3 ING 1998 2001 16 2 13 3 23
1 1 2 Herring and Santomero 1990 (1992) 3 2 Berger, Hanweck and Humphre(1987) 3 4 1 2 4 3 3 4 1 2 (2003) 3 Group of Ten (2001) 4 24
Berger, Hanweck and Humphre(1987) 1 2 3 4 5 Panzar and Willig(1981) Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) economies of product mix Pulle, Berger and Humphere(1994) Lang and Welzel(1998) Herring and Santomero 1990 1 Herring and Santomero 1990 2 (2003) 3 (2003) 3 ING 1998 2001 3 1 16 2 2 13 3 3 4 2 2.1 2 1 2 2 c 1 2 c 2 5 Panzar and Willig(1981) 25
c 2 c 1 c 2 + t c 1 c 2 + t c 1 1:. u(c 1 ) + βu(c 2 ) 6 1 c 1 2 c 2 1 t 1 λ max u(c 1 ) + βu(c 2 ) subject to c 1 + c 2 + tc 1 + tc 2 c 1 : u (c 1 ) = λ( + t) c 2 : βu (c 2 ) = λ( + t) u (c 1 ) βu (c 2 ) = + t + t 1 p1+t p 2+t 45 1 u (c) βu (c) = 1 β + t + t < 1 β c 1 > c 2 + t + t > 1 β c 1 < c 2 2 6 u(c 1, c 2 ) (1) 26
1 β < + t + t c 1 = c 2 1 β > + t + t c 1 < c 2 c 1 > c 2 + t + t 1 β 2:. c 2 + t c 1 c 2 c 1 c 2 + t c 1 3:. 1. (, ) (c 1, c 2 ) +t +t < 1 β c 1 > c 2 +t +t > 1 β c 1 < c 2 +t +t = 1 β c 1 = c 2 2.2 1 t 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 (c 1, c 2 ) t max {c 1, c 2 } 1 t max u(c 1 ) + βu(c 2 ) subject to c 1 + c 2 + t max {c 1, c 2 } 27
c 2 + t c 1 c 2 c 1 c 2 + t c 1 4:. 1 β < + t + t 1 β + t 1 β > + t c 1 < c 2 c 1 = c 2 c 1 > c 2 + t + t 1 β 5:. c 1 c 2 c 1 + c 2 + tc 1 = ( + t)c 1 + c 2 c 1 c 2 c 1 + c 2 + tc 2 = c 1 + ( + t)c 2 = 3 c 1 c 2 +t c 1 c 2 p1 +t 3 45 4 45 u (c) βu (c) = 1 β + t 1 β + t c 1 = c 2 c 1 < c 2 + t > 1 β + t c 1 > c 2 5 < 1 β 28
2. (, ) t (c 1, c 2 ) p 1 2+t β p1+t = c 1 = c 2, +t > 1 β = c 1 < c 2, +t < 1 β = c 1 > c 2. c 1 = c 2 1 β c 1 < c 2 45 1 β c 1 > c 2 45 1 β +t +t +t < +t +t 1 β +t c 1 = c 2 +t > 1 β c 1 < c 2 +t < 1 β c 1 > c 2 2.3 (, ) p1+t p 2+t 45 (c 0 1, c 0 2) (c 1 1, c 1 2) c 0 1 > c 0 2 3 1 c 1 1 > c 1 2 2 c 1 1 = c 1 2 3 c 1 1 < c 1 2 1 +t +t < 1 β 2 3 3. (, ) t (c 0 1, c 0 2) (c 1 1, c 1 2) p1+t p < 1 2+t β c0 1 > c 0 2 1 p1+t < 1 β c1 1 > c 1 2 2 1 β p1+t c 1 1 = c 1 2 1 1 ( + t)c 1 1 + c 1 2 = +t i q i 1 ( + t, + t) ( + t, ) max u(c 1 ) + βu(c 2 ) subject to q 1 c 1 + q 2 c 2 = c1 : u (c 1 ) λq 1 = 0 c2 : βu (c 2 ) λq 2 = 0 λ : q 1 c 1 + q 2 c 2 = 29
u (c 1 ) 0 q 1 0 βu (c 2 ) q 2 q 1 q 2 0 u (c 1 )dc 1 q 1 dλ = λdq 1 βu (c 2 )dc 2 q 2 dλ = λdq 2 q 1 dc 1 q 2 dc 2 = d + c 1 dq 1 + c 2 dq 2 dc 1 dc 2 dλ = 1 u (c 1 ) 0 q 1 0 βu (c 2 ) q 2 q 1 q 2 0 Ax = b dc 1 dc 2 dλ λdq 1 λdq 2 d + c 1 dq 1 + c 2 dq 2 = 0 λdq 2 c 2 dq 2 A = q 2 1u (c 1 ) q 2 1βu (c 2 ) = q 2 1(u (c 1 ) + βu (c 2 )) > 0 A 1 b A 1 0 0 q 1 A 1 = λdq 2 βu (c 2 ) q 2 = q 1 (βu (c 2 )c 2 + q 2 λ)dq 2 c 2 dq 2 q 2 0 dc 1 = A 1 A = (βu (c 2 )c 2 + q 2 λ) q 1 (u (c 1 ) + βu (c 2 )) dq 2 dc 1 = A 1 = (βu (c 2 )c 2 + q 2 λ) dq 2 A q 1 (u (c 1 ) + βu (c 2 )) A 2 b A 2 u (c 1 ) 0 q 1 A 1 = 0 λdq 2 q 2 = (q 1λ 2 q 2 u (c 1 )c 2 )dq 2 q 1 c 2 dq 2 0 (2) dc 2 = A 2 A = (q2 1λ q 2 u (c 1 )c 2 ) q 2 1 (u (c 1 ) + βu (c 2 )) dq 2 dc 2 = A 2 = (q2 1λ q 2 u (c 1 )c 2 ) dq 2 A q1 2(u (c 1 ) + βu (c 2 )) > 0 (3) 2 q 2 + t dq 2 < 0 (3) dc 2 > 2 1 (2) 1 2 t 30
c 2 + t c 1 c 2 c 1 c 2 + t c 1 6:. 1 1 2 2 1 2 6 12 (4) + t + t < 1 β + t (4) + t + t < 1 β c 1 > c 2 (4) + t 1 β + t c 1 = c 2 2 c 1 = c 2 c 1 = c 2 c ( + t)c = c = + t 1 c > c 0 2 1 2.4 31
1 2 µ µ > 0 c 0 1 > c 0 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 3 2 2 (2003) 2 3 7 3.1 ING Bureau van Dijk Bankscope ISIS Bankscope ISIS 50% 8 50% ING 3 18 9 9 68 10 58 32 5 23 4 R 9 7 8 Bureau van Dijk Bureau van Dijk Ownership Database total ownership Bureau van Dijk 9 32
net interest revenue + commission revenue gross premium written E earning assets total investments 1 ING Group 247 448 3 1,498 9 14,474 23,382 301 103,125 1,622 1,760 98 5,007 9 9,562 16,247 137 54,081 Allianz Group 615 1,578 18 5,339 10 38,937 103,737 674 349,849 984 1,817 0 8,310 58 4,374 13,678 5 91,619 Credit Suisse Group 1,491 2,632 27 6,748 5 36,231 59,925 363 155,692 1,096 1,948 12 9,322 23 5,138 12,195 25 57,680 906 1,238 103 3,048 4 54,842 92,831 6 215,624. 1: 2001. 1998 2001 4 ln R i,t = a o + a 1 ln E i,t + a 2 ln R i,t + u i,t (5) R i,t i t E i,t t R i,t i Ēi,t i R i,t Ēi,t R i a 2 a 2 a 2 i a 2 i (5) Ēi,t (5) R i,t ln R i,t = a o + a 1 ln E i,t + a 2 ln Ēi,t + u i,t (6) 33
Sample a 2 (5) a 2 (6) t Adj.R 2 t Adj.R 2 ING Group 36 -.0004 -.0855.9746.0000 -.0216.9746 Allianz Group 40 -.0126-1.1545.9628 -.0028-1.2993.9631 Credit Swiss Grou0.0610.9946.9866.0015.6106.9862 ING Group 36 1.2989 1.8766 *.7685.0224 2.0356 **.7723 Allianz Grou32.0378.3876.6522.0007.5314.6524 Credit Swiss Group 92 -.0281 -.6889.8994 -.0020-1.0549.9001 ING Group - - - - - - - Allianz Group - - - - - - - Credit Swiss Grou2.1558 1.9822 *.9579.0074 1.5977.9529 ** 5% * 10%. 2:. (5) (6) a 2 2 ING 5% 10% 10% (2003) 10 ((7) ) ((8) ) 10% (1) otherbank (2) other-insurance ln R i,t = a 0 + a 1 ln E i,t + a 2 R other bank i,t + a 3 R other insurance i,t + u i,t R other bank i,t a 2 R other insurance i,t a 3 10 3 3 C overheads underwriting expense ln C i,t = a o + a 1 ln T i,t + a 2 ln T i,t + u i,t (7) ln C i,t = a o + a 1 ln E i,t + a 2 ln Ēi,t + ui,t (8) T E (7) (8) a 2. 7 C i,t i t T i,t t T i,t i T i,t i T i,t T i a 2 a 2 a 2 i a 2 i (8) (7) T E 34
Sample a 2 (7) a 2 (8) t Adj.R 2 t Adj.R 2 ING Group 36.4793.3945.8569.5703.4429.8532 Allianz Group 40.7442.5657.7624.7120.5195.7622 Credit Swiss Grou0.1433.0758.8757.1706.0977.8734 ING Group 36.4956.5005.7609.5628.5319.7443 Allianz Grou32.2920.8525.8590.4316 1.1791.8510 Credit Swiss Group 92.1175.1639.8725.1475.1956.8389 ING Group - - - - - - - Allianz Group - - - - - - - Credit Swiss Grou2.7498.5016.9638 2.4606.5978.7376 ** 5% * 10%. 3:. a 2 a 3 Sample t t Adj.R 2 Credit Suisse Grou2.2141 2.2055 *.0971.9979.9628 ** 5% * 10%. 4: Credit Suisse Group. 3.2 2 2 11 BankScope 700 73 ISIS 300 32 15 2000 2002 2 Allianz Deutsche Bank 4 ING ABN AMRO SNS Reaal Eureko 6 Credit Agricole S.A. BNP Paribas Caisse d Epargne Societe Generale Credit Mutuel Banque Populaire 3 Fortis Dexia Almanij 11 (1992) 35
2 2 2 R R 1 + R 2 + + Y (Y B ) (Y I ) 5 5,199 4,256 184 17,559 3,547 2,846 48 10,834 11,595 17,130 131 55,133 253,364 136,922 7,271 445,095 60,077 86,819 366 331,450. 5: 2002 15. R = r B Y B + r I Y I R r B Y B r I Y I r B, r I Y B, Y I r B = r B (Y B, Y I ), r I = r I (Y B, Y I ) R = r B (Y B, Y I )Y B + r I (Y B, Y I )Y I ln R = a 0 + a B ln Y B + 1 2 a BB(ln Y B ) 2 + a I ln Y I + 1 2 a II(ln Y I ) 2 + a BI ln Y B ln Y I (9) Y B, Y I R 1 1 R(Y B, Y I ) > R(Y B, 0) + R(0, Y I ) 2 B I 2 R Y B Y I > 0 36
2 R = R ( 2 ln R + ln R ln R ) > 0 Y B Y I Y B Y I ln Y B ln Y I ln Y B ln Y I R Y B Y I > 0 2 ln R + ln R ln R ln Y B ln Y I ln Y B ln Y I = a BI + (a B + a BB ln Y B + a BI ln Y I ) (a I + a BI ln Y B + a II ln Y I ) SCOP E(B, I) > 0 Y B 1 Y I 1 SCOP E(B, I) = a BI + a B a I > 0 ln R ln Y B + ln R ln Y I 1 ln R + ln R 1 ln Y B ln Y I = a B + a BB ln Y B + a BI ln Y I + a I + a BI ln Y B + a II ln Y I 1 Scale(B, I) > 0 Y B 1 Y I 1 Scale(B, I) = a B + a I 1 > 0 6 R 1 R 2 SCOP E(B, I) 12 3.3 3 2 12 3 GDP 37
R R 1 R 2 Y B Y I Sample 45 45 Adj.R 2.8920.9168 a 0 -.0923 -.0397 a B.3228 ***.5105 *** a I.6661 ***.5465 *** a BB.2061 ***.2872 *** a BI -.1294 *** -.1667 *** a II.1614 ***.1273 *** Scale -.0111.0570 (-.0951) (.5689) SCOP E(B, I).0856.1123 * (.9951) ( 1.6618) *** 1% ** 5% * 10%. R 1 + R 2 ++ Scale SCOP E(B, I) ( ) t 6:. (9) Y 1 Y 2 Y 3 3 3 ln R = a 0 + a i ln Y i + 1 3 3 a ij ln Y i ln Y j (10) 2 13 i=1 i=1 j=1 R R 1 + R 2 + + Y (Y 1 ) (Y 2 ) (Y 3 ) 3 2 3 SCOP E(i, j) = a ij + a i a j > 0 (i, j = 1, 2, 3) 13 7 1 Deutsche Bank 4 ING ABN AMRO SNS Reaal Eureko 5 Credit Agricole S.A. BNP Paribas Caisse d Epargne Societe Generale Banque Populaire 2 Fortis Almanij 38
4,578 2,918 184 9,845 3,709 2,951 48 10,834 9,318 13,861 131 52,284 53,476 36,531 13,333 133,203 99,578 63,825 2,991 205,976 42,703 52,440 366 195,831. 7: 2002 12. 14 Y 1 Y 2 Y 3 SCOP E(1, 2) = a 12 + a 1 a 2 > 0 SCOP E(2, 3) = a 23 + a 2 a 3 > 0 SCOP E(1, 3) = a 13 + a 1 a 3 > 0 2 SCOP E(1, 3) = a 13 + a 1 a 3 > 0 8 SCOP E(1, 3) = a 13 + a 1 a 3 > 0 1% 15 SCOP E(2, 3) = a 23 + a 2 a 3 > 0 1% 16 14 Scale = a 1 + a 2 + a 3 1 > 0 15 16 3 GDP 39
R R 1 R 2 1 Y 1 2 Y 2 Y 3 Sample 36 36 Adj.R 2.9699.9674 a 0 -.0115.0827 a 1.4818 ***.3029 *** a 2 -.2052 **.0435 a 3.5751 ***.4964 *** a 11.1095 -.2319 a 12 -.0858 -.0122 a 13.1793 **.1441 * a 22.1648.2007 a 23 -.4564 *** -.4481 *** a 33.2460 ***.2331 *** Scale -.1483 * -.1573 * (-1.8022) (-1.8149) SCOP E(1, 2) -.1846.0009 (-.9554) (.0046) SCOP E(1, 3).4563 ***.2944 *** (6.1832) (3.8058) SCOP E(2, 3) -.5744 *** -.4265 *** (-3.7478) (-2.7959) *** 1% ** 5% * 10%. R 1 + R 2 ++ Scale SCOP E(i, j) ( ) t 3.4 8: 3. 2 3 1 2 ING 17 4 3 3 8 17 ING (1) ING 1991 MNB 1988 1997 2001 ING 1992 2.5% 12% 5 1997 40
4 2 3 (2003) Group of Ten(2000) [1] Baumol, William, John Panzar and Robert Willig, Contestable markets and the theor of industr structure, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1982. [2] Berger, Allen N., Gerald A. Hanweck and David B. Humphre, Competitive Viabilit in Banking Scale, Scope, and Product Mix Economies, Journal of Manetar Economics 20, 501-520, 1987. [3] Group of Ten, Report on consolidation in the Financial Sector, 2001. [4] Herring, Richard J. and Anthon M. Santomero, The Role of the Financial Sector in Economic Performance, Working Papers 95-08., Wharton School, Universit of Pennslvania, 1995. [5] Laurence, Pulle, B., Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphre, Do Consumers Pa for One-Stop Banking? Evidence from Non-Standard Revenue Function, Working Paper, Financial Institutions Center, The Wharton School, Universit of Pennslvania, 94-01, 1994. [6] Panzar, Joun C. and Robert D. Willig, Economics of Scope, American Economic Review 71, 268-272. 1981. [7] Economies of Scope 5 3 1986. [8] June-1993 1993. [9] 1981-1988 November-1991 1991. [10] No.28 2003 9. 41
[11] 1992 6. [12] Vol.9 2003. [13] 26 1999 12. 42