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1 * BBC () ()BBC (FEER) () () (CIP) (UIP) () () ( ) 3-2 ( ) 3-3 ( ) 3-4 ( ) * ( ) 1

2 IMF (Stiglitz,2000) 1990 ( 30 ) (Bhagwati,1998) 1 IMF 1980 IMF 1997 IMF IMF (Feldstein,1998) IMF IMF IMF (Fischer, et al.,1999) (International Financial Institution Advisory Commission,2000) IMF 1 2

3 BIBF 4 5 ( MF ) MF ( ) 2 (2000) (2001) 3 (Asian Currency Unit, ACU) (,1999b) 4 (capital control) (financial regulation) (sequence of liberalization) National Self-sufficiency (,1999a,8-9 ) 3

4 ( ) 6 MF 7 MF IMF BBC BBC () 1970 (Eatwell and Taylor,1999) (Mundel,1963/1968,,311 ) 7 Frenkel and Razin(1987), Obstfeld(2000), (1989)(2001), (1994) 8 IMF 1 IMF IMF 4

5 (policy trilemma) (inconsistent trinity) (open-economy trilemma) (Obstfeld,1998,p.8) (Eichengreen,1996, Obstfeld,1998) EU (Eichengreen,1994) (two corner solutions, bipolar view) IMF (Fischer,2001) (exchange control) (capital control) 5

6 ( ) ( ) IMF ( ) () BBC (FEER) BBC BBC Band( )-Basket( )-Crawl( ) (Dornbusch,1998) (Williamson, 2000,2001) BBC 10%15% 3540% 3035% 30% (Asian Currency Unit, ACU) TB 6

7 BBC BBC BBC EMS (fundamental equilibrium exchange rate, FEER) 9 (Swan,1963/1968) 2-1 SP R = P * S P P * ( ) (S ) (P ) (P * ) (R ) 2-1 A A = C + I + G C I G Y X M 9 (,1999)Williamson(1985) FEER (Williamson,1985,pp.19-22) 7

8 Y = A + X M X M = Y A = 0 ( ) R A EE R ( ) A ( ) EE R A R A R A R A ( ) R A DE R ( ) A ( ) DE R A R A R A R A ( ) E R * FEER 10 BBC FEER FEER BBC BBC FEER GDP 10 (R ) P (R ) E IMF 8

9 FEER (De Grawe, ) BBC FEER = () ( FH ) 11 (,1999) 3-1 Obstfelt and Taylor(1997) 12 GDP FH Feldstein and Horioka(1980) OECD 16 (I/Y) (S/Y) 2 I / Y = S / Y R = 0.91 (0.02) (0.07) Obstfeld and Rogoff(1996,pp ) OECD 22 2 I / Y = S / Y R = 0.69 (0.02) (0.09) 9

10 3% % FH (1999) Obstfelt and Taylor(1997) ( ) 3-2 Obstfelt and Taylor(1997) ( ) ( ) ( ) FH (round-tripping) () (CIP) (UIP) SF ii * 1 10

11 i 1/S ( ) i * F 1 ( ) (1i * )F/S 1i ( ) ( ) i S i * F (3-1) (covered interest parity, CIP) d ( ) CIP * F 1+ i = (1 + i ) (3-1) S F S * d = = i i (3-2) S 12 CIP (d) (i i * ) CIP 3-4 CIP 3-1 (Obstfelt and Taylor,1997) 1% 4% 1980 CIP CIP (3-5 ) (3-1) 1+ i F = * 1+ i S sf SF * f s i i 11

12 (uncovered interest parity, UIP) E UIP ( i ) ( i * ) (3-3) (ii * ) CIP UIP UIP UIP ( ) 14 UIP UIP (Isard,1995,ch.5,,1999, ) E=F UIP CIP UIP (3-3) * E S i = i + (3-3) S E S * µ = = i i (3-4) S 13 UIP ( ) * F E i = i + µ + ρ ρ = (3-5) S 15 0 (FE) 13 CIP e E (3-4) * e s i i 14 ( ) S=F (3-4) * i = i MF 15 12

13 (i) (i * ) ( ) (E)120 (F)130 ( 140 ) 10 (FE) (S)100 (ii * ) (=(E S)/S)2 ( =(FE)/S)1% 0 (FE) (i * ) (i) ( ) (E)130 (F)120 ( 110 ) 10 (EF) (S)100 (i * i) (=(ES)/S)3 ( =(EF)/S)1% () (4-1) 4-1 (perfect capital mobility between countries) CIP (perfect substitutability between domestic and foreign bonds) UIP f = e + ρ 13

14 UIP (3-2) CIP = + = S S F d d i i * CIP (3-4) UIP i = + = S S E i µ µ * (imperfect asset substitutability) UIP (3-5) = + + = S E F i i ρ ρ µ * (Dornbusch and Krugman, 1976, p.556) MF MF ( ) ( ) ( ) 14

15 ( ) (UIP UIP MF 1617) () M P L Y M = L( i, Y ) (4 1) P * E S i = i + + ρ (4 2) S ' ρ = ρ( B A), ρ 0 ( Krugman and Obstfeld, pp , pp ) A B ( ) (BA) 16 UIP MF Y = C( Y T ) + I( i) + G + BP( Y, S) M = L( i, Y ) P * E S i = i + S (T BP ) 14 E=S * i = i MF UIP MF Krugman and Obstfeld(2000,ch.16) AA-DD MF IS-LM 17 (Mundel,1963/1968,,298 ) MF (1987) 6 MF (1996) 15

16 (A) 4-2 (4-1) (4-2) (4-1) (4-2) 9 (4-2) 9 E1 4-2 (A) ( 1 2) E1 E2 S1 S2 MF (A) ( 1 3) E1 E3 S1 i1 i2 18 W M B( ) 18 (Branson and Henderson,1985) (1996) (1999) 16

17 F( ) W = M + B + SF (4-3) * M = M ( i, i * B = B( i, i + µ, W ) (4-5) + + * F = F( i, i + µ, W ) (4-6) + + µ, W ) (4-4) + + ( ) (4-3) (4-4) (4-6) ( ) i * E i S MM BB MM BB S ( ) SF W i i E1 ( ) ( ) ( ) MM M M S i E2 i2 S2 ( ) W 17

18 BB B B S i E3 i3 S2 ( ) 4-4 MM BB S1 i1 i2 ( ) IMF MF BBC BBC 19 FEER FEER (,2001) 18

19 20 (CIP) (UIP) UIP UIP (,166 ) UIP UIP 20 Eatwell and Taylor(1999) (2000) 19

20 Bhagwati, J. (1998), The Capital Myth, Foreign Affaires, May/June, pp.7-12( 5 23 ). Branson, W.H. and W.H. Buiter (1983), Monetary and Fiscal Policy with Flexible Exchange rates, in Bhandari Jagdeep S., and Bluford H. Putnam (eds.), Economic Interdependence and Flexible Exchange Rates, The MIT Press (Cambridge, Mass).pp Branson, W.H. and D.W. Henderson (1985), The Specification and Influence of Asset Markets, in R.W.Jones and P.B.Kennen (eds.), Hnadbook of International Economics, vol. II, North-Holland. De Grauwe, P.(1996) International Money, 2nd. Edition, Oxford University Press, 1996(,,2001 ). Dornbush,R.(1980), Open Economy Macroeconomics, Basic Book, New York (,1984 ). (1998), Asian Crisis Themes, and Krugman, P. (1976) Flexible Exchange Rates in the Short Run, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, pp Eatwell,J. and L.Taylor, Global Finance at Risk : The Case for International Regulation, The New Press,2000(,2001 ). Eichengreen,B.(1994), International Monetary Arrangements for the 21st Century, The Brooking Institution ( 21,1997 ). (1996), Gobalizing Capital, Princeton University Press (,1999 ). Feldstein,M.(1998), Refocusing the IMF, Foreign Affairs, March/April ( IMF ). and Horioka, C.(1980), Domestic Saving and International Capital Flows, Economic Journal, 90, pp Fischer,S.(2001), Exchange Rate Regimes : Is the Bipolar View Correct?, Delivered at 20

21 the Meeting of the American Economic Association, New Orleans, January 6.,et al. (1998), Should the IMF Pursue Capital-Account Convertibility?, Princeton : International Financial Section, Department of Economics, Princeton University, Essays in International Finance, No.207, May( IMF,1999 ). Flemming,J.M,(1962) Domestic Financial Policies under Fixed and Floating Exchange Rates, IMF Stuff Papers, Vol.9, pp Frankel, Jeffry A. (1983), Monetary and Portfolio-Balance Models of Exchange Rate Determination, in Bhandari Jagdeep S., and Bluford H. Putnam (eds.), Economic Interdependence and Flexible Exchange Rates, The MIT Press (Cambridge, Mass).pp Frenkel, J.A., and A. Razin (1987) The Mundell-Fleming Model a Quarter Century Later: A Unified Exposition, IMF Staff Papers, 34, December, pp International Financial Institution Advisory Commission(The Meltzer Commission) (2000), Report, Isard,P.(1995), Exchange Rate Economics, Cambridge University Press (,2001 ). Krugman,P. and Obstfeid,M.(2000), International Economics, 5th. edition, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. Marston,R.C.(1985), Stabilization Policy in Open Economy, in R.W.Jones and P.B.Kennen (eds.), Hnadbook of International Economics, vol. II, North-Holland. Mundell,R.A.(1963/1968), Capital Mobility and Stabilization Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science,Vol.29, pp , in Mundel,R.A(1968)., International Economics, Macmillan Co.,New York, ( ),2000 Stiglitz,J.(1998), Boats, Planes and Capital Flows, Financial Times, March 25. (2000), What I Learned at the World Economic Crisis : The Insider, The New Republic, April 17. Swan, T. (1963/1968), Longer Run Problems of the Balance of Payments, in H.W.Arndt and Max Coeden (eds.), The Australian Economy : A Volume of Readings, Melbourne, Cheshire, Reprinted in R.E.Caves and H.G.Johnson (eds.), Readings in International Economics, London : Allen & Unwin. Obstfeid,M.(1998), The Global Capital Market : Benefactor or Menance?, NBER Working Paper, 6559, May. (2000), International Macroeconomics : Beyond the Mundell-Fleming Model, 21

22 NBER Working Paper, No. W8369, July. and K.Rogoff (1996), Foundation of International Macroeconomics, The MIT Press. and A.M.Taylor,(1997), The Great Deppresion as a Watershed : International Capital Mobility over the Lomg Run, NBER Working Paper, 5960, March. Wiliamson,J.(1985), The Exchange Rate System, revised edition, Washington : Institute for International Economics. (2000), Exchange Rate Regimes for Emerging Markets : Reviving the Intermediate Option, Washington : Institute for International Economics, Swptember. (2001), The Case for a BBC Regime for East Asia, Reserve Bank of Australia, July24. (1999a). (1999b) -. (2000)21 No.551,12. (1987) ( )37 12, (1999), 8. (1989) ( ). (2001),. (1994). (1999) (2 ). (1996). (2000),3. (2001), 12. (1992), 6, (1999) 48,1,1-12. (1996)Mundell-Fleming 26 12,

23 1-1 ( ) ( ) ( ) 2-1 EE * DE 23

24 3-1 ( ) 3-2 ( ) (1999) 24

25 3-3 ( ) (1999) 3-4 ( ) 25

26 3-5 (1999) 4-1 (UIP) (flexible prices) (ii* ) ( ) (sticky prices) (CIP) ( =0) (ii*d) (UIP) ( 0) Frankel(1983) 26

27 4-2 27

28 S 4-3 E2 S2 S1 B B M M B M M E3 E1 B i2 i1 i3 i 4-4 S S1 B B E 2 E1 M M M M B B i2 i1 i 28

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IMF http : // htm 1 2 1971 1973 1999 1997 2 IMF 1 1 2 3 1 4 1 2 5 6 1 2 7 IMF http : //www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2006/eng/0706. htm 8 du jure de facto Reinhart Rogoff 20041946 2001 153 Levy-Yeyati Sturzenegger 20051974