社会学部紀要　１２０号☆／１７．清水

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1 March Kelley & Thibaut Kohlberg 1976 Haidt 2012 Haidt Haidt Haidt 3 Haidt Barash 2007 Haidt

2 Diamond, 1997 Hadit Haidt Aunger, 2000 Richerson & Boyd 2005 Tomasello 1999 Haidt 2012 Aoki, 2000 Aoki 2000 Heath 2008 Gintis

3 March 2015 Kelley & Thibaut Kelley & Thibaut Prisoner s Dilemma Game : PDG 1 A B Grand Means : GM Self Control : SCPartner s Control : PC Joint Control : JCKelley, et al SC PC JC 1 A SC A SC 2 2 PC JC PD SC 2 PC 4 SC SC 2 PC GM SC

4 PC JC 4 GM 3 GM SC PC JC Kelley Evolutionary Stable Strategy ; ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS ESS 1

5 March A not A A Roth & Erev SC PC JC SC 0 Appendix E [!x i ]%x i (1!x i )(!JC$SC$2JCx)"k x i i SC x x i k Appendix x%0 1 (JC!SC )"2JC (JC!SC )"2JC 0 1 SC 0 "JC"#"SC" JC SC x JC#SC x%0 1!JC#SC (JC!SC )"2JC "JC"!"SC" SC#0 x%1 x% x%1 ("JC"!"SC") x%0 1 (JC#SC ) (JC!SC )"2JC (!JC#SC ) 3 SC JC PC PC u u%(gm$(2x!1)(pc$sc$jc (2x!1))"2 PC GM 3 3 SC JC SC ("JC"!"SC")SC JC JC JC (JC#SC ) SC JC JC JC (!JC#SC ) 3 SC!PC#SC x=0 JC PC JC

6 JC JC JC x=0 1 x=1 x=0 JC JC JC fight or flight ESS Aumann, 1987 JC 3 3 Kelley 1979 SC!PC"SC JC Kelley 1979 JC JC JC SC!PC!SC 3

7 March Axelrod 1984Tit For Tat : TFT TFT Nowak,

8 120 3 Aoki 2000 Jacobs Jacobs 3

9 March Nowak, 1998 ; Takahashi & Mashima, 2006 Yamagishi & Kiyonari A B A B

10 120 B A B B Diamond, TFT

11 March 2015 Luhmann Diamond 1997 Kameda, Takezawa, & Hastie 2003 Diamond 1997 Luhmann Smith 1970 Smith Haidt 2012 Smith

12 N 2011 Haidt

13 March Haidt 2012 Kohlberg

14 120 Appendix SC A B AA (SC"PC"JC"GM )#2 AB (SC!PC!JC"GM )#2 BA (!SC"PC!JC"GM )#2 BB (!SC!PC"JC"GM )#2 1 Roth & Erev 1995 i A P i a B P i b i t A x i x i (t )#P i a(t )#(P i a(t )"P i b (t )) 2 t i A P i (t ) P i (t"1)#(1!!)p i (t )"R i (t ) 3! R i (t ) t i )#!#1 i A t"1 t!x i P i (t (P i a(t )"P i b (t ))!x i#x i (t"1)!x i (t ) #Pa(t"1)#P (t"1)!x i (t ) =((1!x(t ))Pa(t"1)!x i (t )P i b (t"1))#p i (t"1) 4 2 P i a(t )#x i (t )P i (t ) P i b (t )#(1!x i (t )) P i (t ) 4 ((1!x(t ))Pa(t"1)!x i (t )P i b (t"1)) #R i a!x(t )(R i a"r i b ) 5!x i#(r i a!x(t )(R i a"r i b )#P i (t"1) 6 x x i A x i A B P i a(t ) P i b (t ) R i a R i b x i x R i a AA R i b#0 x i (1!x) R i a AB R i b#0 (1!x i )x R i a#0 R i b BA (1!x i )(1!x) R i a#0 R i b BB 7 6 7!x i x ix (1!x i ) AA/(P i a(t ) AA x i (1!x) (1!x i ) AB/(P i a(t ) AB (1!x i )x!x i BA/(P i b (t ) BA (1!x i )(1!x)!x i BB/(P i b (t ) BB 8 P i a P i b 2008 k!x i E [!x i ] E [!x i ] #x i x(1!x i ) AA"x i (1!x)(1!x i ) AB!(1!x i )xx i BA!(1!x i )(1!x)x i BB #x i (1!x i )(x AA"(1!x) AB!x BA!(1!x) BB SC PC JC GM E [!x i ]#x i (1!x i )(!JC"SC"2JCx)#k 10 x i x#0"1"(jc!sc )#2JC 3 x i x Aoki, M Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis. MIR Press. Aumann, R. J Correlated equilibrium as an expression of bayesian rationality. Econometrica, 55, Aunger, R. ed Darwinizing culture : the status of memetics as a science. Oxford University Press. Axelrod, R The Evolution of Cooperation, Basic Books. Barash, D. P Evolution and Group Selection. Comment on The new synthesis in moral psychology. Science, 317, Diamond, J Guns, Germs, and Steel : The Fates ofhumansocieties.w.w.norton&co. Gintis, H The Bounds of Reason : Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences. Princeton University Press.H NTT Haidt, J The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail :

15 March 2015 A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgement. Psychological Review 108, Haidt, J The Righteous Mind : Why Good People Are Divided by Politics and Religion. Pantheon. Heath, J Following the Rules : Practical Reasoning and Deontic Constraint Oxford University Press. J NTT Jacobs, J Systems of survival : a dialogue on the moral foundations of commerce and politics, Random House.J Kameda, T., Takezawa, M., & Hastie, R The logic of social sharing : An evolutionary game analysis of adaptive norm development. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7, Kelley, H. H Personal relationships : The structure and processes. Lawrence Erlbaum Association, Inc. H. H. Kelley, H. H., Holmes, J. G., Kerr, N. L., Reis, H. T., Rusbult, C. E., & Van Lange, P. A An atlas of interpersonal situations. New York : Cambridge. Kelley, H. H. & Thibaut, J. H Interpersonal relations : A theory of interdependence. Wileyinterscience. H. H.J. H Kohlberg, L Moral stages and moralization : The cognitive-developmental approach. Lickona, T ed. Moral Development and Behavior : Theory, Research and Social Issues. Holt, NY : Rinehart and Winston. Luhmann, N Macht. Ferdinand Enke Verlag. N Luhmann, N Soziale Systeme. Grundrib einer allgemeinen Theorie. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main Nowak, M. A. & Sigmund, K Evolution of indirect reciprocity byimage scoring, Nature, 393, Richerson, P. J. & Boyd, R Not by Genes Alone : How Culture Transformed Human Evolution. Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago. Roth,A.E.&Erev,I Learning in extensive-form games : Experimental data and simple dyanamic models in the intermediate term, Games and Economic Behavior, 8, Smith, A The Theory of Moral Sentiments. A , Takahashi, N. & Mashima, R The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 243, Tomasello, M The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press M Yamagishi, T. & Kiyonari, T The group as the container of generalized reciprocity. Social Psychology Quarterly,

16 120 A Theoretical Approach to the Origin of Morality: The Dynamic Interdependence Theory and Institutional Analysis ABSTRACT This article discusses the origin of morality on the basis of dynamic interdependence theory and institutional analysis. The moral foundation theory explains the origin of morality through a multilevel selection theory, a genetic evolutionary approach taking both individual and group selection into consideration. However, this theory, similar to other cultural evolutionary theories, has certain limitations in explaining how injunctive morality arose in social groups. Therefore, we offer an institutional evolutionary explanation of the origin of morality, which is based on dynamic interdependence theory and comparative institutional analysis. This approach gives us certain important advantages in discussing the origin of morality. First, three fundamental patterns of interdependence are identified on the basis of the dynamic interdependence theory. Then, transformation methods of outcome matrices corresponding to the patterns of interdependence are developed. Next, institutional analysis allows us to describe how social institutions operate with these transformation methods. These theoretical components indicate that social institutions (authority, indirect reciprocity, and traditional religion, among others) constructed an environment producing selection pressure on morality. Finally, we discuss how injunctive morality as an emotion functions in social groups. Key Words: the origin of morality, institutions, dynamic interdependence theory

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<30355F8E9197BF5F8B76967B8E812E696E6464> Network programming with Visual Basic and its application to social psychology Creating of network games to understand social dilemmas Hiroyuki HISAMOTO Abstract It was explained that the basic method

社会学部紀要 １２０号☆／１７．清水

社会学部紀要　１２０号☆／１７．清水