中京大学経済学論叢 23 号 22 年 3 月 審査論文 Keywords: JEL Classication: L3, L22, L33 * 2373253 * Inoue, Kamijo, and Tomaru (29)Mukherjee and Suestrong (29) Long and Stähler (29)Gil-Molto, Poyago-Theotoky, and Zikos (2)Matsumura and Tomaru (2a) Matsumura and Tomaru (2b) - 29 -
DeFraja and Delbono (989) DeFraja and Delbono (989) Matsumura (998) 2 Matsumura (998) *2 Matsumura (998) Matsumura (998) Matsumura and Kanda (25) *2 Matsumura (998) Kamijo and Tomaru (28) Kamijo and Tomaru (28) Matsumura (998) - 3 -
非対称技術を持つ多数企業からなる混合寡占市場における部分民営化政策 Mills and Smith (996) R&D 26 5 685 6762534 53 7.5% 62% 2 2 HSBC 22.449.944.3 38.337. 84% 43% % = > - 3 -
2 3 2 4 2 ii [, ] 2 P = P(Q) = a Q Q i q(i) Q = q(i)di + q(2) c(i) Π(i) = (P(Q) c(i)) q(i) = (a Q c(i))q(i), () W = Q P(z)dz c(i)di c(2), - 32 -
非対称技術を持つ多数企業からなる混合寡占市場における部分民営化政策 2 Matsumura (998) V = α(s)w + ( α(s))π(2). (2) s 2 α(s) α() = α() = α (s) > s = 2 s = 2. i a > c(i) a 2. (i) c(i) c (i) > (ii) c(2) = c(k) k (, ) 2 2 s 2 s 2-33 -
s *3 3 3. 2 2 i Π(i) Π(i) = a Q q(i) c(i), q(i) q(i) q(i) =, V q(2) = a Q ( α(s))q(2) c(2), q(2) V q(2) =, a Q c(i), if Q a c(i), q(i) = R(i; Q) =, otherwise, a Q c(2), if Q a c(2), q(2) = R(2; Q, α(s)) = α(s), otherwise, *4 *3 Furusawa and Konishi (27) 定は全ての財の平均価格に影響がないものとして, 自社の財価格を決定することを考えている. *4 Okuguchi (973) Ohkawa, Okamura, Nakanishi, and Kiyono (25) - 34 -
非対称技術を持つ多数企業からなる混合寡占市場における部分民営化政策 Q α O a c() a c(k) α(s) Q a c() + (a Q) c(2) c(i)di, if Q a c(), α(s) α(s) R(Q, λ, α) = λ + (a Q) λ c(2) c(i)di, if Q = a c(λ) for λ [k, ), α(s) α(s) λ(a Q) λ c(i)di, if Q = a c(λ) for λ [, k),, otherwise. Q a c() /( α(s)) a c() < Q < a c(k) a c(k) < Q a c() Q Q c (a Q) + (a Q) = λ + α(s) c (a Q)(a Q) = λ a Q c (λ) <, a Q α(s) c (λ) <, Q > a c() R(Q, α(s)) R(Q,α(s)) = - 35 -
Q = R(Q,α(s)) Q (α(s)) Q α(s) α(s) Q < a c(k) Q > a c(k) α(s) a Q ( α(s))q(2) c(2) α(s) Q < a c(k) α(s) α(s) α(s) α(s) *5 α(s) Q < a c(k) R(Q,α(s)) 45 R(Q,α(s)) Q > a c() α(s) a (k + )c(2) k c(i)di a c(2) (k + ) c(2) k c(i)di + c(2) k + *5-36 -
非対称技術を持つ多数企業からなる混合寡占市場における部分民営化政策 *6 α(s) 3. a a > (k + )c(2) k c(i)di. λ λ = 45 R [, a c()] Q = a c() 45 R F(α(s)) = Q + (a Q) c(i)di c(2) α(s) α(s) = (a c()) + c() c(i)di c(2), α(s) α(s) = a 3 2α(s) α(s) c() + c(i)di + c(2) α(s). a < 3c() c(2) c(i)di α(s) [, ] α(s) (a c(), a c(k)) a 3c() c(2) c(i)di lim s F(α(s)) = lim s F(α(s)) F F(α(s)) = s [, ) F F(α(s)) = α(s) = F( α) = α = a 3c() + c(2) + c(i)di a c() +. c(i)di *6 Megginson and Netter (2)Zhang, Zhang and Zhao (2)Fries and Taci (25) Nishimori and Ogawa (22) Matsumura and Matsushima (24) - 37 -
F(α(s)) α α α (, a c()] α (a c(), a c(k)) Q (α(s)) λ (α(s)) (i)a < 3c() c(2) c(i)dia 3c() c(2) c(i)di α α Q (α(s)) = a c(λ (s)), a c(λ (α(s))) = R(Q (α(s)),α(s),λ (α(s))) (ii)a 3c() c(2) c(i)di α< α Q (α(s)) = 2 α(s) 3 2α(s) a α(s) c(i)di + 3 2α(s) α(s) c(2), λ (α(s))) =.. α [, α) ( α, ) Q (α(s)) < λ (α(s)) [] (ii) λ (α(s)) = Q (α(s)) Q (α(s)) = R(Q (α(s)),α(s),λ (α(s))) < Q (α(s)) < a c() Q (α(s)) = R/ α ( R/ Q) = c() c(2) ( α(s)) >. 2 2 + α(s) (i) 2 α c (λ ) Q (α(s)) ( R/ Q) c (λ ) λ = (α(s)) R/ α ( R/ λ) = a Q c(λ ) = Q (α(s)) = R/ α ( R/ Q) = c(λ (α(s))) c(2) ( α(s)) 2 + α(s) + >, λ (α(s)) R/ α c(λ (α(s))) c(2) λ (α(s)) = c (λ (α(s))) { ( R/ Q)} = () c (λ (α(s)))( α(s)) 2 + α(s) + λ (α(s)) <. - 38 -
非対称技術を持つ多数企業からなる混合寡占市場における部分民営化政策 α(s) 3.2 s α s α W(α) = Q (α) P(z)dz λ (α) c(i)q (i)di c(2)q (2). q (i) i q (2) α dq (i) dα dq (2) dα = Q (α) = c(λ (α)) c(2) ( α) 2 + α + <, (3) λ (α) = Q (α)( α) + c(λ (α)) c(2) = λ (α) (c(λ (α)) c(2)) ( α) 2 ( α) 2 + α + >, (4) λ (α). [] α (i) d W dα = P(Q )Q (α) c(λ )q (λ )λ (α) = P(Q )Q (α) = Q (α) c(λ ) + λ λ >, ( c(λ ) > c(2) λ ) λ c(i) dq (i) dα di c(2)dq (2) dα, c(i) dq (i) dα di c(2)dq (2) dα, ( q (λ ) = ) c(i)di c(2)λ, ( (3) (4)) - 39 -
(ii) d W dα = Q (α) P(Q ) + = Q (α) P(Q ) + c(i)di c(2), c(i)di c(k), >, ( k P(Q ) > c(k)) α Lahiri and Ono (988) Lahiri and Ono (988) d W dα = P(Q )Q (α) + k [c(2) c(i)] dq i (α) λ dα di + k [c(2) c(i)] dq i (α) dα di c(λ )q (λ )λ (α) 2 3 2 3 4 α α 2 3-4 -
非対称技術を持つ多数企業からなる混合寡占市場における部分民営化政策 2 2 k P(Q )Q (α) + [c(2) c(i)] dq i (α) dα di = Q (α) P(Q ) kλ c(2) + k c(i)di P(Q ) > c(2) α = 4 R&D R&D 2 R&D - 4 -
DeFraja, G., Delbono, F., (989) Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly, Oxford Economic Papers, vol.4, pp.32 3. Fries, S., Taci, A., (25) Cost Efficiency of Banks in Transition: Evidence from 289 Banks in 5 Post-communist Countries, Journal of Banking & Finance, vol.29, pp.55 8. Furusawa, T., Konishi, H., (27) Free Trade Networks, Journal of International Economics, vol.72, pp.3 335. Gil-Molto, M.J, Poyago-Theotoky, J., Zikos, V., (2) R&D Subsidies, Spillovers, and Privatization in Mixed Markets, forthcoming in Southern Economic Journal. Inoue, T., Kamijo, Y., Tomaru, Y., (29) Interregional Mixed Duopoly, Regional Science and Urban Economics, vol.39, pp.233 242. Kamijo, Y., Tomaru, Y., (28) An Endogenous Objective Function of a Partially Privatized Firm: A Nash Bargaining Approach, G-COE GLOPE II Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.5, Waseda University. Lahiri, S., Ono, Y., (988) Helping Minor Firms Reduces Welfare, Economic Journal, vol.98, pp.99 22. Long, N.V., Stähler, F., (29) Trade Policy and Mixed Enterprises, Canadian Journal of Economics, vol.42, pp.59 64. Matsumura, T., (998) Partial Privatization in Mixed Duopoly, Journal of Public Economics, vol.7, pp.473 483. Matsumura, T., Kanda, O., (25) Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets, Journal of Economics, vol.84, pp.27 48. Matsumura, T., Matsushima, N., (24) Endogenous Cost Differentials between Public and Private Enterprises: A Mixed Duopoly Approach, Economica, vol.7, pp.67 688. Matsumura, T., Tomaru, Y., (2a) Market Strucutre and Privatization Policy under International Competition, forthcoming in Japanese Economic Review. - 42 -
非対称技術を持つ多数企業からなる混合寡占市場における部分民営化政策 Matsumura, T., Tomaru, Y., (2b) Mixed Duopoly, Privatization and Subsidization with Excess Taxation Burden, forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Economics. Megginson, W., Netter, J., (2) From State to Market: A Survey of Empirical Studies on Privatization, Journal of Economic Literature, vol.39, pp.32 389. Mills, D.E., Smith, W., (996) It Pays to be Different: Endogenous Heterogeneity of Firms in an Oligopoly, International Journal of Industrial Organization, vol.4, pp.37 329. Mukherjee, A., Suestrong, K., (29) Privatization, Strategic Foreign Direct Investment and Host-country Welfare, European Economic Review, vol.53, pp.775 785. Nishimori, A., Ogawa, H., (22) Public Monopoly, Mixed Oligopoly and Productive Efficiency, Australian Economic Papers, vol.4, pp.85 9. Ohkawa, T., Okamura, M., Nakanishi, N., Kiyono, K., (25) The Market Selects the Wrong Firms in the Long Run, International Economic Review, vol.46, pp.43 65. Okuguchi, K., (973) Quasi-Competitiveness and Cournot Oligopoly, Review of Economic Studies, vol.4, pp.45 48. Zhang, A., Zhang, Y., Zhao, R., (2) Impact of Ownership and Competition on the Productivity of Chinese Enterprises, Journal of Comparative Economics, vol.29, pp.327 346. 2 年 月 2 日受理 22 年 月 日採択 - 43 -