Graduate School of Policy and Management, Doshisha University 27 2011 11 2011 2011 10 2013 1950 1 1953 12 atoms for peace 2 3 1948 1960 1956 4 1958 1 1955 2 1957 IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 3 2011 69 73 2009 35 37 4 1948 1990 2001 2008 2013 2013
28 5 1959 10 6 2011 7 23 8 4 5 20,716MW 150,327GWh 34.8% 2013 6~7 1978 2013 23 35 2008 2006 14.6% 2030 28.7% 9 2013 10 1990 IAEA 1996 IAEA 11 IAEA IAEA 2011 11 2011 12 5 1967 6 1967 1999 2011 7 2011 2013 8 9 2013 2006 2008 11 10 11 Convention on Nuclear Safety 12
29 42% 38.8% 19.2% 17.1% 53% 22.3% 7.3% 0.3% 6.1% 48.2% 34.4% 11.4% 2011 16 28 13 16.9% 23.8% 59.3% 5.5% 32.5% 36.8% 23% 2.2% 2.4% 27.1% 43.7% 26.8% 14 2011 10 2013 15 16 17 Moe Moe insulate 18 Gilardi time horizon 13 http://www.keei.re.kr 2013 14 1997 15 2013 257 16 2006 Moe (2005) Gilardi (2002) 17 A.Dixit, Incentives and Organizations in the Public Sector: An Interpretation Review, The Journal of Human Resources, Vol.37, No.4, 2002, pp.696-727. 18 T.M.Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, American Journal of Political Science, Vol.26, No.4, 1982, p.202
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31 23 24 25 26 Horn 1995 Lewis 2003 2003 2003 Wood&Bohte 2004 2003;2008 Horn 27 the cost of legislative decision making and private participation commitment problem agency costs the cost of uncertainty Horn 28 Horn enacting coalition lifetime income Horn rationally ignorant 23 49 1998 188 24 137 1995 64 25 1999 1999 79 80 26 46 1996 46 27 M.J.Horn, The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp.13-24. 28 Horn 1998
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33 2012 171 1978 35 2011 11 IAEA IAEA 36 IAEA 35 1981 1982 36 2011 2011
34 201121 37 2012 12 19 18 38 39 18 40 18 22 41 18 37 10 38 2003 39 18 2012 125 126 40 18 2013 25 22 41 2013 23
35 2013 2 26 42 2013 22 43 44 42 2013 17 2013 31 43 12 2003 83 84 44 2003 83
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37 47 2011 11 2009 48 12 2010 49 11 2008 18 153 81 25 40 299 2011 2011 27 38 10 26 2012 19 12 2011 27 17 11 10 50 2010 36 47 2000 48 49 2013 50 2011 28
38 2011 51 3.11 2011 IAEA IAEA 52 17 53 191 189 2011 29 18 2011 2013 54 25 22 2012 19 152 127 21 300 51 Vol.507 2011 61 52 301 2011 16 20 53 301 2011 17 12 54 2013 29
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