04M3070 1953 28 1957 32 1958 33 1988 63 1989 2002 14 2003 15-1-
2001-2-
50-3-
2001 2000 12 2,693 1995 2,557 2004 1.29 WHO 2.08 1970 1) 14 2006 18 2,774 2000 10 50 59 60 10 10 19 2) 1987 62 1988 63 1 15 49 2 2001 2000 50 59 1,918 10 19 1,403-4-
1991 92 1991-5-
-6-
1957 back tax theorie -7-
3) 1995 1996 4) 5) 6) 3) 1957 14 4) 1995 7 1999 26 5) 1995 7 6) 1996 17-8-
1995 7) 9) 8) 7) 1995 51 8) 1995 146 9) 2002 61-9-
10) 2001 11) 1995 12) 2002 13) 14) 1996 15) 1995 10) 1996 17 11) 2001 84 12) 1995 51 13) 2002 62 14) 2002 62 15) 1996 17-10-
16) 1995 17) 16) 1995 8 9 17) 1995 51-11-
20) 2001 22) 23) 1995 18) 19) 21) 18) 2002 62 19) 2002 62 20) 2002 2002 62 21) 2001 86 22) 1995 22 23) 1995 45-12-
14 24) 25) 2002 26) 1983 27) 28) 1995 2001 29) 30) 24) 14 25) 1995 51 26) 2002 62 27) 1983 16 28) 1985 149 150 29) 1995 146 30) 34-13-
1982 31) 32) 33) 1958 31) 1982 171 32) 2001 86 33) 2001 91-14-
Accidental Bequest Motive Model Yaari 1965 Abel 1985 Ando andmodigliani 1963 Altruistic Bequest Motive Model Blinder 1973 Ishikawa 1974 Becker 1981-15-
U β 1 1 = u C1, C2 ) ( + βu U 2 C,C 1 2 U 2 Joy of Giving Model Andreoni 1989 34) U = u( C, b) U C b 34) 2002 112-16-
Strategic Bequest Motive Model Bernheim, Schleifer and Summers 1985 Cox 1987 1994 Cox 1987 1990 Cox 1987 Horioka 2001 1994 Wilhelm 1996-17-
Altonji, Hayashi and Kotlikoff 1997 Jones and Manuelli 1990 1993 2001-18-
1905 38 1945 20 GHQ GHQ 1949 24 5 10 9 15 1950 25 1949 35) 35) 1949 143-19-
Accession Tax 1949 36) 10 60 19 25 90 14 1949 1999 37) 36) 1949 144 145 37) 1949 149-20-
38) 500 0.5 18 1950 25 1952 27 1983 1948 23 10 1950 25 39) 38) 1999 19 39) 1983 210-21-
1953 28 1957 32 1951 26 1955 30 1953 28 1958 33 1988 63 1953 28 1958 33-22-
1958 33 1957 41) 42) 1999 40) 40) 41) 1957 42) 886 887 889 890 900 901 907 1958 33 1989 1989 128 129 1988 63 27-23-
43) 1964 39 200 250 1966 41 200 160 46) 47) 1975 50 600 45) 44) 4,000 1966 41 43) 1999 20 44) 21 45) 21 46) 1968 23 47) 400 840-24-
48) 20 1958 33 1980 55 49) 1983 58 50) 1987 62 1988 63 48) 70 49) 51 50) 1983 1983 177-25-
1988 63 1975 50 1975 2000 100 81.0 14,593 2.1 1980 1987 99.2 1975 1.2 1987 59,008 7.9 1975 1986 51) 2,000 4,000 400 800 14 13 75 70 51) 1986 75-26-
4,000 8,000 1988 36,468 4.6 2000 100 52) 1958 33 30 52) -27-
1958 33-28-
1980 55 1989 2002 14 1988 63 1991 1991 56,554 6.8 1992 1988 63 4,000 4,800 800 950 10 400 70 10 700 70 10 1991 1992 54,449 6.4 1991-29-
53 1994 4,800 5,000 950 1,000 10 700 70 10 10 800 70 20 1992 8,000 6,000 2001 13 60 110 54 53 1990 1991 1992 4.4 1985 1989 1990 6.0 1990 1992 0.3 1998 10 1980 54 21-30-
1975 50 55 330 400 56 200 240 1992 1994 3,200 8,000 2001 13 60 110 55 2002 13 56 69-31-
2003 15 2003 15 70 70 13 50 50 58) 2,500 20 59) 57) 57 16 21 58 2003 11 59 21 18-32-
65 20 60) 2005 61) 65 3,500 2,500 2003 62) 2005 60 61 70 62 2003 11-33-
50 1994 2002 50 8,000 6,000 12.5 15 80 2001 13 330 400 200 240 1983 58-34-
-35-
1970 1970 1979 10 65 1980 1980 1989 10 10 1986 1987 1,041 1,312 126 110 30.9 1980 1981 65.4 34.6 1990 1990 1,756 1990 1999 10 27.2 100 2000 2002 1,298 54 1,107 46-36-
-37-
1989 1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 1989 1994 1999 1989 1994 1999 1994 25 1989 1994 1999-38-
1989 1994 1999 1999 3,398 6,129 1.8 1994 613 1999 547 10.8 1994 1,307 1999 1,510 15.5 1994 2.1 1999 2.8 1994 3,557 1999 2,852 19.8 1994 6,435 1999 4,619 28.2 1994 10 2.8 1.8 30 1994 590 1999 582 1.4 1994 795 1999 687 13.6 22-39-
1994 1999 63) 1994 1999 63 1989-40-
69.4 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 1989 770 11,447 15 1999 1,001 6,119 1984 505 6,585 13 1999 1,135 3,275 2002 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999-41-
1979 1984 1989 1994 1999-42-
1994 1999 1994 71 1999 66 1994 1999 1999 64) 23.3 1994 1999 1994 1999 1994 1999 64-43-
1994 1999 1989 1994 1999-44-
1989 1994 1999 1994 30 1,322 70 9,260 1999 30 1,036 70 6,947 6.7 1994 1999 20-45-
40 30 138.7 40 50 70 11.5 15 60 29.7 70 34.0 20 60 32.5 70 36.5 30 30 0.5 1.5 40 60 70 10 1989 1994 1999 65) 65 1989-46-
1989 1994 1999 1999 1991 1994 1999-47-
1999 89 99 10 Kotlikoff and Summers 1981 Modigliani 1988 1991 1991 36 Kotlikoff and Summers 1981 1991-48-
1935 1940 1945 1950 22 50 1957 32 2000 12 24 25 29 30 34 22 27 32 66) 1993 66 1995 1995 1994 1991-49-
1994 300 1935 30 1950 330 1935 50 1,500 1950 3,250 1935-50-
1940 1945-51-
1950 50 50 50 50 50 50 67) 67 50 1995 67 1945 50 1950 45 50-52-
1966 41 2000 12 68) 1940 1991 1940 69) 1935 1945 50 1950 68 1954 1966 1935 1940 31 26 69 1991 11-53-
-54-
70) 2003 15 70 50 20 40 1 7,281 3,780 9,000 1993 5.4 2002 3.3 1990 70-55-
1 2002 1996 1997 2 3 130 215 72 21 1985 1989 OECD, RevenueStatistics -56-
unified credit 1993 71) 72) 71 inheritance tax estate tax federal estate tax inheritance tax 72 1993 92-57-
GSTT generation-skipping transfer tax 1976 federal unified transfer tax system 2000 308 estate executer IRS internal revenue service -58-
73) taxable estate gross estate deduction marital deduction 2001 18 55 300 17 1977 2001 74) 1977 2001 73 2032 a 74 1976 l977 1977-59-
2001 34 5,800 2001 2001 1993 94 2001 AICPATaxDivision 2001 17-60-
2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 2010 75) 2001 2009 350 2009 45 2010 76) 1,000 4 15 75 2001 2010 10 3,500 1999 2000 2001 76 2010 2010 2011 2002 2011-61-
1932 1993 94 2001 2010-62-
2001 2002 100 2009 45 2010 100 35 1,000 77) 100 77 18-63-
78) carry-over basis Y 78 C Y = C + W W -64-
2004 79) carry-over basis step-up in basis 79 2004 29-65-
2004 80) step-up in basis 80 2004 29-66-
carry-over basis -67-
2003 15 1950 25 1953 28-68-
IHT inheritance tax estate tax 81) personal representation open market value 81 Foreman 2001 2004-69-
50 100 2003 25 5,000 2000 2001 23 4,000 2001 2002 24 2,000 2002 2003 25 40 40 32 chargeable transfer exempt transfer CLT chargeable lifetime transfers PET potentially exempttransfers 20-70-
40 40 3,000 250 40 20-71-
2003 15 40 1980-72-
2006 18-73-
2003b 82) 2001 38 82 2003b 16-74-
46,000 760 12 13 2003b 83) 2003a 84) 83 2003b 17 84 2003a 63-75-
2003a 62-76-
-77-
1995 2000 1996 2001 1995 2000 40 40 1995 2000 1996 2001 1999-78-
1999 1999 40 5,857 5,857 2000 17,822 2000 508,125 1.2-79-
2000 14 2005 85) 2005 17 2050 62 85 2045 40 44 2050 40 44 45 49 2005 14 2040 30 34 35 39 2040 2045 2045 2050-80-
2005 17 2040 177 2,000 2005 55 59 2040 90 2005 5,000 2040 2,000-81-
12.5 50 1993 Jones and Manuelli 1990 1993 2001 2005 5,000 2040 2,000-82-
-83-
1996 1982 22 1 4 pp.151 176 1993 pp.156 173 1985 40 4 pp.146 152 2001 30 pp.57 97 2004 56 pp.21 43 2002 65 pp.108 125 1994 30 2 pp.62 74 2003a ESP 453 pp.61 63 2003b 2170 pp.16 19 2002 49 pp.59 78 1993 110 pp.73 133 1949 General Headquarters Supreme CommanderfortheAlliedPowers 1983 1999 87 pp.18 23-84-
2004 56 pp.103 154 1983 38 9 pp.14 20 1995 1991 32 pp.1 13 2001 pp.119 144 1989 1995 23 pp.45 66 1995 23 pp.1 24 1999 54 10 pp.26 32 Abel, A. 1985, PrecautionarySaving and AccidentalBequests, AmericanEconomic Review, Vol.75, pp.777 791. AICPA TaxDivision 2001, Study on Reform of the Estate andgifttaxsystem. Altonji, j., F. Hayashi, and L. Kotlikoff 1997 Parental Altruism and Inter Vivos Transfer: TheoryandEvidence, Journal ofpolitical Economy,Vol.105, pp.1121 1166. Ando A. and F.Modigliani 1963, The Life Cycle Hypothesis of Saving: Aggregate Implications and Tests, AmericanEconomic Review,Vol.53, 2, pp.55 84. Andreoni, J. 1989, Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence, Journal ofpolitical Economy,Vol.97, pp.1447 1458. Becker, G. S. 1981, ATreaties on the Family,HarvardUniv. Bernheim, D., A, Schleifer,andL.Summers 1985, The Strategic Bequest Motive, Journal of PoliticalEconomy,Vol.93, pp.899 972. Blinder, A. S. 1973, A Model of Inherited Wealth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, -85-
Vol.87, pp.608 626. Cox, D. 1987, Motive for Private Income Transfer, Journal of Political Economy,Vol.95. Foreman, A. 2001, Tax Handbook,Allied Dunbar. Horioka,C. 2001, AreJapanese Selfish, Altruistic, or Dynastic, NBER WorkingPaper, 8577, pp.26 54. Ishikawa. T. 1974, Imperfection in the Capital Market and the Institutional Arrangement of Inheritance, Review of Economic Studies,Vol.41, pp.383 404. Jones, L. E. and R. E. Manuelli. 1990, Finite lifetimes and growth, NBER Working Paper, 3469, pp.1 43. Kotlikoff, L. J. and L. H. Summers 1981, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, Journal of Political Economy, Vol.89, 4, pp.706 732. Modigliani, F. 1988, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Saving in the Accumulation of Wealth, Journal ofeconomic Perspectives,Vol.2, No.2, pp.15 40. Wilhelm, M. O. 1996, Bequest behavior and the effect of heirs earnings: testing the altruistic model of bequests, American Economic Review,Vol.86, pp.874 892. Yaari, M. 1965, Uncertain Lifetime, Life Insurance, and the Theory of the Consumer, Review ofeconomic Studies,Vol.32, pp.137 150. -86-
1983 58 14 1957 1968 1983 58 1986 2000 2002 14 2003 15 OECD, RevenueStatistics -87-
50 50 12 86) 50 1990 1940 50 1990 50 86 12-88-
1990 1940 50 1990 50 50 1990 1940 50 50 1990 50 67 1991-89-
1994 1991 50 50 50 1940 50 1990 1940 1990-90-
-91-
-92-
-93-
-94-
-95-