|
|
|
- ゆめじ つちかね
- 5 years ago
- Views:
Transcription
1
2 IMF Morris and Shin (1998)
3 A 69 B
4 C 73 C C C D 75 E 77 E E E E E E E E E.4.1 II E
5 IMF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 4
6 % 50% 7 IMF 20% % OECD 30% 3 98 GDP 10.2% 13.2% 6.7% IMF IMF IMF IMF 5
7 1) 2) 3) global game IMF ) 2) 3) 6
8 GDP ) GDP 8% IMF % GDP 8% 2) 1) (1999) 2) (1999) GDP 8% 7
9 96 GDP % 2.4 3) 1400% 50 4) 7 IMF 7 28 IMF 8 11 IMF IMF IMF GDP 1.6% 1% VAT 7% 10% 3) 4) (1999) 8
10 IMF GDP 2% 5) IMF IMF IMF 6) IMF IMF IMF 5 5) 6) (1999) 9
11 (i) ( 97.6) 90 GDP 5% ) 8) 2.1: (ii) ( ) IMF 7 4% 6% ) Lane et al. (1999, pp. 4-5) 8) Lane et al. (1999, pp. 4-5) 10
12 10 30% IMF (iii) 1 IMF ( ) IMF 9) 1 10) IMF IMF 16 IMF 11) IMF (iv) 2 IMF ( ) 1 15 IMF 12) 50% 2 IMF 5 7 9) (2000, p. 198) 10) (2000, p. 201) 11) Lane et al. (1999, p. 38) 12) (1999) 11
13 (v) (98.7 ) % 13) 14) GDP 11 2 OECD % GDP CPI 90 IMF 15) 90 ( ) 16) 97 13) = ) Lane et al. (1999, pp. 4-5). 15) IMF Rubin, R. E. and J. Weisberg, ) (1999, p. 31) 80 12
14 (i) (ii) (iii) 3 (i) OECD GDP % % % 80 10% 90 CPI 5% % 17) 94 18% 95 31% 96 4% 97 6% (ii) S&P AA- 17) (1999, pp ) 13
15 A = IMF (iii) IMF ) 12 3 IMF ) 1 1 = = IMF 14 18% 25% IMF = G7 IMF = = ) Research Department The Bank of Korea (1998) 19) (2000)
16 Jan-96 May-96 Sep-96 Jan-97 May-97 Sep-97 Jan-98 May-98 Sep THB/USD IDR/USD KRW/USD : 96 1 = Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q THAILAND KOREA INDONESIA : GDP 15
17 THAILAND KOREA INDONESIA M M M M M M M M M M M M : THAILAND KOREA INDONESIA M M M M M M M M M : 16
18 2.2: IMF IMF VAT VAT IMF IMF IMF 2.2 IMF IMF 20) 3 IMF GDP 1% 97 GDP % 95 8% % % 2.2 IMF 20) 96 GDP 8% 5% 3% 17
19 IS 21) IMF 22) IMF IMF % 1 13% % 1.2% % 12 3 IMF 30.8% % GDP % 0.8% 13.1% IMF 23) 21) Lane et al. (1999, pp ). 22) Lane et al. (1999, p. 10) 23) Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) Furman and Stiglitz (1998) 18
20 24) CMI ASEAN ASEAN 3 ASEAN 25) 10 3 ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN 26) 2.5 Rubin and Weisberg (2003) 24) 25) 5 26) +3 19
21 60!$#+&' 6 80 "!$#+&(' 210 (!)#*&"' 40!%# 60!%# 20 "!$# 15!%# 10!%#&' 20 "!$# 20 "!$# 60!%# : : 30 "!$# 30 "!$# 20!%# ;< 7154 = ASEAN, -/ : % 80% IMF IMF EMEAP 27) ABF1 EMEAP 11 BIS BIS EMEAP ABF1 EMEAP ABF ABF2 PBIF Pan-Asian Bond Index Fund FoBF Fund of Bond Funds 2 27) EMAEP 11 20
22 PBIF FoBF EMEAP 28) FoBF ABF ABMI ASEAN+3 ABMI ASEAN+3 5 ABMI (1) (2) (3) 28) 21
23 Krugman (1979) Flood and Garber (1984) seigniorage (Obstfeld, 1994)
24 Obstfeld (1994, 1996) Obstfeld (1994) Krugman (1999) Chang and Velasco (2001) 3 Krugman (1999) Chang and Velasco (2001) Morris and Shin (1998) MS MS 1) 1 2 1) Carlsson and van Damme (1993) global game Morris and Shin (2003) 23
25 2) Morris and Shin (1998) MS MS Morris and Shin (1998) Morris and Shin (1998) Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin (2004) 2 Goldstein (2005) 5 6 Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) Morris and Shin (2005) IMF 2) Morris and Shin (1998) 24
26 4 2 Morris and Shin (1998) MS θ θ [0, 1] e f (θ) f (θ) d f (θ) dθ θ [0, 1] > 0 (4.1) f (θ) e (4.2) f (θ) (4.2) 1) MS [0, 1] 1) 25
27 θ θ i x i 1 4.1: MS θ θ θ i θ x i x i x i = θ + α i (4.3) α i ε [ ε, +ε] 2) θ α ε ε 0 θ e υ > 0 m 3) c(θ, m) 2) α i iid U[ ε, +ε]. 3) 26
28 c(θ, m) e c(θ, 1) e t υ f (θ) c(θ, 0) θ θ 0 θ 1 0 θ 1 4.2: (θ, θ) 0 υ c(θ, m) (4.4) 4) f (θ) f (θ) c(θ, m) < 0, θ (4.5a) c(θ, m) > 0. m (4.5b) 4.2 υ c(0, 0) < 0 : θ = 0 1 υ c(1, 1) < 0 : θ = 1 {, } 2 4) 27
29 θ m θ m (4.4) 0 υ c(θ, m) > 0 (4.6) θ, m θ υ c(θ, m) = 0 m (4.6) m < m m m θ a(θ) (4.5a), (4.5b) a (θ) > 0 5) x 1 t > 0 6) e f (θ) t, t 7) 0 e f (1) t < 0 : 8) {, } x 5) θ < θ a (θ) > 0 θ a(θ) < 1 θ ) 7) 7) 100 = = ) A 28
30 x π(x) (4.7) θ π(x) s(θ, π) 9) [θ ε, θ + ε] s(θ, π) = 1 2ε θ+ε θ ε π(x)dx (4.8) 10) s(θ, π) a(θ) A(π) A(π) = {θ s(θ, π) a(θ)} (4.9) π x u(x, π) u(x, π) = 1 [ ] 2ε A(π) (e f (θ))dθ t (4.10) [x ε,x+ε] x θ [x ε, x + ε] A(π) e f (θ) t 9) m 10) π(x) s(θ, π) θ {p, q, r} 3 1/3 {p, q, r} 3 p θ p, q, r 1/3 q, r 2 if x = p, q (i) 3/4 : if x = r if x = p (ii) 1/4 : if x = q, r π(x) π(x = p) = 1, π(x = q) = 3/4, π(x = r) = 0 π(x) s(θ, π) θ = r (i) p, q, r = 2 3 (ii) s(θ = r, π) = =
31 4.1: π s(θ, π) θ p q r 1/3 1/3 1/3 (i) 3/4 (ii) 1/4 π(x) 1 3/4 0 s(θ, π) 7/12 7/12 7/ θ 11) υ c(θ, 0) = 0 θ θ θ θ e f (θ) t = 0 θ θ θ θ (θ, θ) θ < θ 12) (θ, θ) 3 θ [0, θ] : θ (θ, θ) : 1 θ [ θ, 1] : θ (θ, θ) 11) 12) 2ε θ, θ 1 2ε 30
32 θ θ θ θ π(x) indicator function 1 if x < k π(x) = I k (x) = (4.11) 0 if x k x k 4.1 u(k, I k ) k strictly deacreasing Morris and Shin (1998) Appendix I k k k k k k θ ε θ θ u(k, I k ) > 0 k θ + ε u(k, I k ) < u(k, I k ) u(k, I k ) = 0 k (θ ε, θ + ε) 1 k x u(x, I x ) = 0 (4.12) 4.2 x x < x B 31
33 4.2 I x π x < x x switching point k (< x ) 4.1 k u(k, I k ) > 0 k u(k, I k ) = 0 k k < k k < x 13) k k, k k,... x x < k s(θ, I x ) 1 if θ < x ε 1 s(θ, I x ) = 2 1 2ε (θ x ) if x ε θ < x + ε 0 if x + ε θ (4.13) s(θ, I x ) θ a(θ) 1 14) θ θ θ θ θ θ 4.3 (4.13) s(θ, I x ) a(θ) 4.3 θ s(θ, I x ) = ε (θ x ) = a(θ ) (4.14) u(x, I x ) = u(x, I x ) = 1 [ θ ] (e f (θ))dθ t = 0 (4.15) 2ε x ε 13) B b k x 4.3 s(θ, I x ) s(θ, I k ) θ x A < B u(x, I k ) < 0 u(k, I k ) = 0 k < x 14) θ (0, 1) x (θ ε, θ + ε), θ > θ a (θ) > 0, 2ε θ, θ 1 2ε 32
34 1 s(θ, I x ) a(θ) 0 x x e f (θ) A t C B 0 x ε θ x + ε θ 4.3: x θ 15) θ x ε (e f (θ))dθ = 2εt. (4.16) 4.3 A B x θ 16) ε 0 θ 4.4 ε 0 θ x θ 0 (θ, θ) (1 a(θ 0 )) ( e f (θ 0 ) ) = t (4.17) Heinemann (2000) a( ) 4.3, ) (4.10) A(π) [x ε, x + ε] [x ε, θ ] 16) (4.16) A + C B + C C (4.16) A = B 33
35 4.3 MS 2 IMF θ x IMF D > 0 D υ c(θ, m) + D (4.18) 17) θ υ c(θ, m) + D = 0 (4.19) m = a 2 (θ) θ 2 a 2 (θ 2 ) = 0 (4.5b) θ > θ 2 a 2 (θ) > a(θ) (4.20) a( ) MS a( ) θ, x 4.4 a(θ) a 2 (θ) s(θ, I x ) θ u(x, I x ) = 0 A < B x s(θ, I x ) a 2 (θ) θ 17) D 1 (2002) 34
36 1 s(θ, I x ) a 2 (θ) 0 x e f (θ) x A t B 0 x ε θ x + ε θ 4.4: a(θ) A B x2, θ 2 x 2 < x θ2 < θ < θ IMF θ (θ2, θ ] (4.17) (1 a 2 (θ 0 )) ( e f (θ 0 ) ) < (1 a(θ 0 )) ( e f (θ 0 ) ) = t (4.21) (1 a 2 (θ)) (e f (θ)) θ [0, 1] (1 a 2 (θ 0 )) (e f (θ 0 )) = t θ IMF 140 IMF 35
37 1 l s(θ, I x ) ã(θ) a(θ) s(θ, I x ) 0 θ s θ θ θ 4.5: ) 19) IMF 20) IMF 21) IMF MS θ s IMF 4.3 θ s < θ s(θ, I x ) a(θ) 4.5 θ s l 3 s( ): a( ): 22) ε θ θ s 1 2 a(θ) ã(θ) s(θ, I x ) s(θ, I x ) 3 θ θ s s( ) ã( ) θ 18) ) Ito (1998) 20) Ito (1998) 21) (1999) 22) 36
38 7/2 7/9 7/16 7/23 7/30 8/6 8/13 8/20 8/27 9/ y = x R 2 = (8/20) IMF (7/28) y = x R 2 = : θ s 1 IMF l a( ) s( ) IMF 23) IMF 2. IMF 3. 3 IMF IMF ) 37
39 4.2: t P D x D 1 x D D 2 x R x D 1 IMF D 2 IMF IMF 4.5 IMF MS Monetary Policy MP MP MP 1 1 MP = 0 MS MP 7) 1 t MP t(mp) dt(mp) dmp > 0 (4.22) t x 4.3 t A < B A B x θ 38
40 1 s 3(θ, I x ) a(θ) s(θ, I x ) 0 x 3 x x A e f (θ) t B 0 θ 3 θ θ 4.7: θ 3, x x 3 < x, θ 3 < θ (4.23) (4.17) dθ 0 dt 1 = (1 a(θ 0 )) f (θ 0 ) + a (θ 0 )(e f (θ 0 )) 1 = f t (θ 0 ) e f (θ 0 ) a (θ 0 )(e f (θ 0 )) < 0 (4.24) t θ ) MS Goldstein (2005) 24) t 39
41 5 Goldstein (2005) ) θ θ 1 f (θ) f (θ) < 1 f (θ) θ > 0 (5.1) [0, 1] [0, A] 2) 1) C.1 4 2) 40
42 3) 2 2 f (θ) i θ i σε i σ ε 0 g( ) G( ) 4) 1 σ σ 5) 1 σ g(θ i θ σ ) (5.2) D 4 0 v 3) 4) 5) Hartigan (1983) C.2 41
43 n m 3 c(θ, m, n) (5.3) c(θ, m, n) < 0 θ (5.4a) c(θ, m, n) ) > 0 m (5.4b) c(θ, m, n) > 0 n (5.4c) v c v c(θ, m, n) > 0 (5.5) v c(θ, m, n) 0 f (θ) θ m n 1 f (θ) e 1 if (θ, m, n) A 0 e(θ, m, n) = (5.6) f (θ) if (θ, m, n) A 0 A 0 (5.5) (θ, m, n) (5.4a), (5.4b), (5.4c), (5.5) e(θ, m, n) 0 θ e(θ, m, n) 0 m e(θ, m, n) 0 n (5.7a) (5.7b) (5.7c)
44 6) 1 7) R(θ, n) Increasing Return to Scale 8) R(θ, n) > 0 θ (5.8) R(θ, n) < 0 n (5.9) 1 r 2 (> 1) 1 R(θ, n) = 1) e er(θ, n) r 2 r 2 er(θ, n) ˆR 9) er(θ, n) if er(θ, n) r 2 ˆR(θ, n, e) = (5.10) r 2 if er(θ, n) r 2 (5.7a), (5.7c) (5.10) ˆR(θ, n, e) 0 θ ˆR(θ, n, e) 0 n ˆR(θ, n, e) 0 e (5.11a) (5.11b) (5.11c) 10) 1 1 σ g(θ i θ )dθ (5.12) σ ˆR(θ, n, e) 1 σ g(θ i θ )dθ (5.13) σ 6) 1 7) 1 8) n 9) D 10) C 43
45 e(θ, m, n) t 11) (5.7a) (5.7c) a(θ, m, n) = 1 e(θ, m, n) t (5.14) a(θ, m, n) 0 θ a(θ, m, n) 0 m a(θ, m, n) 0 n (5.15a) (5.15b) (5.15c) θ i 12) a(θ, m, n) 1 σ g(θ i θ )dθ (5.16) σ 0 1 σ g(θ i θ )dθ = 0 (5.17) σ θ B (5.12), (5.13) 1 1 σ g(θ i θ σ )dθ = ˆR(θ, n, e) 1 σ g(θ B θ )dθ (5.18) σ { ˆR(θ, n, e) 1} 1 σ g(θ B θ )dθ = 0 (5.19) σ 11) C D 12) 44
46 13) 1 0 [ { { [ ˆR θ B G 1 (n)σ, n, e θ B G 1 (n)σ, G G 1 (n) + θ S θ B σ ] }} ], n 1 dn = 0 (5.20) G 1 (n) n = G( ) θ B θ S θ S θ B θ B = θ B (θ S ) (5.21) θ S (5.16), (5.17) 14) 1 0 a(θ, m, n) 1 σ g(θ i θ )dθ = 0 (5.22) σ { [ a θ S G 1 (m)σ, m, G G 1 (m) + θ B θ ]} S dm = 0 (5.23) σ G 1 (m) m = G( ) θ B θ S θ B θ S θ S = θ S (θ B ) (5.24) 5.2 (5.21), (5.24) θ B θ S ) (5.21) 0 θ B(θ S ) θ S < 1 (5.24) 0 θ S (θ B ) θ B < 1 16) { θˆ B, θˆ S } θ B θ S 13) E.1 14) E.1 15) A 16) E
47 5.1: E.2.2 θ B θ S θ B θ S ˆ θ B θ B θ B θ S θ B θs θ B θˆ S θs θ S n m v c(θ, m, n) > 0 (5.5) 46
48 5.2: 5.3: 5.3 { θˆ B, θˆ S } m = G( θ θˆ S σ n = G( θ θˆ B σ ) 17) c(θ, m, n) v = c(θ, m, n) θ G θ G < θ θ G θ = θˆ B = θˆ S 17) m n 47
49 IMF D (5.3) c 2 (θ, m, n) = c(θ, m, n) D (6.1) 48
50 6.1: c 2 (θ, m, n) (6.1) (5.4a) (5.4c) c 2 (θ, m, n) < 0 θ (6.2a) c 2 (θ, m, n) ) > 0 m (6.2b) c 2 (θ, m, n) > 0 n (6.2c) v c 2 (θ, m, n) > 0 (6.3) v c 2 (θ, m, n) 0 f (θ) (θ, m, n) A 5 A 0 A 2 A 0 A 2 (6.4) 1) A 0 A if (θ, m, n) A 2 e 2 (θ, m, n) = (6.5) f (θ) if (θ, m, n) A 2 θ m n 1) (5.4a) (5.4c), (6.1), (6.2a) (6.2c) 49
51 6.1.2 (5.10) er(θ, n) if er(θ, n) r 2 ˆR(θ, n, e) = r 2 if er(θ, n) r 2 θ m 2) e (θ, m, n) er(θ, n) r 2 ˆR ˆ R 0 ˆ R 2 (5.20), 1 [ { { [ ˆR θ B G 1 (n)σ, n, e θ B G 1 (n)σ, G 0 θ B (θ S ) 3) Rˆ 0 (θ, n, e) Rˆ 2 (θ, n, e) (6.6) G 1 (n) + θ S θ B σ ] }} ], n 1 dn = 0 (5.14) a(θ, m, n) = 1 e(θ, m, n) t θ n 4) e a a 0 a 2 (5.23) 1 { a θ S G 1 (m)σ, m, G θ S (θ B ) 5) 0 a 0 (θ, m, n) a 2 (θ, m, n) (6.7) [ G 1 (m) + θ B θ S σ ]} dm = θ B (θ S ) θ S (θ B ) 6.2 2) m 3) E.3.1 4) n 5) E
52 6.2: 0 2 θ B (θ S ) θ S (θ B ) 0 θ B (θ S ) < 1 0 θ S (θ B ) < 1 { θˆ B, θˆ S } { θˆ B, θˆ S } { θˆ B, θˆ S } G( θ θ B0 ˆ ) G( θ θ B2 ˆ ) G( θ θ S ˆ 0 ) G( θ θ S ˆ 2 σ σ θˆ B > θˆ S σ σ ) 6.3: θ G0 θ G
53 SET IMF 6) IMF 7) 20 IMF 8) IMF 9) IMF 10) IMF θ S, θ B 6) (1999) 7) IMF 8) (1999) 9) (1999) 10) (1999) 52
54 6.2 IMF Monetary Policy MP MP MP 1 1 MP = ) R 3 (θ, n, MP) R 3 (θ, n, MP) > 0 θ (6.8a) R 3 (θ, n, MP) < 0 n (6.8b) R 3 (θ, n, MP) < 0 MP (6.8c) t(mp) t(mp) MP > 0 (6.9) MP Rˆ er 3 (θ, n, MP) if er 3 (θ, n, MP) r 2 3 (θ, n, e, MP) = (6.10) r 2 if er 3 (θ, n, MP) r 2 11) Ho and Saunders (1981) Saunders and Schumacher (2000) 53
55 (5.7a), (5.7c), (6.8a) (6.10) Rˆ 3 (θ, n, e, MP) θ Rˆ 3 (θ, n, e, MP) n Rˆ 3 (θ, n, e, MP) e Rˆ 3 (θ, n, e, MP) MP (6.11a) (6.11b) (6.11c) (6.11d) a 3 (θ, m, n, MP) = 1 e(θ, m, n) t(mp) (6.12) 5 (6.12) a 3 (θ, m, n, MP) θ a 3 (θ, m, n, MP) n a 3 (θ, m, n, MP) m a 3 (θ, m, n, MP) MP (6.13a) (6.13b) (6.13c) < 0 (6.13d) ) 1 0 [ { [ R ˆ3 {θ B G 1 (n)σ, n, e θ B G 1 (n)σ, G { Rˆ 3 (θ, n, e, MP) 1} 1 σ g(θ B θ )dθ = 0 (6.14) σ G 1 (n) + θ S θ B σ ] } } ], n, MP 1 dn = 0 (6.15) θ B θ S θ S θ B 12) E.4.1 θ B = θ B3 (θ S ) (6.16) 54
56 13) 1 0 a 3 (θ, m, n, MP) 1 σ g(θ i θ )dθ = 0 (6.17) σ [ a 3 {θ S G 1 (m)σ, m, G G 1 (m) + θ B θ ] } S, MP dm = 0 (6.18) σ θ B θ S θ B θ S θ S = θ S 3 (θ B ) (6.19) (6.15), (6.18) (6.15) MP (6.11d) < 0 (6.16) θ S θ B 14) (6.18) MP (6.13d) < 0 (6.19) θ B θ S 15) θ B = θ B3 (θ S ) θ S = θ S 3 (θ B ) 6.4 θ B = θ B3 (θ S ) θ S = θ S 3 (θ B ) A) A B C D A B C IMF 13) E ) E ) E
57 6.4: θ B (θ S ) C 2 A 6.5 { θ B3 ˆ, θ S ˆ 3 } { θ ˆ B3, θ ˆ S 3 } θ A A + B C C + D 6.5: A, B, C 56
58 Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q ! " # : 16) G ) 57
59 Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q : Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q : IFS
60 Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q : IFS % 6.9 A 6.4 A 6.4 C
61 1 1 = e 1 = e t+1 i e t+1 (1 + i) e i 1 + i e t+1 e (1 + i) > 1 + i (6.20) 17) R θ, e l 18) R/ θ 0, R/ e 0, R/ l 0 (6.21) (5.11a), (5.11b), (5.11c) f (θ)(1 + i) θ f (θ)(1 + i) > 1 19) 20) 17) 18) [0, B] (B > 0) 1 1 i = 0 θ i = θ + σε i 1 l l 19) 1000% 1/11 20) 60
62 [0, 1] 1 21) 1 s s (1 > s > 0) R 4 (θ, n) n R 4(θ,n) θ > 0 R 4(θ,n) n 1 s e < ( ) c4 (θ, m, n) > 0 n 3 (θ, m, n) e 4 (θ, m, n) a 4 (θ, m, n) θ C { R 4 (θ, n) 1 s } 1 e σ g(θ C θ σ )dθ = 0 21) 61
63 e {er 4 (θ, n) (1 s)} 1 σ g(θ C θ )dθ = 0 (6.22) σ er 4 (θ, n) Rˆ 4 (θ, n, e) Rˆ 4 (θ, n, e) R 3 Rˆ 4 (θ,n,e) θ > 0 Rˆ 4 (θ,n,e) n < 0 Rˆ 4 (θ,m,n) e < 0 ˆR(θ, n, e) (6.22) 22) 1 0 [ { [ R ˆ4 {θ C G 1 (n)σ, n, e θ C G 1 (n)σ, G G 1 (n) + θ S θ C σ ] }} ], n (1 s) dn = 0 (6.23) θ C = θ C (θ S ) (6.24) θ S = θ S (θ C ) (6.25) : (6.24), (6.25) ) dn = 1 g ( ) θ C θ σ σ dθ m n θ S θ σ = G 1 (n) (6.22) (6.23) θ C θ σ 62 = G 1 (m)
64 6.3.5 (6.23) s s (6.23) s < 0 θ C 23) θ C = θ C (θ S ) θ S θ C IMF IMF IMF ) 23) E ) 2 IMF (1999) 63
65 M2 (% ) Base Money (% ) call rate(% ) M M M M M M M M : IFS 25) 26) Q4 98 Q ) (1999, p. 86) 26) , p
66 4 3 (%) Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q Q : GDP 27) 27) 65
67 66
68 7 IMF 5 IMF contagion 67
69 1 1 68
70 A Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) (1996) 1) n I = 1,..., n i A i i T i i u i (a 1,..., a n, t i ) T 1 T n p(t 1,..., t n ) 1. t = (t 1,..., t n ) p 2. i t i a i A i 3. i u (a 1,..., a n, t i ) i T i A i s i (t i ) t i a i t i T i i t i s i (t i ) E(u i t i ) = p(t i t i ) u i (s i (t i ), s i (t i ), t i ) (A.1) t i 1) 2 (1996)
71 i s i s = (s 1,..., s n) p(t i t i ) u i (s i (t i), s i (t i), t i ) p(t i t i ) u i (s i (t i), s i (t i ), t i ) (A.2) t i t i s 70
72 B b x π(x) π (x) x u(x, π) u(x, π ) (4.9) π(x) π (x) (4.8) θ s(θ, π) s(θ, π ) A(π) A(π ) e f (θ) u(x, π) = 1 [ ] 2ε A(π) (e f (θ))dθ t [x ε,x+ε] 1 [ ] 2ε A(π ) (e f (θ))dθ t [x ε,x+ε] = u(x, π ). x x x = inf{x π(x) < 1}, x = sup{x π(x) > 0}. (B.1a) (B.1b) x inf{x 0 < π(x) < 1} sup{x 0 < π(x) < 1} x x x (B.2) π(x) < 1 x (B.1a) x u(x, π) 0. (B.3) u(x, I x ) I x π b (B.3) u(x, I x ) u(x, π) 0. 71
73 (4.12) x u(x, I x ) = u(k, I k ) k x x (B.4) (B.2), (B.4), (B.5) x x x = x = x (B.5) (B.6) π x I x
74 C 1) prior distribution posterior distribution C.1 noninformative prior distribution Jeffreys (1961) 1 θ p(θ) improper prior distribution C.2 θ i g( ) 1 σ g( θ i θ σ ) 1) (1985) 73
75 θ G( θ i θ σ ) (C.1) C.3 a a θ u(a, θ) E[u(a, θ)] = u(a, θ) 1 σ g(θ i θ )dθ (C.2) σ 74
76 D Morris and Shin (2003) 4 2 : π B (θ, m, n) = 1 R(θ, n, e(θ, m, n)) (D.1) : π S (θ, m, n) = a(θ, m, n) (D.2) 1. Action Monotonicity: π B (θ, m, n) n non decreasing in n π S (θ, m, n) m strategic complementarities self fullfilling (5.11b), (5.15c) 1) 2. State Monotonicity: π B (θ, m, n) π S (θ, m, n) θ θ (5.11a), (5.15a) 2) 3. Strict Laplacian State Monotonicity: Action Monotonicity, State Monotonicity Limit Dominance 0 1) ˆR(θ, n, e) 0, n 2) ˆR(θ, n, e) 0, θ a(θ, m, n) 0. m a(θ, m, n) 0. θ 0 π B (ˆθ B, m, n)dn = 0 π S (ˆθ S, m, n)dm = 0 75 (D.3) (D.4)
77 State Monotonicity ˆθ B ˆθ S E Uniform Limit Dominance: π 3) θ i < θ θ i > θ δ θ i < θ 1 0 π B(θ i, 0, 0)dn < +δ θ i < θ 1 0 π B(θ i, 1, 1)dn < δ θ i < θ 1 0 π S (θ i, 0, 0)dn < +δ θ i < θ 1 0 π S (θ i, 1, 1)dn < δ π B3 (θ, m, n, MP) = 1 R 3 (θ, n, e(θ, m, n), MP) π S 3 (θ, m, n, MP) = a 3 (θ, m, n, MP) θ i < θ 1 0 π B3(θ i, 0, 0, 1)dn < +δ θ i < θ 1 0 π B3(θ i, 1, 1, 1)dn < δ θ i < θ 1 0 π S 3(θ i, 0, 0, 1)dn < +δ θ i < θ 1 0 π S 3(θ i, 1, 1, 1)dn < δ 5. Continuity: 1 0 π B(θ, m, n)dn 0 6. Finite Expectations of Signals: (Return of each signal)g( θ i θ σ )dθ 3) (1996) 76
78 E E.1 0 n = G ( ) θ B θ σ θ S m = G ( ) θ S θ σ dn = 1 σ g ( ) θ B θ σ dθ m n θ S θ σ = G 1 θ (m), B θ σ = G 1 (n) θ B θ B θ S θ B 1) (5.19) (5.20) (5.22) (5.23) m, n, dm 0 E θ B (θ S ) (5.21) 0 θ B(θ S ) θ S < 1 θ S (θ B ) (5.24) 0 θ S (θ B ) θ B < 1 2 E θ B (θ S ) 0 θ B(θ S ) θ S (5.20) 1 0 [ { { [ ˆR θ B G 1 (n)σ, n, e θ B G 1 (n)σ, G G 1 (n) + θ S θ B σ ] }} ], n 1 dn = 0 < 1 θ S θ B θ S G 1 (n)+ θ S θ B σ G [ ] G 1 (n) + θ S θ B σ e(θ,m,n) m 0 (5.7c) 1) E
79 e ˆR(θ,n,e) e 0 (5.11c) ˆR 0 θ B θ B θ S G 1 (n) + θ S θ B σ G [ ] G 1 (n) + θ S θ B σ e(θ,m,n) θ 0 (5.7a) e(θ,m,n) m 0 (5.7b) e(θ,m,n) n 0 (5.7c) e ˆR(θ,n,e) 0 (5.11a) ˆR(θ,n,e) e 0 (5.11c) ˆR 0 θ B(θ S ) θ S θ B ˆR θ S θ B (θ S ) θ S < 1 0 θ S (θ B ) θ B θ < 1 E.2.2 D Uniform Limit Dominance 1 1 θ (5.21), (5.24) { θˆ B, θˆ S } {θb H, θh S } { ˆR ( θ, n A (θ), e ( θ, m A (θ), n A (θ) )) 1 } 1 σ g(θh B θ σ )dθ = 0 m A (θ), n A (θ) θ H B ˆ θ B n A (θ) G( θh B θ σ ) ma (θ) G( θh S θ σ ) ˆR θ, G( θh B θ σ ), e θ, G( θh S θ σ ), G(θH B θ σ ) 1 1 σ g(θh B θ σ )dθ 0 78
80 1 0 ˆR θh B G 1 (n A )σ, n, e θ B G 1 (n A )σ, G G 1 (n A ) + θh S θh B, n A σ 1 dn 0 θˆ B n = G( θ B θ σ ) θˆ S m = G( θ S θ σ ) E.3 E.3.1 ˆR θ S θ B ˆR 1 0 [ { { [ ˆR θ B G 1 (n)σ, n, e θ B G 1 (n)σ, G G 1 (n) + θ S θ B σ ] }} ], n 1 dn 0 (5.20) θ B θ B m = G [ ] G 1 (n) + θ S θ B σ e(θ, m, n) θ = θ B G 1 (n)σ m e(θ,m,n) θ 0 (5.7a) e(θ,m,n) m 0 (5.7b) e ˆR(θ, n, e) θ = θ B G 1 (n)σ e ˆR(θ,n,e) θ 0 (5.11a) ˆR(θ,n,e) e 0 (5.11c) ˆR(θ, n, e) E.3.2 a(θ,m,n) θ 0 (5.15c) (5.15a) a(θ,m,n) n 0 E.4 E.4.1 II dn = 1 σ g ( ) θ B θ dθ m n θ S θ σ = G 1 (m) θ B θ σ = G 1 (n) (6.14) (6.15) (6.17) (6.18) σ 79
81 E.4.2 MP θ S θ B MP Rˆ 3 (θ,n,e,mp) MP 0 (6.11d) Rˆ 3 (θ, n, e, MP) 1 0 [ { [ R ˆ3 {θ B G 1 (n)σ, n, e θ B G 1 (n)σ, G G 1 (n) + θ S θ B σ ] } } ], n, MP 1 dn < 0 θ B θ B m = G [ ] G 1 (n) + θ S θ B σ e(θ, m, n) θ = θb G 1 (n)σ m e(θ,m,n) θ ˆ Rˆ 3 (θ,n,e,mp) θ 0 (5.7a) e(θ,m,n) m 0 (5.7b) e R 3 (θ, n, e, MP) θ = θ B G 1 (n)σ e 0 (5.11a) Rˆ 3 (θ,n,e,mp) e a 3(θ,m,n,MP) θ a 3 (θ,m,n,mp) MP 0 (6.11c) ˆ R 3 (θ, n, e, MP) 0 (6.13a) a 3(θ,m,n,MP) n < 0 (6.13d) 0 (6.13b) 80
82 [1] (1999), IMF, 50, [2] (1996),, [3] (1999),, [4] (1999), [5] (2001), [6] (2002), 14 [7] (2000),, [8] (1985),, [9] (2002),, 21, [10] Carlsson, H. and E. van Damme (1993), Global Games and Equilibrium Selection, Econometrica 61, [11] Chang, R. and A. Velasco (2001), A Model of Financial Crisis in Emerging Markets, Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, [12] Corsetti, G., A. Dasgupta, S. Morris, and H. S. Shin (2004), Does One Soros Make a Difference? A Theory of Currency Crises with Large and Small Traders, Review of Economic Studies 71, [13] Flood, R. P. and P. M. Garber (1984), Collapsing Exchange-Rate Regimes: Some linear Examples, Journal of International Economics 17, [14] Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991), Game Theory, MIT Press. [15] Furman, J and J. E. Stiglitz (1998), Economic Crises: Evidence and Insights from East Asia, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2,
83 [16] Goldstein, I. (2005), Strategic Complementarities and the Twin Crisis, Economic Journal 115, [17] Goldstein, I and A. Pauzner (2004), Contagion of Self-Fulfilling Financial Crisis due to Diversification of Investment Portfolios, Journal of Economic Theory 119, [18] Hartigan, J. (1983), Bayes Theory, Springer-Verlag. [19] Heinemann, F. (2000), Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks: Comment, American Economic Review 90, [20] Ho, T. and A. Saunders (1981), The Determinants of Bank Interest Margins: Theory and Empirical Evidence, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analyses 16, [21] Ito, T. (1998), The Development of Thailand Currency Crisis: A Chronological Review, Journal of Research Institute for International Investment and Development 24, [22] Jeffreys, H. (1961), Theory of Probability, 3rd ed. Clarendon Press. [23] Krugman, P. R. (1979), A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 11, [24] Krugman, P. R. (1999), Balance Sheets, the Transfer Problem and Financial Crises, International Tax and Public Finance 6, [25] Lane, T., A. Ghosh, J. Hamann, S. Phillips, M. Schulze-Ghattas, and T. Tsikata (1999), Supported Programs in Indonesia, Korea, Thailand: A Preliminary Assessment, IMF Occasional Paper 178. [26] Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (1998), Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks, American Economic Review 88, [27] Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2003), Global Games: Theory and Applications. In: Dewatripont, M., Hansen, L., Turnovsky, S. (Eds.), Advances in Economics and Econometrics: the Eighth World Congress, Cambridge University Press, [28] Morris, S. and H. S. Shin (2005), Catalytic Finance: When does it work? Forthcoming in Journal of International Finance. [29] Obstfeld, M. (1994), The Logic of Currency Crises, Cahiers Economiques et Monetaires, Banque de France 43, [30] Obstfeld, M. (1996), Models of Currency Crises with Self-fulfilling Features, European Economic Review 40,
84 [31] Research Department of The Bank of Korea (1998), Financial Crisis in Korea- Why it happened and how it should be overcome-, The Bank of Korea. [32] Rubin, R. E. and J. Weisberg (2003), In an Uncertain World: Tough Choices from Wall Street to Washington, Random House.,,, 2005 [33] Saunders A. and L. Schumacher (2000), The Determinants of Bank Interest Rate Margins: an International Study, Journal of International Money and Finance 19, [34] Stiglitz, J. E. and B. Greenwald (2003), Towards a New Paradigm in Monetary Economics, Cambridge University Press.,,,
IMF http : // htm
1 2 1971 1973 1999 1997 2 IMF 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 2 5 6 1 2 7 IMF http : //www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2006/eng/0706. htm 8 du jure de facto Reinhart Rogoff 20041946 2001 153 Levy-Yeyati Sturzenegger 20051974
デフレ不況下の金融政策をめぐる政治過程
1991 2003 GDP....................................... http://www.stat.go.jp/ http://www.boj.or.jp/ GDP http://www.esri.cao.go.jp/ GDP - - - inflation targeting Krugman a IS-LM liquidity trap Krugman b Krugman
Jeffrey Sachs Chang(1998) Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs (1998) 1999 IMF 1999 World Bank 1998 [ 1998 ] 2000 p [ 20
![Jeffrey Sachs Chang(1998) Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs (1998) 1999 IMF 1999 World Bank 1998 [ 1998 ] 2000 p [ 20](/thumbs/88/117909888.jpg "Jeffrey Sachs Chang(1998) Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs (1998) 1999 IMF 1999 World Bank 1998 [ 1998 ] 2000 p [ 20")
62 1997 1996 1 1 2 1 Jeffrey Sachs1997 2 Chang(1998)Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs (1998) 1999 IMF 1999 World Bank1998 [ 1998 ] 2000p.9196 [ 2003] 21 [ 2002 2000] [ 1998 1999 ] 1 62 21 3 4 5 6 90 7 3
国際流動性に関する財政的側面について
IMF SDR IMF 2011 6 1 2 2011 E-mail: obstfeld@econ.berkeley.edu / /2011.10 35 1. 2007 2009 2 Goodhart [1999] 2010 11 2. 4 1970 IMF 1960 36 /2011.10 international reserve 1 D 35 1 D 35 1960 Eichengreen [2011]
1 Flores, D. (009) All you can drink: should we worry about quality? Journal of Regulatory Economics 35(1), Saggi, K., and Vettas, N. (00) On in
6 016 4 6 1 1 Flores, D. (009) All you can drink: should we worry about quality? Journal of Regulatory Economics 35(1), 1 18. Saggi, K., and Vettas, N. (00) On intrabrand and interbrand competition: The
伝統的な経済学では、「消費は重要ではあるが、気にしなくてもよい」と考えられてきた
2005 1 2004 SARS 2003 IMF 2004 5.0 2004 4.1 0.9 30 2005 2004 2005 2005 2005 2004 2005 IMF 2005 4.3 2004 IMF 2004 2003 3.0 4.3 2003 2 2003 2004 IT 2005 IMF 2005 2004 3.5 IT 1995 10 2.8% 10 2 1 IT IT 2004
........,.,.,..,.,.,.,.,.,.,.,., International Capital Market Litan et al a b c d M&A a a b E- e- Litan et al. : Table Levine World Bank Levine Greenwald et al. B R F R r R R r B R r B R r B R R Stiglitz
untitled
2 book conference 1990 2003 14 Repeated Cross-Section Data 1 M1,M2 M1 Sekine(1998) Repeated Cross-Section Data 1 1. (1989), Yoshida and Rasche(1990), Rasche(1990), 19921997, Fujiki and Mulligan(1996),
アジアの資本移動の変化に関するクラスター分析 アジア域内の証券投資活性化に向けて
* ** 199 1 1996-97 relation * ** Seoul conference China and Emerging Asia: Reorganizing the Global Economy? held by KIEP and Seoul National University 26 5 11-12 Hugh Patrick Yung-Chul Park 26 9 9-1 East
, 3, 1999, 4,,
1, 1992 2005,,, 10 2,, 1992 1998 1,,, 1998 2002 2,, 3,,, 2002, 2002 3 1 2 1 , 3, 1999, 4,, 3 14 11 2 I, 10,, 1992 2005, 2,, 3, 4,, II,, 1992 1998 1,, 1998 2002 2 2002 3 II-1: 1 1993 1998 90,, 1995 6850,,
12056286_03.indd
: 82 1 2013 7 2010 2011 1 30 2010 30 2011 30 2010 9 10 11 2011 1 2 1 2010 9 UK UK UK UK UK p. 843 45 82 1 1 UK 9 9 2007-08 UK 30% 30 20%30 150 30 32.5% 2030% p. 843 3 2004-05 5% 5% 75% p. 843 2010 11 1963
COE-RES Discussion Paper Series Center of Excellence Project The Normative Evaluation and Social Choice of Contemporary Economic Systems Graduate Scho
COE-RES Discussion Paper Series Center of Excellence Project The Normative Evaluation and Social Choice of Contemporary Economic Systems Graduate School of Economics and Institute of Economic Research
Tran Thi Van Anh
Title Kobe University Repository : Kernel アジア債券市場整備の取り組みと債券市場の現状について (To Which Stage Has Asian Bond Market Achieved?) Author(s) 三重野, 文晴 / 清水, 聡 / [ トラン, ティンバンアン ] Citation 国民経済雑誌,204(6):25-43 Issue date
ＧＤＰギャップと潜在成長率
2003 output gap 80 1 20 90 20 70 2 1 2 output gap potential output 1 2 (2001) 3 potential rate of growth 2000 Meyer (2000) European Central Bank: (1999b) 2002 10 4 3 (2000) 4 4 () 5 5 5 6 () () 7 Total
46−ª3�=4�“ƒ‚S“·‚Ö‡¦
463420101 1. 1989, Yoshida and Rasche1990, Rasche1990, 19921997, Fujiki and Mulligan1996, 1996, Sekine1998, 2001, Fujiki2002, 2003, 2004 Bahmani-Oskooee and Shabsigh1996, Amano and Wirjanto2000, Bahmani-Oskooee
18lacs.dvi
18 : 114 cfl 2011 1 (Kenichiro Matsui) 1990 2000 ( ) 1 2000 2000 2000 2000 2 (stabilizer) I 3 II 1990 2000 III I. 1. 2000 ODA 2001 9 1 2000 3 1 (2006 ) 8,068-1,468 586 490 6.1% 3,567-4,190 3,397 3,316
untitled
2007 2 * (i) (ii) 2006 7 1999 2 2000 8 1 (2003) Oda and Ueda (2005) 2005 Kimura and Small(2006) Iwamura, Shiratsuka and Watanabe (2006) (2006) 3 (i) (ii) (iii) 2 2 3 4 2.1 (2003) (2005) 1) (i) (ii) (i)
001-002/2
97 97 97 An Analysis of 97 Asian Crisis in Terms of Liquidity Aspect This paper focuses on one of the main elements, which cause the Asian Crisis in 997. much on the short-term foreign capital, is one
Kobe University Repository : Kernel Title 世 界 金 融 危 機 の 東 アジア 新 興 国 経 済 への 影 響 Author(s) 金 京, 拓 司 Citation 国 民 経 済 雑 誌, 202(5): 61-70 Issue date 2010-11 Resource Type Departmental Bulletin Paper / 紀 要
1990年代以降の日本の経済変動
1990 * kenichi.sakura@boj.or.jp ** hitoshi.sasaki@boj.or.jp *** masahiro.higo@boj.or.jp No.05-J-10 2005 12 103-8660 30 * ** *** 1990 2005 12 1990 1990 1990 2005 11 2425 BIS E-mail: kenichi.sakura@boj.or.jp
物価変動の決定要因について ― 需給ギャップと物価変動の関係の国際比較を中心に―
NAIRU NAIRU NAIRU GDPGDP NAIRUNon- Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment GDP GDP NAIRU Lown and RichFisher, Mahadeva and Whitley raw materials G NAIRUTurnerFai WatanabeNAIRU Watanabe nested NAIRU
金／金
IMF IMF M&A IMF IMF Gerchenkron Gerchenkron unbalanced growth Gerchenkron Johnson development state Hirschman IMF OECD IMF IMF GDP crony capitalism Krugman IMF capital market-based financial system bank-centered
公務員倫理問題への新アプローチ
OECD CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI CPI / GDP / / / /.............................. Transparency International Corruption Perception Index CPI CPI 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
橡motonishi.PDF
2000 3 ITME Discussion Paper No.26 850-8506 4-2-1 moto@net.nagasaki-u.ac.jp 1 1 MRF 1 (2000) 2 MRF 2 Schreft (1997) 3 2 Tobin (1985) Friedman (1992) 3 3 4 5 3 4 5 2 White (1984) 1 4 (1996) (1999) (1999)
IMES DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES Discussion Paper No. 99-J-17 INSTITUTE FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES BANK OF JAPAN 100-8630 203 IMES Discussion Paper Series 99-J-17 1999 6 * JEL classification E52 E58
46 RIM 2007 Vol.7 No HSBC WTO 2006
19782006 200716.7 2006 2007 RIM 2007 Vol.7 No.27 45 46 RIM 2007 Vol.7 No.27 2003 HSBC 1978 2006 2007 WTO 2006 RIM 2007 Vol.7 No.27 47 2003 10 92 95 98 99 4,000 20032006 2003 225 AMC 150 joint -stock companies
Powered by TCPDF ( Title 金利現実化措置以後の韓国における企業金融 : 年 Sub Title Korean corporate finance between 1965 and 1971 Author 李, 明輝 (Lee,
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org) Title 金利現実化措置以後の韓国における企業金融 : 1965 1971 年 Sub Title Korean corporate finance between 1965 and 1971 Author 李, 明輝 (Lee, Myunghwi) Publisher 慶應義塾経済学会 Publication year 2016
Autumn II III Zon and Muysken 2005 Zon and Muysken 2005 IV II 障害者への所得移転の経済効果 分析に用いるデータ
212 Vol. 44 No. 2 I はじめに 2008 1 2 Autumn 08 213 II III Zon and Muysken 2005 Zon and Muysken 2005 IV II 障害者への所得移転の経済効果 17 18 1 分析に用いるデータ 1 2005 10 12 200 2 2006 9 12 1 1 2 129 35 113 3 1 2 6 1 2 3 4 4 1
1 1 1 [2000]
![1 1 1 [2000]](/thumbs/88/114894310.jpg "1 1 1 [2000]")
* 2000 7 26 1 1 1 [2000] 1 2 1 2 2 1 B to C 250000 億円 200000 日本米国 213,200 150000 100000 50000 0 153,600 106,900 71,100 66,620 42,700 43,860 22,500 26,940 15,340 645 3,360 7,730 1998 年 1999 年 2000 年 2001
(1) (Karlan, 2004) (1) (1973) (1978) (1991) (1991) 1
2004 1 8 2005 12 17 1 (1) (Karlan, 2004) 2 3 4 5 E-mail: aa37065@mail.ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp (1) (1973) (1978) (1991) (1991) 1 2 2 2.1 (, 1978, 7 ) (2) (1988) 38 2 (3) (4) (2) (1986) 91 (1996) 2 1 (1993) 1
高齢化とマクロ投資比率―国際パネルデータを用いた分析―
196 2017 * ** ** ** ** 160 2 2 JEL Classification Codes E21, E22, J11 Keywords * ESRI 28 ESRI 29 3 17 ESRI ** 115 196 Population Aging and Domestic Investment An Analysis Using International Panel Data
Association of South East Asian Nations: ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN
Association of South East Asian Nations: ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: FTA FTA ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN ASEAN The European Union: EU
Walter et al. 2009: 1 Helleiner 1994 Strange 1971: Gilpin 1987: -65 Strange b, 1998c,
54 2012 77 92 E. Yano Shuichi 2011 11 2008 40 19821997 1998 LTCM 2001 IT 2007 1970 International Political Economy Helleiner 1994 54 2012 Walter et al. 2009: 1 Helleiner 1994 Strange 1971: Gilpin 1987:
Abstract IFS IFS 135
Abstract IFS IFS 135 International Financial Statistics Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 136 137 International Financial 138 Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions International
autocorrelataion cross-autocorrelataion Lo/MacKinlay [1988, 1990] (A)
![autocorrelataion cross-autocorrelataion Lo/MacKinlay [1988, 1990] (A)](/thumbs/93/112038541.jpg "autocorrelataion cross-autocorrelataion Lo/MacKinlay [1988, 1990] (A)")
Discussion Paper Series A No.425 2002 2 186-8603 iwaisako@ier.hit-u.ac.jp 14 1 24 autocorrelataion cross-autocorrelataion Lo/MacKinlay [1988, 1990] 1990 12 13 (A) 12370027 13 1 1980 Lo/MacKinlay [1988]
1 (1997) (1997) 1974:Q3 1994:Q3 (i) (ii) ( ) ( ) 1 (iii) ( ( 1999 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1995,pp ) 1
1 (1997) (1997) 1974:Q3 1994:Q3 (i) (ii) ( ) ( ) 1 (iii) ( ( 1999 ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) ( 1995,pp.218 223 ) 1 2 ) (i) (ii) / (iii) ( ) (i ii) 1 2 1 ( ) 3 ( ) 2, 3 Dunning(1979) ( ) 1 2 ( ) ( ) ( ) (,p.218) (
野村資本市場研究所｜アジアの金融競争力（PDF）
2013 Spring 1. GDP 3 26% 2. 3. 4. GDP 1 GDP 2000 25.4% 2012 10 IMF 1 GDP 28.7%GDP 10.7% 20.3% 2000 2012 10 2 3 2000 2012 4.2 5.4 2 2000 14% 2012 26% GDP 2012 30 10 32003 11 2013 Spring 100% 2 90% 80% 70%
[17]Holmström and Tirole (2000) (1) (2) (1) (2) 1 1 2
![[17]Holmström and Tirole (2000) (1) (2) (1) (2) 1 1 2](/thumbs/91/105001680.jpg "[17]Holmström and Tirole (2000) (1) (2) (1) (2) 1 1 2")
2002 4 1 1990 1 525-8577 1-1-1. Tel.: 077-561-4855. Fax.: 077-561-3964. E-mail: khori@ec.ritsumei.ac.jp 1 [17]Holmström and Tirole (2000) (1) (2) (1) (2) 1 1 2 MM MM MM MM CP 0 3 1 1990 1970 2 2 1 1 17%
調査レポート
2011 8 19 2009 2011 2.4 108-8248 2-16-4 TEL03-6711-1250 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8% -10% -12% 1/20 18% 16% 14% 12% 10% 8% 6% 4% 2% 0% -2% -4% -6% -8% -10% -12% -14% -16% -18% 2/20 35% 30% 25%
Winter 図 1 図 OECD OECD OECD OECD 2003
266 Vol. 44 No. 3 I 序論 Mirrlees 1971 Diamond 1998 Saez 2002 Kaplow 2008 1 700 900 1, 300 1, 700 II III IV V II わが国の再分配の状況と国際比較 OECD Forster and Mira d Ercole 2005 2006 2001 Winter 08 267 図 1 図 2 2000 2
-February FRB BIS IMF BIS Spillover Spillovers BIS IMF EMEs
BIS FRB BIS BIS FRB QE QE -February FRB BIS IMF BIS Spillover Spillovers BIS IMF EMEs GDP GDP........ GDP BIS, 83rd Annual Report, June 2013, p.14 Ibid., p.14. -February 1 1 2009 2013 2) 2009 2013 2) -7.6-4.0
財政赤字の経済分析：中長期的視点からの考察
1998 1999 1998 1999 10 10 1999 30 (1982, 1996) (1997) (1977) (1990) (1996) (1997) (1996) Ihori, Doi, and Kondo (1999) (1982) (1984) (1987) (1993) (1997) (1998) CAPM 1980 (time inconsistency) Persson, Persson
復活だぁっ！ 日本の不況と流動性トラップの逆襲
It s Baaack! Japan s Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap 1998 2001 8 29-9 9 Ver.1.0.1 1 2 2 5 2.1..................................... 5 2.2......................... 6 2.3.........................
untitled
Trade and Trade Finance in the 200809 Financial Crisis, IMF Working Paper WP/11/16., Understanding the Great Trade Collapse of 200809 and the Subsequent Trade Recovery, Economic Perspectives, 2Q/2011.
株式保有構成と企業価値 ─コーポレート・ガバナンスに関する一考察─
q E-mail: kenji.nishizaki@boj.or.jp E-mail: kurasawa@ynu.ac.jp OECD Vives Tirole Shleifer and Vishny q %% %% % % Allen and Gale %% % Admati, Pfreiderer and Zechner Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi Cremer 1995Pagno
5 5 (%) 9. 3 5 3 8. 7. 5. 5.. 5 5 5 3 8 5 3.9 3.. 1/3 1/9 /3 /9 3/3 3/9 /3 /9 5/3
I *1 *1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) * ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (JCR) G7 *1) *) (1) JCR AAA ( ) 1 () 5 - IT 1 5 5 (%) 9. 3 5 3 8. 7. 5. 5.. 5 5 5 3 8 5 3.9 3.. 1/3 1/9 /3 /9 3/3 3/9 /3 /9 5/3 1 (%).
- March IMF IMF IMF ITO The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
M&A IMF IMF gold tranche - March IMF IMF IMF ITO The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade IMF IMF IMF GATT OECD OECD BITs. - March. U I = I (r m, i, Z * r m i Z * (= Z / Z) I / r m > I / i < I / Z *
表紙＿目次.PDF
JIL 2 1980 vol.3 15 3 1 3 15 18 IT 26 28 33 20 OECD 80 90 (1998) (2000) 2 Aghion et al. (1999) OECD 1970 1 2 70 1980 90 1.1 Kuznets U inverted U-shaped hypothesis GNP U 1 18901940 6 3 Kuznets(1955) (1963)
Public Investment, the Rate of Return, and Optimal Fiscal Policy Economic Growth Pioneering Economic Theory Mathematical Theories of Economic Growth Review of Economic Studiesvol.27 Econometrica vol.34
03.indd
81 opqropqropqropqropqropqropqropqropqropqropqropqr 第 Ⅲ 章 卒業論文作成ガイドライン opqropqropqropqropqropqropqropqropqropqropqropqr 1. 論文作成の各段階で注意すべきこと第一段階 :3 年次のゼミ履修 指導教授の決定 3 3 第二段階 : 登録 LOYOLA 2011 第三段階 : 留学する場合の注意事項
わが国企業による資金調達方法の選択問題
* takeshi.shimatani@boj.or.jp ** kawai@ml.me.titech.ac.jp *** naohiko.baba@boj.or.jp No.05-J-3 2005 3 103-8660 30 No.05-J-3 2005 3 1990 * E-mailtakeshi.shimatani@boj.or.jp ** E-mailkawai@ml.me.titech.ac.jp
産業・企業レベルデータで見た日本の経済成長.pdf
2003 11 10 IT IT JIP JCER ) 2003 CD-ROM http://www.esri.go.jp/jp/archive/bun/bun170/170index. html 1 JIP Jorgenson, Mun, andstiroh (2002) GDP 2 3 1951 1954 1957 1960 1963 1966 1969 1972 1975 1978 1981
デフレの定義（最新版）.PDF
DP/01-1 Director General for Economic Assessment and Policy Analysis CABINET OFFICE E-mail : naoki.okamoto@mfs.cao.go.jp 1 2 3 i (ii) 4 5 Deflation defined as at least two consecutive years of price decreases.
, Exchange & Finamce
10 35 50 10 20 1210 18 15 15, 7.5 10 13 50 10 10 10 10 10 10 1225 7.5 10 1.3 10 6.8 5.5 142 25 Exchange & Finamce 1210 10 2.75 2.5 2.5 1210 10 12 1.5 10 10 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.2 1.5 1.5 10 1.4 1.3 1.3 10 12,900
ŒÚ”ŁŠp.qx
10 Sawada Yasuyuki 199798 twin crisis Kaminsky and Reinhart199919701980 1 19981 122 2001 20061998 1 197079 1 198095 1 26 2.6 50 3.13 1 0.10 18 1.13 25 2.50 32 2.00 3 0.30 23 1.44 Kaminsky and Reinhart1999,
わが国銀行業の将来像― 預金通貨需要からのアプローチによるマクロ的サイズの検討―
M1GDP M2M1 M1GDP M2M1 E-mail: kazuhiko.ishida@boj.or.jp E-mail: hitoshi.mio@boj.or.jp M2GDP Modigliani-Miller: MM Hoshi and Kashyap HKHK HK Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing, Mining and Trade
bottleneckjapanese.dvi
1 M&A Keywords:,. Address: 742-1, Higashinakano, Hachioji-shi, Tokyo 192-09,Japan fax:+81 426 74 425 E-mail: yangc@tamacc.chuo-u.ac.jp ; yasuokaw@tamacc.chuo-u.ac.jp 1 Yang and Kawashima(2008) 1 2 ( MVI
03.™ƒ−ÔŁñ“’
BIS BIS, Implications for Central Banks of the Development of Electronic Money, 1996. IC IC IC BC BA IC IC ATM ATM BIS POS IC IC ICICIC ECOM ECOM face-to-face IC Berger, A. N., D. Hancock, and J. C.
橡20内藤仁美.PDF
1 1 2 2 1 2 3 1 2 1997 7 1 30 1 1 2 3 3 3 1 2 365 2003 2 IMF 3 4 1 1 2 2 1 1 1997 7 2 15 97 98 5 30 3 2 1 1 5 1 97 7 10 1 97 7 10 ASEAN4 7 10 366 4 25 35 2.8 2.7 6.8 2 97 10 11 2 10 11 10 7 1983 10 23
130 Oct Radial Basis Function RBF Efficient Market Hypothesis Fama ) 4) 1 Fig. 1 Utility function. 2 Fig. 2 Value function. (1) (2)
Vol. 47 No. SIG 14(TOM 15) Oct. 2006 RBF 2 Effect of Stock Investor Agent According to Framing Effect to Stock Exchange in Artificial Stock Market Zhai Fei, Shen Kan, Yusuke Namikawa and Eisuke Kita Several
Title 最適年金の理論 Author(s) 藤井, 隆雄 ; 林, 史明 ; 入谷, 純 ; 小黒, 一正 Citation Issue Date Type Technical Report Text Version publisher URL
Title 最適年金の理論 Author(s) 藤井, 隆雄 ; 林, 史明 ; 入谷, 純 ; 小黒, 一正 Citation Issue 2012-06 Date Type Technical Report Text Version publisher URL http://hdl.handle.net/10086/23085 Right Hitotsubashi University Repository
商学 ６３‐３☆／６．山本
193 W. A. 1 2 3 1 2 WTO FTA TPP D. P. P. W. A. 194 2 3 Lewis 1954 1982, 1987 1999 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 A B 1987 119 1985 Krugman and Obstfeld 2009 19742006 3 W. A. 195 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 A a1 a2 * * i ai i 1, 2
RIETI Highlight VOL.25
RIETI Highlight 2009 SUMMER 25 VOL. Research Digest RIETI 2009 SUMMER VOL. 25 Highlight 1 2 3 5 8 10 12 13 14 19 ResearchDigest 20 24 28 32 36 38 40 41 42 44 45 RIETI Topics 01 CONTENTS 02 RIETI Highlight
2 Recovery Theorem Spears [2013]Audrino et al. [2015]Backwell [2015] Spears [2013] Ross [2015] Audrino et al. [2015] Recovery Theorem Tikhonov (Tikhon
![2 Recovery Theorem Spears [2013]Audrino et al. [2015]Backwell [2015] Spears [2013] Ross [2015] Audrino et al. [2015] Recovery Theorem Tikhonov (Tikhon](/thumbs/92/109954502.jpg "2 Recovery Theorem Spears [2013]Audrino et al. [2015]Backwell [2015] Spears [2013] Ross [2015] Audrino et al. [2015] Recovery Theorem Tikhonov (Tikhon")
Recovery Theorem Forward Looking Recovery Theorem Ross [2015] forward looking Audrino et al. [2015] Tikhonov Tikhonov 1. Tikhonov 2. Tikhonov 3. 3 1 forward looking *1 Recovery Theorem Ross [2015] forward
日本における財政政策のインパクトー1990年代のイベント・スタディー
FTPL FTPL sustainability FTPL fiscal theory of the price level FTPL Fukuda and Teruyama Giavazzi and Pagan Giavazzi and Pagano Alesina and PerottiSutherlandPerottiGiavazzi, Jappelli and Pagano FTPL LeeperSimsWoodford
公的機関が関与した企業再生支援
14 56 2004.10 corporate control right debt overhang 4, 1998, p.253., p.263., 2000, p.44. 2004.10 57 DES DDS DES DDS 10 11 Hold out, 2000, pp.215-226, p.44. N 1265, 2004.4.1, pp.25-26. Coase theorem Ronald
時間割引：双曲割引と弱加法性
Discussion aper No. 666 June 2006 The Institute of Social and Economic Research Osaka University 6-1 Mihogaoka, Ibaraki, Osaka 567-0047, Japan Time Discounting: Declining Impatience and Interval Effect
中国の家計所得と消費構造に関する分析
20 9 2001 12 WTO 80 ...3...6...10...14... 14... 16 20 2003 3 13 625 9,500 3,000 200 825 9,000 2 4 4,000 2002 6 90 1 1 2002 1 1978 0.16 2001 0.32 20 2002 2001 0.51 household localization 2001 12 WTO 2006
Non-Deliverable Forwards NDF BIS BIS
Some Features of Foreign Exchange Markets in April OKUDA, Hiroshi On September,, BIS and many Central Banks published surveys of foreign exchange activities that occurred in April. By analyzing these surveys,
292 Vol. 44 No refundable tax credit Mirrlees 1971 Friedman
Winter 08 291 I はじめに Shinozaki 2005 2006 OECD United Nations 2007 OECD 2008 2 1 2006 2005 2 2006 refundable tax credit 2006 292 Vol. 44 No. 3 3 1 2 refundable tax credit 3 10 5 5 10 5 2 1 Mirrlees 1971
小塚匡文.indd
流通科学大学論集 - 経済 情報 政策編 - 第 22 巻第 2 号,19-32(2014) Lending Behavior for Small-Medium Business by Shinkin Bank and Other Domestic Bank in Japan: Evidences from Time Series Data Masafumi Kozuka I. 2006 99.7
1970). Baumol, W. J., Panzar, J. C. and R. D. Willig (1982); Contestable Markets and The Theory of Industry Structure, 1982. Caves, R. and M. E. Porter (1977); From entry barriers to mobility barriers:
個人消費支出からみた戦間期の景気変動:LTES個人消費支出の再推計
LTES LTES LTES 1 GNE GDP GDP 1920 LTES GDP LTES 1931 GDP 76 Hi-Stat E-mail: kiyohito.utsunomiya@boj.or.jp / /2009.3 73 1. Long-Term Economic Statistics LTES 1 1971 LTES 2 LTES LTES System of National Accounts
Microsoft Word - Šv”|“Å‘I.DOC
90 ª ª * E-mailshinobu.nakagawa@boj.or.jp i ii iii iv SNA 1 70 80 2 80 90 80 80 90 1 80 90 98 6 1 1 SNA 2 1 SNA 80 1SNA 1 19931998 1 2-190 1,2 2 2-2 2-3,4 3 2-5 4 2030 2-3 3 2-15 97 20 90 2-15 9198 1.
, 1), 2) (Markov-Switching Vector Autoregression, MSVAR), 3) 3, ,, , TOPIX, , explosive. 2,.,,,.,, 1
2016 1 12 4 1 2016 1 12, 1), 2) (Markov-Switching Vector Autoregression, MSVAR), 3) 3, 1980 1990.,, 225 1986 4 1990 6, TOPIX,1986 5 1990 2, explosive. 2,.,,,.,, 1986 Q2 1990 Q2,,. :, explosive, recursiveadf,
Value Added Tax VAT Mirrlees, J. VAT The Mirrlees Review The Structure and Reform of Direct Taxation Report of a Committee chaired by Professor J. E. Meade Dimensions of Tax Design Mirrlees 2010 Tax by
1 CAPM: I-,,, I- ( ) 1 I- I- I- ( CAPM) I- CAPM I- 1 I- Jensen Fama-French 3 I- Fama-French 3 I- Fama-MacBeth I- SMB-FL, HML-FL Fama-MacBeth 1 Fama-Fr
1 CAPM: I-,,, I- ( ) 1 I- I- I- ( CAPM) I- CAPM I- 1 I- Jensen Fama-French 3 I- Fama-French 3 I- Fama-MacBeth I- SMB-FL, HML-FL Fama-MacBeth 1 Fama-French (FF) 3 [5] (Capital Asset Pricing Model; CAPM
untitled
17 5 13 1 2 1.1... 2 1.2... 2 1.3... 3 2 3 2.1... 3 2.2... 5 3 6 3.1... 6 3.2... 7 3.3 t... 7 3.4 BC a... 9 3.5... 10 4 11 1 1 θ n ˆθ. ˆθ, ˆθ, ˆθ.,, ˆθ.,.,,,. 1.1 ˆθ σ 2 = E(ˆθ E ˆθ) 2 b = E(ˆθ θ). Y 1,,Y
43 2000 1964 65 possibilism 1 30 2 3 4 Development Projects Observed 5
43 2000 59 76 Shuichi YANO 1967A.O.Hirschman Development Projects Observed Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C.,1967. 1968 1970 30 1995 11 43 2000 1964 65 possibilism 1 30 2 3 4 Development Projects
An Empirical Study of the Securities Firms' Dilemma on Financial Innovation through Diffusion of Internet Deals Yasugi Satoshi Bower, J. L., 1999, Disruptive technologies: Catching the wave,
研究シリーズ第40号
165 PEN WPI CPI WAGE IIP Feige and Pearce 166 167 168 169 Vector Autoregression n (z) z z p p p zt = φ1zt 1 + φ2zt 2 + + φ pzt p + t Cov( 0 ε t, ε t j )= Σ for for j 0 j = 0 Cov( ε t, zt j ) = 0 j = >
Title Author(s) Kobe University Repository : Kernel 流 動 性 危 機 : レパレッジとモニタリング (< 特 集 > 世 界 金 融 危 機 )(Liquidity Crisis : Leverage and Monitoring ( World Financial Crisis)) 丸 茂, 俊 彦 Citation 国 民 経 済 雑 誌,203(1):107-119
02.„o“φiflì„㙃fic†j
X-12-ARIMA Band-PassDECOMP HP X-12-ARIMADECOMP HPBeveridge and Nelson DECOMP X-12-ARIMA Band-PassHodrick and PrescottHP DECOMPBeveridge and Nelson M CD X ARIMA DECOMP HP Band-PassDECOMP Kiyotaki and Moore
野村資本市場研究所｜勃興するインドネシアのリテール金融ビジネス（PDF）
2012 Winter 1. GDP 3,000 2. 3. 4. 10 20 5. socialisation 32 1 7 2 4 30 8 G20 1 1998 5% 2010 6.1% 2010 GDP 6,400 65 1 GDP 3 GDP 30% 33 2012 Winter 1 GDP 2010 2 42010430 192 km 2 51.8 922 87%10% 1 = 1002011
p *2 DSGEDynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium New Keynesian *2 2
2013 1 nabe@ier.hit-u.ac.jp 2013 4 11 Jorgenson Tobin q : Hayashi s Theorem : Jordan : 1 investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 *1 *1 93SNA 1 p.180 1936 100 1970 *2 DSGEDynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium New Keynesian
03.Œk’ì
HRS KG NG-HRS NG-KG AIC Fama 1965 Mandelbrot Blattberg Gonedes t t Kariya, et. al. Nagahara ARCH EngleGARCH Bollerslev EGARCH Nelson GARCH Heynen, et. al. r n r n =σ n w n logσ n =α +βlogσ n 1 + v n w
Tezukayama RIEB Discussion Paper Series No. 7 地方政府間の距離が財政調整に対する態度に与える影響 - 独裁者ゲーム実験からの示唆 - 竹本亨 小川一仁 高橋広雅 鈴木明宏 伊藤健宏 帝塚山大学 関西大学 広島市立大学 山形大学 岩手県立大学 経済学部 社
Tezukayama RIEB Discussion Paper Series No. 7 地方政府間の距離が財政調整に対する態度に与える影響 - 独裁者ゲーム実験からの示唆 - 竹本亨 小川一仁 高橋広雅 鈴木明宏 伊藤健宏 帝塚山大学 関西大学 広島市立大学 山形大学 岩手県立大学 経済学部 社会学部 国際学部 人文学部 総合政策学部 2013 年 11 月 Tezukayama University
表紙参照.PDF
CIRJE-J-94 2003 5 CIRJE http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/cirje/research/03research02dp_j.html The Erosion and Sustainability of Norms and Morale KANDORI, Michihiro The initially high performance of a socioeconomic
The Institute for Economic Studies Seijo University 6 1 20, Seijo, Setagaya Tokyo 157-8511, Japan The Institute for Economic Studies Green Paper No. 59 Consumers Decision on the Choice of Small Payment
濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析 77 多角化企業の利潤分析 多角化ディスカウントの寡占理論による説明 * 濱田弘潤 (diversification discount) Keywords: JEL classifications: D43, L13, L22, G
濱田弘潤 : 多角化企業の利潤分析 77 多角化企業の利潤分析 多角化ディスカウントの寡占理論による説明 * 濱田弘潤 (diversification discount) Keywords: JEL classifications: D43, L13, L22, G34 950-2181 2 8050 Tel. and fax: 025-262-6538 E-mail: khamada@econ.niigata-u.ac.jp
カルマンフィルターによるベータ推定（ ）
β TOPIX 1 22 β β smoothness priors (the Capital Asset Pricing Model, CAPM) CAPM 1 β β β β smoothness priors :,,. E-mail: koiti@ism.ac.jp., 104 1 TOPIX β Z i = β i Z m + α i (1) Z i Z m α i α i β i (the
untitled
c 645 2 1. GM 1959 Lindsey [1] 1960 Howard [2] Howard 1 25 (Markov Decision Process) 3 3 2 3 +1=25 9 Bellman [3] 1 Bellman 1 k 980 8576 27 1 015 0055 84 4 1977 D Esopo and Lefkowitz [4] 1 (SI) Cover and
和RIM28_向山氏.indd
9ASEAN 23 2615.314.7EU 12.3 27.1 223 2638.1 M&A45.3 2.6 CIS97.5 2 ASEAN 26 RIM 28 Vol.8 No.28 13 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 8 9 14 RIM 28 Vol.8 No.28 ASEAN 2 28 GDP 15 2 199798 5 5 15 1997 98 99 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 World
Constitution State colonies Provisions State Nutmeg State Land of Steady Habits Quinnehtukqut Quinnihtukqut Nautilus American Turtle Yankee Omi Omi Shonin Edo The Theory of Environmental Policy A Listing
untitled
[ 研究ノート ] 4% 19 19 20 1997a 20 Mitchell, 2002: 123 208 1997b; 2008 2 1960 1980 Abdel-Fadil, 1975; Hansen, 1969; Radwan & Lee, 1986 Abdel-Fadil, 1980; 85 Assaad, 1997 2 Hopkins Hopkins & Westergaard, 1998:
#10094931_信金7月号.indb
2006. 7 2006 7 2 4 24 41 58 84 85 97 99 2006 7 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55
財政赤字の経済分析：中長期的視点からの考察
000 364 645 (ax smoohing (Barro(979 Barro(979 (consumpion smoohing Hall(978 Campbell(987 Barro(979 Hall(978 Campbell(987 Campbell(987 B ( r B G T ( ( r E B G T Y T/Y r ( No Ponzi Game ( [ Ω ] Y ( lim (
Jorgenson F, L : L: Inada lim F =, lim F L = k L lim F =, lim F L = 2 L F >, F L > 3 F <, F LL < 4 λ >, λf, L = F λ, λl 5 Y = Const a L a < α < CES? C
27 nabe@ier.hit-u.ac.jp 27 4 3 Jorgenson Tobin q : Hayashi s Theorem Jordan Saddle Path. GDP % GDP 2. 3. 4.. Tobin q 2 2. Jorgenson F, L : L: Inada lim F =, lim F L = k L lim F =, lim F L = 2 L F >, F
59-1･2 鳥居昭夫・春日教測 .pwd
logit JEL Classifications: D10, M30, L82 Wilbur 2008 Shishikura et al. 2018 and de Gracia 2012 Bayraktaroglu et al. 2018 Carare and Zentner 2012 Carare and Zentner 2012 Train et al. 1987 Hendel 1999 Spence