One for all, all for one.
One for all, all for one. ( One for all, all for one. ) One for all, all for one. ( One for all, all for one. ) One for all, all for one. Manes, A. (1877~1963) [2006] p. 37 Raiffisen [1992] (p. 65~66) [2003]
(cross subsidization) [1991] p. 224 [2006] p. 8Manes n P r Z np = rz P = (r/n) Z = wz [2006] p. 37~38 [2003] (p. 112) [2003]
[2006] [2007] CRD CRD (pp. 112~113) [1993] (pp. 6~9) [1993] JA pp. 19~20 building society
CRD (insurance) (pool) (share) [2006] p. 15 [2007] pp. 177~178 [1992] (p. 66)
Sandler and Tschirhart [1980] (p. 1513) Buchanan [1965] [1971] Tiebout [1956] Pigou Knight, F. (Sandler and Tschirhart [1980] p. 1481) Sandler and Tschirhart [1980] mutual benefit voluntary group (p.1482) [1988] pp. 190~191 207~ 216 [1999] pp. 100~103 [2005] pp. 271~272 360~362 [2006] pp. 232~233
Sandler and Tschirhart [1980] (p. 1512) professional associations (p. 1513)
(congestion) [1988] (p. 191)
Ng [1973] Sandler and Tschirhart [1980] Sandler and Tschirhart [1980] p. 1497 Buchanan [1965] (p.7) Buchanan (p. 1) Hillman [1978] [2004] p. 78 Sandler and Tschirhart [1980] p. 1497
[2000] [2004] [2006] [2000] [2004] [2000] pp. 3, 14~15
(member bank) [2006] [1977] [1978] [1980] [1977] [1978] [2004] pp. 85~87 [2006] pp. 149~150 [1980] p. 185
[2000] [2000] [2006] [2007] CRD CRD
CRD [2006] [2007]
(2006) (2006)
A B C
CPU Caves et al. [1985] pp. 471~475. [2004] [2006] [2006] (Caves et al. [1985] p. 474) [1998]
Leibenstein Katz and Shapiro [1985] (p. 424) [1998] p. 39
[1999] pp. 195~196
[1997] [1999] [1993] p. 168 [1996] p. 4
! [2000 (a)] [1996] p. 4 (A) [1999. 6] p. 6
a) b) c) [1999] [2000 (a) (b)]
! [1999]
! [2000 (b)]
! [1999]
voice exit voice
(deposit) (share) credit union
reputation Fitchrating reputation
[1996] [1997] Baseman, K., Open Entry and Cross-Subsidization in Regulated Markets, in Fromm (ed.), Studies in Public Regulation, MIT Press, 1981. Buchanan, J. M., An Economic Theory of Clubs, Economica, Vol. 32 Isuue 125, Feb. 1965, pp. 1-14., The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Rand McNally, 1971. Caves, W., Chrisyensen, R. and Tretheway, W., Economies of Density versus Economies of Scale: Why Trunk and Local Service Airline Costs Differ?, Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 15 No. 4, Winter 1984, pp. 471-489. Cornes,R.andSandler,T.,The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods, 1986 (2nd edition 1996), Cambridge University Press. Faulhaber, G., Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises, American Economic Review, Vol. 65 No. 5, Dec 1975, pp. 966 977. Hillman, A., The Theory of Clubs: A Technological Formulation, in Sandmo, A. (ed.), Essays in Public Economics, Lexington, 1978., Public Finance and Public Policy: Responsibilities and Limitations of Government, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2003. Katz, L. and Shapiro, C., Network Externalities, Competition,and Compatibility, American Economic Review, Vol. 75 No. 3, June 1985, pp. 424-440. Laffont,J.andTirole,J.,A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation, MIT Press, 1993. Ng, Yew-Kwang, The Economic Theory of Clubs: Pareto Optimality Conditions, Economica, Vol. 40 Issue 159, Aug. 1973, pp. 291-198. Sandler, T. and Tschirhart, J., The Economic Theory of Clubs: An Evaluative Survey, Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 18 Issue 4, Dec. 1980, pp. 1481-1521. and, Club Theory: Thirty Years Later, Public Choice, Vol. 93 Nos. 3-4, 1997, pp. 335-355. Tiebout, C., A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 64 No. 5, Oct. 1956, pp. 416-424. RIETI Discussion Paper Series 06-J-041, pp. 161-191
pp. 221-254 No. 47 pp. 83-89 No. 51, 1978, pp. 78-84 pp. 185-190 REPORT pp. 13-20 (a) pp. 87-108 (b) REPORT pp. 19-24 REPORT pp. 21-26 pp. 39-58 pp. 141-171 pp. 41-50 pp. 2-7 pp pp. 1-39 pp. 67-111 pp. 47-68
pp. 141-157 pp. 75-95 pp. 219-249 CRD No. 27 CRD 2000-J-11 JR Vol. 7 No. 024 Spring, pp. 2-10 pp. 17-39 pp. 215-231 pp. 1-47 (A) Vol. 10 Summer (B) Vol. 10 Summer pp. 48-55 pp. 37-44 NTT pp. 3-16 pp. 119-141 pp. 313-323