電力市場設計の経済学：メモ

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1 (p.11, Chapter 1-1, Stoft (2002)) - (p.12, Chapter 1-1, Stoft (2002)) (1) IT (2)

2 real power flow reactive power flow 1 Stoft (2002), Figure voltage collapse 2 2

3 Stoft (2002), Figure VOLL, Value of Lost Load Stoft Demand-Side Flaw 1 Stoft Demand-Side Flaw 2-3

4 system operation $20 $30/MW Stoft, p.292 p.245 in Stoft 2 100MW 200MW $20/MWh $30/MW $35/MWh $35/MWh 200MW 200MW 200MW 100MW p in Stoft $20/MWh $40/MWh 100MW 20,000MW 20,000MW 20,020MW 100MW 80MW 20,000MW 4

5 $20/MWh $20/MWh $2000/h $20/MWh $40/MWh $40/MWh $20/MWh decremental bid $19.90/MWh $20/MWh 3 TC $2000/h MC=$20/MWh MC=$20/MWh 20,000 MW side payments 5

6 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 1 6

7 - 4 7

8 5 load-duration curve 1 8

9 6 - (1) (2) (3) 7 p Q 9

10 8 p 4 d 3 d 1 d p 3 d p 2 p 1 Q LNG 1 Stoft, S., Power System Economics, (IEEE/Wiley), 2002, Chapter 1-3, Table

11 2 kwh 9 Severin Borenstein, James Bushnell and Frank Wolak, Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California s Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market, Center for the Study of Energy Markets (CSEM) Working Paper No.102, University of California Energy Institute. 11

12 9 NERC VOLL OpRes pricing VOLL VOLL system operator Value of Lost Load VOLL 16,000 MWh 10,000 MWh Stoft (2000), p $43 MWh 2 2 $3,122 MWh 70 VOLL 12

13 VOLL Stoft (2002) p $50,000 5 $10,000 MWh kwh VOLL VOLL VOLL VOLL VOLL Stoft (2002), pp $/MWh Operating-Reserve Pricing VOLL OpRes Operating Reserve 1 VOLL VOLL 3 5 OpRes 1 13

14 VOLL MW VOLL 150 MWh MW VOLL MWh Stoft (2002), pp VOLL OpRes (1) VOLL OpRes Stoft (2002), p.169. (2) VOLL VOLL 5 MW 47,600MW 2500MW 2400MW 100MW VOLL 100 MW 150 MWh 15,000 h 1.5 MWh 2500MW 3,750 h VOLL OpRes VOLL Stoft (2002), pp OpRes P cap 14

15 PJM $7.38 MWh VOLL OpRes Stoft (2002), p.187. OpRes VOLL Stoft (2002), Chapter 2-9 (1) 15

16 (2) (3) (1) (2) Stoft (2002), pp DA Day Ahead 16

17 2001 Stoft, p.205 ExchangePool 3 (1) (2) (3) 3 (1) 1 (2) (3) 17

18 3 2 3 Stoft, p.298 (1) (2) (3) (4) Harvey and Hogan (2000) - 3 MW 6 kwh 2 MW 5 kwh 8 kwh 3 MW 18

19 1 MW 1 MW 2 MW 5 1 MW MW 2 6 MW 5 2 MW MW 6 MW MW 5 MW 1 5 MW

20 6 1 kw 2 5 MW 8 MW kw MW PJM Stoft, pp

21 Redispatch 2000 MWh kwh 5 MW 1000 h 2 6 MW 8 kwh 5 2 h 8 MW 2 h 6 8 MW MW 6 2 h (1) (2) (3) 5 8 (4) Redispatch MW 1 6 MW 5 MW MW MW 8 8 Redispatch EC Proposal 2002/3, FERC Working Paper 2002/3/15 FERC Working Paper 2002/3/15 21

22 TCC Transmission Congestion Contract 100MW 100 ( P PA ) TCC B P P A B - reference bus or swing bus FERC Working Paper,

23 Newbery (2000) 23

24 (1) (2) (3) avoidable cost Newbery (2000) kwh kwh kwh kwh kwh kwh kwh Newbery (2001), (2002) 2 24

25 14 England and Wales Fig.3 Deconcentrating Generation in Newbery (2002). 15 Figure 4 Domestic pre-tax prices in Edinburgh, Scotland and London, England in Newbery (2002). Hogan MIT Joskow Joskow (2001) (1) 25

26 (2) (3) (4) Independent Transmission Company England and Wales Chandley and Hogan (2002) PJM (1) (2) (3)

27 Green and Newbery (1992) 5 (1) Green and Newbery (1992) Newbery (1998) S( p) NETA 1 Newbery (1998) Baldick and Hogan (2001) England and Wales

28 (2) Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) SCE PG&E 0.1 SCE PG&E 3 91% (3) conjectural variation Day, Hobbs and Pang (2002) conjectured variation conjectured supply function England and Wales (4) von der Fehr and Harbord (1993) 2 Green and Newbery Green and Newbery 28

29 Newbery (2002), p.18 ISO Wolak (2002) ISO Newbery (2002), p.20 Newbery (2002), p.20 Borenstein, Bushnell and Stoft (2000) 3,000MW 3,835MW 8,443MW 9,450MW 18,671MW 1 29

30 use it or lose it Joskow and Tirole (2000) use it or lose it use it or get paid for it use it or lose it use it or lose it Gilbert, Neuhoff and Newbery (2002) single-price auction pay-as-bid auction 30

31 16 Figure 6 Arbitrage profit on the German-Dutch Interconnector auction in Newbery (2002). Newbery (2002) Gilbert, Neuhoff and Newbery (2002) use it or lose it pay-as-bid Baldick, R. and W. Hogan, (2002), Capacity Constrained Supply Function Equilibrium Models of Electricity Markets: Stability, Non-decreasing Constraints, and Function Space Iterations, 31

32 PWP-089. A Power Working Paper - University of California Energy Institute's Program on Workable Energy Regulation. Borenstein, S. and J. Bushnell, (1999), An Empirical Analysis of the Potential for Market Power in California s Electricity Industry, Journal of Industrial Economics Borenstein, S., J. Bushnell and S. Stoft, (2000), The Competitive Effects of Transmission Capacity in a Deregulated Electricity Industry, Rand Journal of Economics 31, Chandley, J. D. and W. W. Hogan, (2002), Independent Transmission Companies in a Regional Transmission Organization, Center for Business and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. Day, C.J., B.F. Hobb and J-S Pang, (2002), Oligopolistic Competition in Power Networks: A Conjectured Supply Function Approach, PWP-090. A Power Working Paper - University of California Energy Institute's Program on Workable Energy Regulation. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, (2002), Working Paper on Standardized Transmission Service and Wholesale Electric Market Design. Gilbert, R.J., K. Neuhoff and D.M. Newbery, (2002), Mitigating Market Power in Electricity Networks, mimeo, Cambridge, Green, R.J. and D. Newbery, (1992), Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market, Journal of Political Economy 100, Harvey, S.M. and W. Hogan, (2000), Nodal and Zonal Congestion Management and the Exercise of Market Power, Center for Business and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. Harvey, S.M. and W. Hogan, (2002), Market Power and Market Simulations, Center for Business and Government, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. Joskow, P. L., (2001), Regional Transmission Organizations: Don t Settle for Nth Best (N >> 1), Presentation Joskow, P. L. and J. Tirole, (2000), Transmission Rights and Market Power on Electric Power Networks, Rand Journal of Economics 31, Newbery, D, (1998), Competition, contracts, and entry in the electricity spot market, Rand Journal of Economics 29, Newbery, D, (2000), Privatization, Restructuring, and Regulation of Network Utilities, The MIT Press. Newbery, D., (2001), Regulating Unbundled Network Utilities, Paper prepared for the European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland, 30 August Newbery, D., (2002), Mitigating market power in electricity networks, Paper prepared for the conference Towards a European Market of Electricity: What have we Learnt from Recent Lessons? Spot Market Design, Derivatives and Regulation organized by the SSPA Italian Advanced School of Public Administration on June 24-5,

33 Stoft, S., (2002), Power System Economics, IEEE Press, NJ. von der Fehr, N-H. and D. Harbord, (1993), Spot Market Competition in the UK Electricity Industry, Economic Journal 103, Wolak, F. A., (2001), Proposed Market Monitoring and Mitigation Plan for California Electricity Market, Market Surveillance Committee (MSC) of the California Independent System Operator (ISO). 33

IEEJ: PJM RTO Tradable Obligations System 2

IEEJ: PJM RTO Tradable Obligations System 2 27 27 IEEJ:2007 7 19 6 7 1 IEEJ:2007 7 PJM RTO Tradable Obligations System 2 IEEJ:2007 7 P ES P* P ED P* 3 IEEJ:2007 7 /1,000kWh 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 EEX Powernext Omel Pool GME APX Nord Pool Denmark West