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1 u u u 1 2 (Kala (1977)) 3 1

2 (transferable) (crcumstantal) 4 (external resources) (nternal resources) Roemer (1996, p242-7) 2

3 5 (Roemer (1985)) (Roemer (1986, 1987)) 6 (Dworkn s cut) (Equalty of Opportunty for Welfare) (Arneson (1989)) (Bossert (1995) and Fleurbaey (1994, 1995a,b), etc.) 5 (factor-selectve egaltaran) (Fleurbaey (1995c)) 6 (1997) 3

4 (hypothetcal nsurance market) 7 7 (1985) (1971) 4

5 (luck) (opton luck) (brute luck) A B B A A 5

6 ローマーによるドゥウォーキンの資源の平等論批判 (Roemer (1985, 1986, 1994, and 1996)) A B C A B v( ) w( ) C 0 v (C) > w (C) A B v( ) w( ) 1 1 ( C1, C2 ) C, C B 2 2 A A B A B a 1 a 2 a 1 > a 2 u(, ) 6

7 C 0 u( C,a1) v (C),, u( C,a2 ) w (C) u ( C,a2 ) < u( C,a1) C > 0 ( ) u(, ) a1 a 2 1/ 2C 1 max [ u ( C ) ( )] C 1, C 1,a1 + u C2, a2 s.t. C 1 + C 2 = C. 2 2 C 1 A B a 1 C 2 A B a 2 u(, ) : a1 a1 C 0 u( C,a2 ) = u ( C,a1). a2 a2 u ( C, a C 1 1) = u ( C, a C 2 2 ) ( u C (, ) u(, ) C > 0 ) a1 C2 = C1 a2 C 1 > 1 C 2 > C 2 B 7

8 (Roemer (1986, 1987)) n N n m m U (m) R m + u(0) 0 e 1 n m; x; u, L,u x R m + N u (m) U 8 m ( m) m ( ) m e m ( ) : ;(C,a,a ); u A, u B u A, u B (3) U, C 0 u A ( C,a1,0) u A ( C,a1, a2 ) u ( C,a1) u, 0,a ) u C,a, ) u C,a ) B ( C 2 B ( 1 a2 ( 2 8

9 A (e) :={ ( u ) N n R + ( x ) N n R +, x x, u ( x ) u ( N )} A(e) (strctly comprehensve) 0 R n + ( ) e Z(e) F 9 : Σ Axom D : F e : (Essental sngle-valuedness): ( x ) N, ( xˆ ) N F ( e ), N u ( x ) u ( xˆ ) ( N ), (Full correspondence): ( x ) N, ( xˆ ) N Z (e), [ ( x ) N F ( e ) & u ( x ) u ( xˆ ) ( N )] ( xˆ ) N F ( e ) (Roemer (1988,1996)) 10 (PO) (Pareto Optmalty): e, ( xˆ ) N F ( e ). 11 (Sy) (Sy) (Ecomomc Symmetry) : e [ u 1 m; x; u, L,u, u (, N ) ( n,,x n) n x L F ( e )]. n 12 (RMON) (Resource Monotoncty): e 1 1 n m; x; u, L,u, e' [ x x' µ (e) µ ( e' ) ], m; x' ; u, L,u, F F µ F (e) : ( u ( F ( e))) N & F (e) F e. 9

10 (consstency) : (CONRAD) (Consstency of Resource Allocaton across Dmenson) 13 : e' m n + l;( x, y); u 1, L,u u ( m+ l) U ( N ) ( xˆ, ŷ ) F ( e ' ) y N 1 m : x R m +, * u ( x ) = u ( x, ŷ ) ( N ). u * ( 0 ) 0 ( N ) u * (m) U e * * 1 *n m; x; u, L,u A e ) ( e' ) ( * A ) N ( xˆ F ( * e ) 4 : ((Roemer (Roemer (1986, 1988))): (PO), (Sy), (RMON), 13 10

11 (CONRAD) F 4 4 (Sy) CONRAD 17 7 e' ;(C,a,a ); u e' (reduced economy) A, u B 14 RMON CONRAD 15 PO 16 Roemer (1994; chap. 7) 4 17 (Scanlon (1986)) CONRAD Roemer (1994; chap. 7; pp.178-9) CONRAD (PP) (Perversty Preventon) PO, Sy, RMON, PP 4 2 PP : m+2 (PP) (Perversty Preventon): u, v U 2 : m (1) x R +, y R+, u ( x, y,0) = v ( x, 0, y), (2) z R +, u ( x, 0, z) = u ( x, 0, 0) = v ( x, 0, 0) = v ( x,z,0). e = m + 2;( x,a,b ), u, v, a b, e * m; x; u*,v* m x + =, R, u * ( x) = u( x,a, 0) & v * ( x) = v( x, 0, b ) v( F 2 ( e)) v* ( F ( e* )) 2 11

12 * e 1 ;C ;v, w e' e * CONRAD * F ( e ' ) F ( e ) A B A B ** e 1 ;C ;v',w' v' v, w' w e' (reduced economy) e' e ** ** CONRAD F ( e ' ) F ( e ) CONRAD B CONRAD (Roemer (1988)) CONRAD 18 : (W) (Welfarsm): e, e', [ A(e) A( e' ) µ (e) µ ( e' ) ]. F F 4. (Roemer (1985,1986)) (Arneson (1989)) (Cohen 18 Σ W CONRAD Axom D CONRAD W Σ Axom D W CONRAD 12

13 (1989,1993)) 15 (Roemer (1996;chap.8)) (Fleurbaey(1994,1995a,b)) (Bossert (1995)) (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996,1999a,b)) (responsble factors) (non-responsble factors) 19 (prncple of natural reward) (Fleurbaey (1995b)) : (prncple of compensaton) (Fleurbaey (1995b)) 20 (Fleurbaey(1994,1995a)) (Bossert (1995)) (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996,1999a)) (skll) Fleurbaey(1994,1995a,b) Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996,1999a) (Dworkn s cut) Bossert (1995) 20 Fleurbaey and Manquet (1999b) 21 (Dworkn (1981b)) 13

14 4.1 (Fleurbaey(1994,1995a)) (EREH) (EWEP) N = { 1,L, n} y R + Y R R + Y y ω R + + y = ( y 1, L, y n ) R = ( R 1, L,R n ) e = ( N, y,r, ω) D e ω Z (e) : = { x R n + N x ω } φ : D R n + e D φ (e) = x Z(e) φ (e) : (EREH) (Equal Resource for Equal Handcap): e D,, N, [ y y φ ( e) = φ ( e) ]. = (EWEP) (Equal Welfare for Equal Preference): 22 Iturbe and Neto (1996) 23 (Roemer (1985,1986)) 24 Fleurbaey(1995a) 14

15 e D,, N, R = R ( φ ( e), y ) I ( φ ( e), y ), [ or e) 0 & (0, y ) R ( ( e), y ), φ = or φ ( e ) = 0 &( 0, y )R ( φ ( e ), y ) ]. ( φ φ { 1, 2, 3, 4} N = y 1 = y2 y 3 = y4 R 1 = R R 2 = R4 R 1 = R3 u( x, y) x y R = u' ( x, y) x y ω 3 2 R 4 : EREH*: e D, [, N, y = y ] [, N, φ ( e) = φ ( e) ]. EWEP*: e D, [, N, R = R ] [, N, ( e), y ) I ( φ ( e), y ) ( φ, or e) 0 & (0, y ) R ( φ ( e), y ), φ = or φ ( e ) = 0 &( 0, y )R ( φ ( e ), y ) ]. ( EREH* EWEP* 2 y~ Y R ~ y~ -EREH*: R ~ -EWEP*: e D,[ N, y ~ = y ] [, N, φ ( e) = φ ( e) ]. e D,[ N, R R ~ ~ = ] [, N, φ ( e), y ) I ( φ ( e), y ), ( Fleurbaey(1994) 15

16 φ e) = 0 & (0, y ) R ~ ( φ ( e), y ), or φ e) = 0 & (0, y ) R ~ ( φ ( e), y ) ]. ( ( y~ ~ y y ~ R ~ R ~ R ~ φ NE, N e D NE φ (e) y I NE φ (e) y φ NE φ NE 16

17 R ~ R ~ B (e) x B (e) N N x y I x y N x y I x y E( e, x) (, ) N N x y P x y φ BME e D φ BME BME (e) B (e) x B (e) E( e, φ ( e)) E( e, x) e D x Z(e) ( e, x) N φ MEI max EI ( e, x) max EI ( e, ( e)) N MEI φ EI mn δ R N x δ y R x y I m G N G m G e D m { 1,L, n} m MUD ( ) N, G I, N, k G, ( φ ( e), y ) I p ( ) p < m, x Z( e), N, G I, N, k G, ( x φ MUD k MUD ( φ ( e), y ), y ) P ( x, y ) k 17

18 R ~ R ~ (Fleurbaey(1995a)): : φ R~ CE R ~ - ( R ~ -Condtonal Equalty) e D,, N, ~ ( φ ( e), y ) I ( φ ( e), y ), or φ e) = 0 & (0, y ) R ~ ( φ ( e), y ), or φ e) = 0 & (0, y ) R ~ ( φ ( e), y ). 25 ( ( R ~ - φ R~ CE EREH R ~ -EWEP = : (Fleurbaey(1995a)): φ ~ y EE y ~ - = ( ~ y -egaltaran equvalent) : e D, ~ x R +, N, ~ yee ( ( ) ) ( x~, y~ φ e, y I y~ ), or [ φ EE (e) = 0 & ( 0, y ) R ( x~, ~ y ) ]. 26 y~ EE y~ - = φ ~ y -EREH EWEP = : e = ( N, y,r, ω) D φ x Z(e) N G 25 well-defned Fleurbaey(1995a) 26 well-defned Fleurbaey(1995a) 18

19 e G := ( G, yg,rg, x ) yg = ( y ) G RG = ( R ) N : G (CON)(Consstency; Thomson (1988)): φ G (e) =φ ( e G ), G (e) e D, G N, (φ ( )). φ := e G (CON) EWEP EREH (Fleurbaey(1995a)) R ~ -EWEP y ~ -EREH : (Fleurbaey(1995a)): R ~ - φ R~ CE ~ y - = φ CON EREH EREH R ~ -EWEP ~ y EE y ~ -EREH EWEP CON EREH EWEP = 2 well-defned = 2 (EWEP) φ R~ CE (EREH)

20 R + Y R u : N, u ( x, y ) x v ( y ). v ( y ) w N, u ( x, y ) x v ( w, y ) v( w, y ) f ( w, y ) (pre-ncome functon) w y x u ( x, y ) (post-ncome) ω = 0 x = 0 ( u ( x, y )) N N ( u ( x, y )) (redstrbuton rule) n N F : W Y n R n + : ( w, y) := (( w, y ) N ) W n Y n, F ( w, y) = ( u ( x, y )) N & F ( w, y) = f ( w, ). F F : (IRF)(Independence of Responsble Factors; Bossert (1995)): N N y ( w, y), ( w', y) W n Y n, F ( w, y) = F ( w ', y). 27 Bossert (1995), Bossert and Fluerbaey (1996), Iturbe (1997), Sprumont (1997), Bossert, Fleurbaey, and Van de gaer (1999) 28 Fluerbaey and Manquet (1999b) 20

21 (ETEH)(Equal Transfer for Equal Handcap; Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)): ( w, y) W n Y n,, N, [ y = y F ( w, y) ( w, y ) f F ( w, y) w, y ) f ( ]. (ETUH)(Equal Transfer for Unform Handcap; Bossert (1995)): ( w, y) W n Y n, [, N, y y = ] [ N, F ( w, y) = w, y ) f ( ]. (ETRH)(Equal Transfer for Reference Handcap; Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)): ( w, y) W n Y n, [ N, y ~ = y ] [ N F ( w, y) = w, y ), f ( ]. F : (GS)(Group Soldarty n Handcaps; Bossert (1995)): ( w, y), ( w, y' ) W n Y n,, N, F ( w, y) F (, y' ) w F ( w, y) F (, y' ) w. (EIER) (EIER)(Equal Income for Equal Responsble Factor; Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)): ( w, y) W n Y n,, N, [ w = w F ( w, y) = F (, y) w ]. (EIUR) (EIUR)(Equal Income for Unform Responsble Factor; Bossert (1995)): ( w, y) W n n Y, [, N, w = w ] [, N, F ( w, y) = F (, y) w ]. (EIRR) (EIRR)(Equal Income for Reference Responsble Factor; Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)): ( w, y) W n n Y, [ N, w = w ~ ] [, N, F ( w, y) = F (, y) w ]

22 29 IRF GS (Bossert (1995)) f : f : W Y R (Bossert (1995)): + W Y : h : Y g : W R R ( w, y) W Y, f ( w, y) = g( w) + h( y)., : (Bossert (1995)): F 0 : ( w, y) W n Y n, N, n W Y n n + R : 0 1 F ( w, y) : g( w ) h( n (Bossert (1995)): (1) F IRF EIUR f F F 0 (2) F GS ETUH f F F 0 N y ). Bossert (1995) w ~ - w ~ CE F (w ~ -Condtonally Egaltaran redstrbuton rule) = ~ y - = ~ F y EE ( y ~ -Egaltaran-Equvalent redstrbuton rule) (Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)) F y~ F EE R~ CE w~ CE φ φ EE : y ~ 29 ETEH EIER 22

23 (Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996)): (1) F GS ETRH ~ F F y EE (2) F IRF EIRR F F w~ CE

24 (Bossert (1995)) 4.3. (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996,1999a) 30 (cooperatve producton economes) 31 N # N n s := ( s ) N R n + R X :=[ 0, x] R + [ 0, x] x R + z ( x, y ) X X R R := ( R ) N f : R + R + x R +, f (x) y f e : ( N,s,R, f ) E e ( N,s,R, f ) E z := ( z ) N ( x, y ) N X n y f N s N x 30 Bossert, Fleurbaey, and Van de gaer (1999), Fleurbaey and Manquet (1997), Gaspart (1998), Manquet (1998) (self-ownershp) Mouln and Roemer (1989), Roemer and Slvestre (1989,1993), Mouln (1990), Yoshhara (1998) (1999) Fleurbaey and Manquet (1999a) Gaspart (1998) 31 (talent) (Dworkn (1981b)) 24

25 e Z(e) ϕ e E (NEES)(No-Envy among Equally Sklled: Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996)): e ( N,s,R, f ) E, z ϕ (e),, N [ s = s z R z & z, R z ]. (NDES)(No-Domnaton among Equally Sklled: Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996)): e ( N,s,R, f ) E, z ϕ (e),, N, [ s = s z z or z z or z z ]. (NEUS)(No-Envy among Unformly Sklled: Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996)): e ( N,s,R, f ) E, z (e) [, N, s = ϕ, s ] [, N, z R z & (NEZS)(No-Envy among Zero-Sklled: Fleurbaey and Manquet (1999b)): e ( N,s,R, f ) E, z ϕ (e),, N [ s = s = 0 ] [, N, z, R z & z z R R z ]. z ]. ( ) (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996,1999a,b) (Maskn Monotoncty; Maskn (1977)) : (MM)(Maskn Monotoncty; Maskn (1977)): e ( N,s,R, f ), e ' = ( N,s,R', f ) E, z ϕ (e), z' Z (e), 25

26 [ N, z R z' z R' z' ] z' ϕ ( e' ). (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1997)) MM NEES : 32 (ETE) (ETE)(Equal Treatment for Equal): e ( N,s,R, f ) E, z ϕ (e), N, [ s = s & R = R ] z I z. (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996)) : (EWEP) (Equal Welfare for Equal Preference): e ( N,s,R, f ) E, z ϕ (e),, N, [ R = R z I z ]. (EWUP) (Equal Welfare for Unform Preference): e ( N,s,R, f ) E, z ϕ (e),[, N, R = R ] [, N, I z z ]. (EWURP) (Equal Welfare for Unform Reference Preference): R ~ e = ( N,s,R, f ) E, z ϕ (e),[ N, R = R ~ ] [, N, I z z ]. (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1999a)) : (SS) (Skll Soldarty; Fleurbaey and Manquet (1999a)): e ( N,s,R, f ), e ' = ( N,s',R, f ) E, z ϕ (e), z' ϕ ( e' ), [ N z R z' ] or [ N z ' R z ].,, (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1999a)) 32 (SPI) (Supportng Prce Independence; Nagahsa (1991), Yoshhara (1998)), (PI) (Pareto Independence; Gaspart (1998), Yoshhara (1998)) SPI PI (Gaspart (1998)) SPI PI 26

27 SS EWEP : (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996)): ϕ NDES EWEP (No-envy and effcent allocaton rule; Foley (1967)) well-defned NEES EWEP well-defned (Pazner and Schmedler (1978)) (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996,1999a,b) = R ~ - X B( z,s, p) p s z X m( R,B( z,s, p)) R B( z,s, p) : (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996)): R ~ ϕ R~ RWEB R ~ - ( R ~ -RWEB)( R ~ -Reference Welfare Equvalent RWEB R ~ RWEB Budget) : z ϕ (e), p =( p x, p y ) R 2 +, s.t. p e z &, N, m( R ~,B( z,s, p)) I ~ m( R ~,B( z,s, p)). R ~ -RWEB (EIW)(Equal Income Walrasan Rule; Pazner and Schmedler (1978b) 33 ) (EB)(Equal Beneft rule; Varan (1974), Roemer and (Yoshhara (1998,1999)) 33 Pazner and Schmedler (1978b) - - (Full-Income-Far allocaton rule) 27

28 Slvestre (1989) 34 ) 2 2 EIW EB R ~ -RWEB EWEP MM : (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996)): R ~ 35 R ~ -RWEB RWEB MM, EWRP, (CI) 36 (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996) EWEP NEUS well-defned : (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996)): ϕ X : X e ( N,s,R, f ) E, z ϕ (e), (1) z e ; (2) p =( p x, p y ) R 2 +, s.t. p e z, & N, z I m( R,B( z,s, p)), k e. k k EWUP NEES well-defned : (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996)): ϕ Y : Y e ( N,s,R, f ) E, z ϕ (e), (1) z e ; (2) p =( p x, p y ) R 2 +, s.t. p e z, 34 Varan (1974) - (Wealth-Far allocaton rule) (CI) (Contracton Independence; Mouln (1990)): e ( N,s,R, f ), e ' = ( N,s,R, g) E, s.t. x R+, g( x) f ( x), z ϕ (e), [ z Z(e' ) z ϕ ( e' ) ]. 28

29 &, N, m( Rˆ,B( z,s, p)) Î m( R,B( z,s. p)), Rˆ û (z) := mn { u (z) N } & u R : u (z) r zi ( 0, r) or zi ( r,0). = : (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1999a)): ϕ 0EE = 0EE ϕ, (Egaltaran Equvalent rule) : e E, y 0 R +, z ( e) (1) z e ; (2) N, z I 0, y ) ( 0. (Fleurbaey and Manquet (1999b) = ϕ SS NEZS = = 0EE 4.4. (responsblty) 29

30 (Fleurbaey (1995b,1998)) (responsblty over factors) (responsblty over outcome) (Fleurbaey (1995b, 1998)) (responsblty by control) (responsblty by delegaton) (lberty) 30

31 (Arneson (1989)) 31

32 (NEES) 2 NEES (EWEP) EWEP 2 EWEP EWEP (socal choce correspondence) 33 [Kranch(1994); Gotoh and Yoshhara (1999; 1999a); Yoshhara (2000)] (dstrbuton rule) 33 [Bossert (1995), etc.,] [Fleurbaey and Manquet (1996;1999)] 32

33 (game form) [Gotoh and Yoshhara (1999; 1999a); Yoshhara (2000)] [Kranch(1994), Gotoh and Yoshhara (1999; 1999a), Yoshhara (2000))] 33

34 : Arneson, R., Equalty and Equal Opportunty for Welfare. Phlosophcal Stdes 56, Bnmore, K., Socal Contract I: Harsany and Rawls. The Economc Journal 99, Bossert, W., Redstrbuton Mechansms Based on Indvdual Characterstcs. Mathematcal Socal Scence 29, Bossert, W. and Fleurbaey, M., Redstrbuton and Compensaton. Socal Choce and Welfare 13, Bossert, W. and Fleurbaey, M., and Van de gaer, D., Responsblty, Talent, and Compensaton: A Second-best Analyss. Revew of Economc Desgn 4, Cohen, G. A., Nozck on Appropraton. New Left Revew 150, Self-Ownershp, World Ownershp, and Equalty: Part 2. Socal Phlosophy & Polcy 3, On the Currency of Egaltaran Justce. Ethcs 99, Equalty of What? On Welfare, Goods, and Capabltes. n M. Nussbaum and A. K. Sen (ed.), The Qualty of Lfe, Oxford Unversty Press: Oxford. Aspremont, C. and Gevers, L., Equty and the Informatonal Bass of Collectve Choce. Revew of Economc Studes 44, Dworkn, R., 1981a. What s Equalty? Part 1: Equalty of Welfare. Phlosophy & Publc Affars 10, b. What s Equalty? Part 2: Equalty of Resources. Phlosophy & Publc Affars 10,

35 Fleurbaey, M., On Far Compensaton. Theory and Decson 36, a. Three Solutons to the Compensaton Problem. Journal of Economc Theory 65, b. Equalty and Responsblty. European Economc Revew 39, c. The Requste of Equal Opportunty. n W. A. Barnet, H. Mouln, M. Salles, and N. J. Schofeld (ed.), Socal Choce, Welfare, and Ethcs, Cambrdge Unversty Press: Cambrdge. 1995d. Equal Opportunty or Equal Socal Outcome. Economcs and Phlosophy 11, Equalty among Responsble Indvduals. n J. F. Lasler, M. Fleurbaey, N. Gravel, and A. Trannoy (ed.), Freedom n Economcs: New Perspectves n Normatve Analyss, Routledge. Fleurbaey, M. and Manquet, F., Far Allocaton wth Unequal Prpducton Sklls: the No-Envy Approach to Compensaton. Mathematcal Socal Scences 32, Implementablty and Horzontal Equty Imply No-envy. Econometrca 65, a. Far Allocaton wth Unequal Prpducton Sklls: the Soldarty Approach to Compensaton. Socal Choce and Welfare 16, b. Compensaton and Responsblty. mmeo. Foley, D., Resource Allocaton and the Publc Sector. Yale Economc Essays 7, Gartener, W., Pattanak, P.K., and Suzumura, K., Indvdual Rghts Revsed. Economca 59, Gaspart, F., Obectve Measures of Well-Beng and the Cooperatve Producton 35

36 Problem. Socal Choce and Welfare 15, Independence wth respect to Preferences: Two Obectve Propertes. mmeo. Gauther, D., Barganng and Justce. Socal Phlosophy & Polcy 2, Gotoh, R., and Yoshhara, N., 1999a. A Game Form Approach to Theores of Dstrbutve Justce: Formalzng the Needs Prncple. n de Swart, Harre., eds., Logc, Game Theory and Socal Choce, Tlburg: Tlburg Unversty Press, b. A Class of Far Dstrbuton Rules à la Rawls and Sen. Mmeo mmeo. Hammond, P. J., Equty, Arrow s Condtons, and Rawls Dfference Prncple. Econometrca 44, Equty n Two Person Stuatons: Some Consequences. Econometrca 47, Herrero, C., Capabltes and Utltes. Economc Desgn 2, Herrero, C., Iturbe-Ormaetxe, I., and Neto, J., Rankng Opportunty Profles on the Bass of the Common Opportuntes. Mathematcal Socal Scences 35, Iturbe-Ormaetxe, I., Redstrbuton and Indvdual Characterstcs. Revew of Economc Desgn 3, Iturbe-Ormaetxe, I., and Neto, J., On Far Allocaton and Monetary Compensaton. Economc Theory 7, Kala, E., Proportonal Solutons to Barganng Stuatons: Interpersonal Utlty Comparson. Econometrca 45, Kranch, L., Equal Dvson, Effcency, and the Soveregn Supply of Labor. 36

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繰り返しゲームの新展開：

繰り返しゲームの新展開： CIRJE-J-65 001 10 001 10 5 New Progress n Repeated Games: Implct Colluson wth Prvate Montorng Htosh Matsushma Faculty of Economcs, Unversty of Tokyo October 5, 001 Abstract The present paper provdes a