Swamy and Arora

% Lichtenberg and Pushner Lichtenberg and Pushner

p p p p p p 1 2 Blockholder Kinyu Houjin Kaigai Kojin c Adj-R 2 p p p p p p 1 2 Blockholder Kinyu Houjin Kaigai Kojin c Adj-R 2 p p p p p p p 1 2 Blockholder Kinyu Houjin Kaigai Kojin c Adj-R 2

M&A MBO

1 1 = 0 0 <1 (1 ) ( )= ( ). = 0 = 1 ( ) < 1 M h (0, ) = 0 ( )= h (, ), = 0 = 0 0 1 SM S0 < <1 0 < <1 ( ) S A M 1 O 1

(1 ) ( ) d ( ) d = ( ) d, ( ) d h d = h d. ( ) h ( ) h = +, ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) h = +, = (1 ) ( ) h + ( ) 2 > 0, ABAC ABAC

q q q + + %% %% %

+ + + q q q q q

q q q q

Admati, A. R., P. Pfreiderer, and J. Zechner, Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium, Journal of Political Economy, 102, 1994, pp. 1097-1130. Allen, F., and D. Gale, Corporate Governance and Competition, in X. Vives ed. Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 23-84. Baltagi, B. H., Econometric Analysis of Panel Data: Second Edition, John Wiley & Sons, 2001. Burkart, M., D. Gromb, and F. Panunzi, Large Shareholders Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 1997, pp. 693-728.,, and, Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders, Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1998, pp. 172-204. Cremer, J., Arm's Length Relationship, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 1995, pp. 275-296.

Fluck, Z., Optimal Financial Contracting: Debt versus Outside Equity, Review of Financial Studies, 11, 1998, pp. 383-419. Lichtenberg, F. R., and G. M. Pushner, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance in Japan, Japan and the World Economy, 6, 1994, pp. 239-261. McConnell, J. J., and H. Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, Journal Financial Economics, 27, 1990, pp. 595-612. Nickell, S., D. Nicolitsas, and N. Dryden, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value, European Economic Review, 41, 1997, pp. 783-796. OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 1999. Pagno, M., and A. Röell, The Choice of Stock Ownership Structure: Agency Costs, Monitoring, and the Decision to Go Public, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 1998, pp. 187-226. Rajan, R.G., Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm s-length Debt, Journal of Finance, 47, 1992, pp. 1367-1400. Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, Journal of Finance, 52, 1997, pp. 737-783. Tirole, J., Corporate Governance, Econometrica, 69, 2001, pp. 1-35. Vives, X., Corporate Governance: Does it Matter? in X. Vives ed. Corporate Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 1-21.