2004 1 8 2005 12 17 1 (1) (Karlan, 2004) 2 3 4 5 E-mail: aa37065@mail.ecc.u-tokyo.ac.jp (1) (1973) (1978) (1991) (1991) 1
2 2 2.1 (, 1978, 7 ) (2) (1988) 38 2 (3) (4) (2) (1986) 91 (1996) 2 1 (1993) 1 (3) (1961) 4 (2000) 1 (1988) (4) (1961) 4 (1978) 3 4 (1981) 2
(5) 2.2 (6) (7) (, 1979, 201 ) (8) (1982) (, 1982, 220 ) (9) (1996, 2 1 ) (10) (5) (1993) (1961) 4 2 (1987) 1 2 3 2 (1984) (1985) (6) (1989) (7) (1969) (1979) 3 1 (1987) (8) (1990) (1988) (2004) (9) (1995) 1 1 (1988) (2004) (10) 14 1417 3
(1997, ) (1995) 178 (2004, 1 ) (1996) (, 1987, 1 ) (, 1987, 22-23 ) (11) (12) (, 1987, 1 ) (13) (14) (11) (1978) 89 (12) (1959) (1978) (1984) (1978) (13) (, 2003, 3 4 ) (1977) (1978) (14) (1979) 3 1 (1987) (1989) 4
(1989) (15) (, 1989, 44 ) (, 1995) 2.3 (1989) 5 6 (16) 1 2 3 (17) (18) (15) (1978) 4 25 (16) (1996) (1992, 1996) (17) (1989) 32 (1995) 14-15 (1994) 21-29 (18) (1989) 42 5
2.4 3 3 3 3.1 (19) s i x is α s x is y i y i = α s x is (19) (2004) 6
Y Y = s α s i x is y i Y (20) (1978, 92 ) Y δ t T = t(y δ) y s δ s T = t s (y s δ s ) i x is δ is T = t s (y is δ is )x is (21) (22) (, 1985, 20 ) T i y i δ i t T = t i (y i δ i ) (1985) δ i y i δ i = 0 (1979) (, 1979, 201 ) (1998, 7 ) (20) (1961) 4 2 (21) (, 1985, 20 ) (22) (1985) 7
3.2 (23) (24) 2 1 2 1649 (25) (, 1995, 218 ) 2 2 1 2 (, 1961, 133 ) (, 2002, 40 ) (, 2000, 42 ) (23) Innes (1990) Che (2002) (24) (2000) 1 2 (25) (1993) 49 8
1 2 (26) 3 3 3.3 Innes (1990) Theorem 1 2 (27) (1961, 4 ) 3.4 (28) (29) (26) (, 1995) (27) (2000) 1 47 32 (28) Morduch (1999a) Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) Ghatak and Guianne (1999) (2003) (29) (Morduch, 1999b) 9
5 (30) (Greif, 2002) (, 1979;, 2001, ) 2 2 1 (31) 2 (30) (2003) 9 Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch (2005) (31) Che (2002) liquidity effect 10
3 (, 2003, 6.5) 3.5 (32) 1 Che (2002) 1 (33) (34) Giné et al. (2005) 2 (, 1994, 77 ) (32) (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, ch.9) (33) (Hölmstrom, 1982) (34) 11
1 2 (35) 4 4.1 (1995) 219 221 (36) (37) (35) Che (2002) Proposition 4 Ghatak and Guianne (1999) (2003) 6.5 (36) (1964) 3 2 (1995) (, 2003, 92 ) (37) (1996) 2 1 98-99 12
(, 1950, 50-51 ) (38) (, 1993, 24 ) (, 1950, 125 ) 4.2 (39) (1996) 1 (40) (1996) (2000) 1 2 3 (41) (42) (38) (1950) 2 1, 4 4 (1936) (1938) (39) (40) (41) (1964) 1 4 (1995) (1996) 1 (42) (2000) 1 2 5 (1958) 2 13
(43) (, 1995, 233 ) (, 1996, 1 ) (44) (45) 4.3 2 (46) 2 (43) (1975) 5 (1996) 4 (44) (1964) 1 4 (1995) (45) (2003); (2003, 2004) (46) Rogerson (1985) 2 Ligon (1998) Townsend (1994) Townsend (1982) Thomas and Worrall (1990) Atkeson and Lucas (1992) Phelan (2000) Coate and Ravallion (1993) Ligon et al. (2002) 14
(, 1994;, 2000, ) 1 2 3 4.4 2 1 2 2 (47) (47) 1 2 2 15
5 2.3 5.1 2 3 1 2 3 3 (2000) (2000) 1 2 3 (1956) 178-179 16
2 (48) (, 1994, 5 ) (49) (50) (1994) 172 (1987) (, 1987, 125 ) 107 185 5.2 (48) (1991) 23 (1958) 114 (1976) 6 203 (1998) 1 (49) (1982) (1987) 1 2 3 2 (50) (1964) 1 4 (1995) (1996) 1 17
1 2 3 (51) 2.2 2 1 2 (52) 5.3 (2000) (, 2000, 63 ) 16 17 (51) (1997) (52) 18
(53) (54) (55) (56) (2002) (1958) (57) 20 1643 (, 1958, 95 ) (58) threat point (59) (53) (2000) 54 (54) (2000) 299 334 (55) (2003) (56) (1961, 4 ) (1982, 2 6 ) (57) (1961) 6 (58) (2002) 248 (59) (1958) 38-39 (2002) 276 20 1643 20 (2000) 20 4 1687 19
(60) (2000) 415 2 (61) (62) (1996) 5.4 2 (60) (1996) 3 4 (61) 1 2 (1982) 20 117 134 133-134 3 2 (62) (1996) 3 20
1 2.2 2 (1975, 5 ) (, 1975, 246 ) (63) 6 2 (63) (1996) 150 21
(1996, 5 ) (64) (1986) (1996) (1996, 5 ) (65) (66) (1986) ( ) (1982) (1958) ( ) (1982) 3 1959 Armendáriz de Aghion, Beatriz and Jonathan Morduch (2005) The Economics of Microfinance. MIT (64) (1996, 5 ) (2004) (2004, 3 3 ) (1993, 5 ) (65) (1996) (66) Carpenter and Seki (2004) Gugerty and Kremer (2002) NGO 22
Press. (1959) 28 1 9 2 Atkeson, Andrew and Robert E Lucas, Jr. (1992) On Efficient Distribution With Private Information. Review of Economic Studies. Vol. 59. No. 3. pp. 427 453. Bolton, Patrick and Mathias Dewatripont (2005) Contract theory. The MIT Press. Carpenter, Jeffrey and Erika Seki (2004) Do Social Preferences Increase Productivity? Field Experiemental evidence from fisherman in Toyama Bay. mimeo. Che, Yeon-Koo (2002) Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending. Contributions to Theoretical Economics. Vol. 2. No. 1.Article 3. Coate, Stephen and Martin Ravallion (1993) Reciprocity without commitment: Characterization and performance of informal insurance arrangements. Journal of Development Economics. Vol. 40. pp. 1 24. (1991) ( ) 1 9 32 (1997) (1997) (1979) (1993) (1975) (1956) (1978) Ghatak, Maitreesh and Timothy W. Guianne (1999) The economics of lending with joint liability; theory and practice. Journal of Development Economics. Vol. 60. pp. 195 228. Giné, Xavier, Pamela Jakiela, Dean Karlan, and Jonathan Morduch (2005) Microfinance Games. mimeo. Greif, Avner (2002) Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics. Vol. 158. No. 1. pp. 168 204. Gugerty, Mary Kay and Michael Kremer (2002) The creation and transformaion of social capital. In Christiaan Grootaert and Thierry van Bastelaer. eds. The Role of Social Capital in Development: An Empirical Assessment. Cambridge University Press.. (2002) ( ) 278 290 (2003) 774 8 14 (2004) ( ) (1973) 2003 (1988) 17-18 ( ) 1 17-18 23
Hölmstrom, Bengt (1982) Moral Hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics. Vol. 13. pp. 324 340. (2001) 645 35 49 (1995) (1988) ( ) 6 (2004) ( ) 5 (1998) Innes, Robert D. (1990) Limited Liability and Incentive Contracting with Ex-ante Action Choices. Journal of Economic Theory. Vol. 52. No. 1. pp. 45 67. (1978) 19 34 43 (1995) ( ) 6 (2003) (1988) ( ) 1 17-18 (2000) Karlan, Dean S. (2004) Social Captial and Group Banking. BREAD Working Papar No. 062. (1996) (1979) (2000) (2003) (2003) 15 17 781 59 68 (2003) Ligon, Ethan, Jonathan P. Thomas, and Tim Worrall (2002) Informal Insurance Arrangements with Limited Commitment: Theory and Evidence from Village Economies. Review of Economic Studies. Vol. 69. pp. 209 244. Ligon, Ethan (1998) Risk Sharing and Information in Village Economies. Review of Economic Studies. Vol. 65. No. 4. pp. 847 864. (1950) (2004) (1990) 488 2 20 (1995) (1987) (1993) Morduch, Jonathan (1999a) The Microfinance Promise. Journal of Economic Literature. Vol. 37. No. 4. pp. 1569 1614. Morduch, Jonathan (1999b) The role of subsidies in microfinance: evidence from the Grameen Bank. Journal of Development Economics. Vol. 60. pp. 229 248. (1993) 24
(1964) (1938) (1961) (1976) (1994) (1996) (2002) ( ) 2 Phelan, Christopher (2000) On the Long Run Implications of Repeated Moral Hazard. Journal of Economic Theory. Vol. 79. No. 2. pp. 174 191. Rogerson, William P. (1985) Repeated Moral Hazard. Econometrica. Vol. 53. No. 1. pp. 69 76. (1989) (1985) 548 (1989) 475 42 60 (1996) (1958) ( ) 3 (1969) (1977) 18 1 24 2 24 43 (1987) (1994) (2003) 774 25 28 (2004) 40 (1978) 196 1 27 197 1979 (1989) ( ) (1991) ( ) 3 6 (1986) (1936) (1978) 25 2 52 86 (1964) Thomas, Jonathan and Tim Worrall (1990) Income Fluctuation and Asymmetric Information: An Example of a Repeated Principal-Agent Problem. Journal of Economic Theory. Vol. 51. No. 2. pp. 367 390. Townsend, Robert M. (1982) Optimal Multiperiod Contracts and the Gain from Enduring Relationships under Private Information. Journal of Political Economy. Vol. 90. No. 6. pp. 1166 1186. Townsend, Robert M. (1994) Risk and Insurance in Village India. Econometrica. Vol. 62. No. 3. pp. 25
539 591. (1995) ( ) 1 (1981) (1984) 105 (1994) (1995) ( ) 183 199 (1998) (2002) ( ) 3 (2004) ( ) 5 (2000) (1996) 37 3 31 53 (1992) 18 419 448 (1996) ( ) 26