(1999 4 ) 0038 ( ) (Old Industrial Organization Theory) (Harvard School) (Chicago School) 1 (1995) 1
2 1930 (EHChamberlin) (ESMason) 50 60 (JSBain) (RECaves) (CKaysen) (DFTurner) (FMScherer) (1) - (2) (1) (Structure) (2) (Conduct) (3) (Performance) (S) ( ) (P) - ( ) ( ) (1) (2) (GJStigler) (HDemsetz) (YBrozen) (ADirector) (RPozner) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (Foreclosure) (2) 1957-1962 - 1968 1969 1972 1974 1970 (1) (2) 1981 (RReagan) 2 (1) (2) (3) (4) 1982 1970 (New Industrial Organization Theory) (1) 3
(2) (Martin 1993) (Contestability Theory) (Strategic Limit-Pricing Theory) 3 (1) (2) (3) (4) (Boumol, Panzar and Willig 1982) (Contestable Market) 4 4
5 (1) (2) (1) (2) (TSchelling) 5 (1) (2) (3) (Stiglitz 1987)
(1) (2) (1) (2) (Spence 1977) (First-mover Advantage) (Excess Capacity) (1) (2) (3) (Schmalensee 1988) 1990 (BClinton) (Post-Chicago School) (It s time to revise the vertical merger guidelines) (Willcox 1995, Riordan and Salop 1995) (Schmalensee 1982) (1) 6
(Positive Analysis) (2) (Normative Analysis) (1) (2) (1) (2) 20 (Network Economics) 1996 (NEconomides) (International Journal of Industrial Organization) (1998) 6 6 (1) 7
a (Star Network) A B A S AS SB b (Local and Long Distance Network) S A S B (Local Switch) (1) (ex A 1 S A A i B 1 S B B j ) (2) (ex A i S A S B B j ) 7 (Economides 1996) (Network Externality) 1950 (HLeibenstein) (Bandwagon Effect) 70 (JRohlfs) 80 (MKatz and CShapiro) (JFarrell and GSaloner) a (n) (2) (3) (4) 7 a b A i B j A i B j (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 8
( n P 2 ) 1 2 3 4 5 6 n n+1 0 2 6 12 20 30 n(n-1) n(n+1) 2 4 6 8 10 2n (1) (2) (Compatibility) Windows Macintosh (Excess Inertia) (Predatory Pricing) (Excess Momentum) (Bottleneck Monopoly) b B j a b (Katz and Shapiro 1994) 9
A i c (Equal Footing) (Access Charge) (Stand Alone Cost) (Incremental Cost) (Universal Service) (1) (2) 10
(Economics of Complexity) (Path Dependency) (Stigler 1968 p1) ( 1993 p18) 11
[1] (1997) [2] (1995) 463: 57-110 [3] (1993) [4] (1995) [5] (1996) [6] (1994) [7] (1995) [8] (1998) [9] (1998) [10]Baumol, WJ, JC Panzar and RD Willig (1982), Contestable Markets and the Theory of Industrial Structure, Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich [11]Economides, N (1996), The Economics of Networks, International Journal of Industrial Organization 14: 673-699 [12]Katz, ML and C Shapiro (1994), Systems Competition and Network Effects, Journal of Economic Perspectives 82: 93-115 Martin, S (1993), Advanced Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishers Inc [13]Riordan, MH and SC Salop (1995), Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A Post-Chicago Approach, The Antitrust Journal 63: 513-568 [14]Schmalensee, R (1982), Antitrust and the New Industrial Economics, The American Economic Review 722: 24-28 [15]Schmalensee, R (1988), Industrial Economics: An Overview, The Economic Journal 98: 643-681 [16]Schmalensee, R and R Willig (1989), Handbook of Industrial Organization, North- Holland [17]Schmidt, ILO and JB Rittaler (1988), A Critical Evaluation of the Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers [18]Shy, O (1995), Industrial Organization: Theory and Applications, The MIT Press [19]Spence, M (1977), Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing, Bell Journal of Economics 8: 534-544 [20]Stigler, JE (1968), The Organization of Industry, New York: Richard D Irwin ( (1975) ) [21]Stiglitz, J (1987), Technological Changes, Sunk Costs, and Competition, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 3: 883-937 [22]Tirole, J (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, The MIT Press [23]Willcox, TC (1995), Behavioral Remedies in a Post-Chicago World: It s Time to Revise the Vertical Merger Guidelines, The Antitrust Bulletin Spring: 227-256 12
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a b 1 2 A 1 2 a b c 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 14